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ABSTRACT 
Neo-liberal reforms are often met with widespread discontent in agrarian societies. This 
project examines a specific manifestation of the post-1990 Indian neo-liberal regime, the Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ), and its impact on marginal farmers.  The SEZ Act of 2005 encourages the 
establishment of single or multi-product export zones, each with a high minimum land 
requirement (12,500 acres for the latter).  The geographically isolated area is comparable to the 
export enclave or the industrial park, where developers of the SEZ are aided by the government’s 
power of eminent domain (the Land Acquisition Act of 1894) in acquiring desirable land from 
tenants and landholders.  Thus, what was once commons or small-to- medium-holder land then 
becomes a massive industrial township- its investors not beholden to local governance.  Since 
neo-liberalism throughout the global South has been contested rigorously among the peasantry, it 
was my aim to investigate why the SEZ, an austere tentacle of economic liberalism, was not 
being successfully challenged with collective action or organized rebellion.   
I spent 30 days in Polepally village, Andhra Pradesh where 1,000 acres of land were 
acquired for the purpose of establishing a Pharmaceutical and Textiles SEZ.  My field research 
revealed, counter-intuitively, that all but a dozen of the farmers initially favored the land 
acquisition.  It was only months after they had signed their land to the government in 2001 that 
certain members of the peasantry, with outside leadership, organized a haphazard and largely 
unsuccessful civil disobedience campaign.  I hypothesize the cause for delayed and fragmented 
mobilization is two-tiered.   First, neo-populism in Andhra Pradesh has homogenized elite 
political strategy: politicians laud the pro-farmer platform while simultaneously supporting the 
neo-liberal regime. Second, a new village social hierarchy has articulated what Mao called a 
“middle peasant”, who supports land acquisition and helps coerce landless tillers and small 
farmers to follow suit.  The implications of such findings suggest that a village-level analysis 
might prove to be invaluable in assessing the success or failure of developmental reforms.  It, 
further, questions the validity of the land acquisition process for the sake of development as 
executed under the Special Economic Zone Act (2005).   My claims rely on rigorous surveys 
conducted with 65 villagers- 50 of whom lost their land in the SEZ and 15 who were unaffected, 
lengthy interviews with 10 local and state-level government officials, 10 interviews with key 
activists organizing against the SEZ and countless hours observing the daily relations and 
conversations of the Polepally people.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. L A N D   I N   T H E   I N D I A N   C O N T E X T 
 
Land reform raises standards of living and education.  Land reform laws have the 
potential to mobilize peasants to take action and demand their tenancy rights or 
redistribution.  Both private and government institutions all over the world including the 
staunchly neo-liberal World Bank and UNDP deem land reform to be a part of their 
agendas to ameliorate poverty.  In India, which has the second highest amount of arable 
land in the world, 80% of the cultivators are marginal farmers but have ownership over 
40% of the nation’s land.  Yet the only time the words “land reform” are invoked is when 
populist politicians are seeking the majority vote.  In fact, perhaps India’s biggest 
problem, according to Bardhan, is its “accommodationist politics” which failed to take 
seriously land reform, leaving intact “the real root of poverty” (Ray and Katzenstein 
2005:4).    
In the Indian political landscape land reform is often used as an umbrella term, 
allowing neo-populist actors to appear as if they mean business.  In actuality, radical 
forms of land reform that actually redistribute wealth are nowhere to be seen in Indian 
policy.  To help understand these nuances, Herring (1983) divides the act of land reform 
into three categories: 
(1) Tenure reform, which attempts to alter the terms between owners and tenants without 
fundamentally restructuring the social relations of production, is most often promoted by 
conservative regimes that do not actually want to change the ownership of land.  Tenure 
programs, according to Herring, tend to be the least successful type of land reform.    
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(2) Ceiling-redistributive reforms seek to place an upper limit on holdings.  They are 
typically accompanied by an effort to seize landholdings that exceed the ceiling and to 
redistribute them among the poor and landless.  These programs are only “partially and 
unevenly effective”.   
(3) Land-to-the-tiller reforms are much more radical and also the most effective.  They 
abolish rent and grant land to those who cultivate it, thus negating the distinction between 
owners and cultivators.  Land-to-the-tiller reforms are hardly ever advocated in 
mainstream public discourse, especially since the market reforms of the 1990s.  The state 
government has attempted land-to-the-tiller reform in only one state to this day- Kerala- 
although in Bengal there were ceiling laws that were, as Herring correctly predicts, 
partially and unevenly (and corruptly) implemented.   
In the decade after independence (1947) there was a series of isolated attempts to 
do land reform elsewhere.  Interestingly, it was the Maoists who most directly addressed 
landlessness by taking direct action to redistribute property.  In Telangana, from 1946-51, 
3 million people, under the instruction of Maoists, fought over an area of 16,000 square 
miles to redistribute roughly 1 million acres of land to the peasantry (Sundarayya 
1972:12).  These revolutionaries demanded land-to-the-tiller, the abolition of landlordism 
with enforceable ceilings and the end to all evictions and forced labor.  Despite their 
revolutionary program, there is evidence that landlordism still existed after the struggle, 
and, more pointedly, landlessness was still flagrant even in areas where the movement 
was strongest (Reddi 1990).  Whether this is because of the elitism within the movement 
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or the reinstallation of landlords by the repressive Union Government is debated1.  The 
truth is, as will be seen in later chapters, it was a combination of both; a newly entitled 
revolutionary elite being co-opted by the Congress government, who was simultaneously 
vying to form its voter base.  Other revolutionary attempts at land reform, albeit non-
violent or “Gandhian”, include Vinoba Bhave’s Bhoodan movement, where Bhave and 
his followers trekked across the Indian heartland, pleading that landlords give up their 
land to the needy.  Despite his impressive accumulation of 4 million acres, critics pointed 
out that most of the land was never actually redistributed to tillers and gradually ended up 
back in the hands of landlords (Guha 2007:226).   
Finally, Nehru notably instituted what Herring (1983) calls “tenure reform”; the 
exploitative zamindari system backed by 200 years of colonial rule was abolished.  This 
outlawed the infamous rent extraction and vested legal rights of ownership in the tenants.  
These reforms, however, were severely limited to the intermediate, male agricultural 
classes, excluding landless laborers, sharecroppers, and women, who continue to fight to 
obtain land titles (ibid).  In reality, feudal relationships, usury, rent-racking, and low 
wages did continue to exist, in some regions exceptionally so, which may be attributed to 
the fact that ceiling laws were ultimately seen as too politically risky to enforce 
(Sundarayya 1973).  Although the pundits hailed Nehru’s policy for putting 20 million 
tenants into direct entitlement to land, they spoke too soon (Chattopadhyay 1973:3).  
They seemed to forget that the colonial-backed local bureaucracy still deeply plagued the 
Indian countryside.  Before long, the “active connivance of the land revenue 
administration” had allowed landlords to resume ownership in much of the areas that 
                                                 
1 Reddi (1990) argues for the former, while Sundarayya (1973) argues the latter.  It should be noted that 
Sundarayya, a participant and leader of the Telangana armed struggle, would not have it in his political 
interest to argue the former.  
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underwent reform (Bhalla 1983:43).  All of these abortive attempts led to a situation in 
1960 where small peasants with 4 hectares (9.8 acres) or less, comprised 81.81% of the 
total landholdings and owned only 38.83% of the arable land (Guha 2007:227).  As 
Mydral (1972:41) notes in regards to India’s political commitment to land reform, “The 
South Asian planners remain in their paradoxical position: on a general and non-
committal level they freely and almost passionately proclaim the need for social and 
economic reform, whereas in planning their policies they tread most warily in order to 
not disrupt the traditional social order” (Mohanty 2001:3858).   
Mydral’s statement came to greatly reflect the see-saw motion of Indian populist 
actors in the contemporary age.  They, on one hand, speak the language of land reform, 
rural employment and ration cards, yet on the other they are actively planting seeds of 
neo-liberal land use transformations.  With the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act (2005), 
massive tracts of land are being acquired all across India to establish industrial parks.  
These sweeping geographical changes have transpired with little political opposition at 
the elite level.  Populist actors use their clientelistic linkages to deftly move past 
subaltern political opposition2, one of the most potentially ruinous barriers to the 
construction of the SEZ.  As will be seen later, in many instances peasant opposition has 
actually delayed, and in rare instances, arrested the erection of SEZ units.  Thus, while 
providing handouts to elite farmers, politicians benefit from local elites who help pass 
                                                 
2 The word subaltern first appeared in the prison writings of Antonio Gramsci (1923-1932), which some 
believe he used to secretly refer to the proletariat, or any group without socio-political power.  He saw the 
subaltern as a class that would overcome its oppression through a broad cultural, historical, political and 
social struggle that would affect all aspects of society.  In postcolonial terms, the word has come to mean 
something more specific.  According to Gayatri Spivak subaltern is not “just a classy word for oppressed” 
but rather “everything that has limited or no access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern — a space of 
difference”.  Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. " Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture. Eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988: 271-
313.  
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neo-liberal reforms via the coercion of landless tillers and small farmers.  In the process, 
a new social hierarchy is articulated, leaving the small and landless laborers in a 
precarious position.  Ironically, at the towering height of India’s Western “liberalism” we 
see a return to feudal, patriarchal relationships between marginal and landed members of 
the village.  This goes against the Marxian, materialist chronology of the universe- as 
capitalism progresses so too should migration to the towns, which were centers of 
industrial growth (Marx 1845).  With the ever-increasing expansion of capital, the 
proletarianization of the peasant will lead to alienation, and then liberation through 
revolution.  In the situation of the SEZ, we skip the part where the rural masses migrate 
to the “town” in search of jobs; instead the “merchants” or the industrial capitalists move 
the town to the countryside.  It is my aim to show what happens in this unusual situation, 
where the peasant is actually alienated but remains within the village, “returning” to a 
semi-feudal relationship with remaining landlords.  The implications of my findings 
suggest that a village-level analysis might prove to be invaluable in assessing the success 
or failure of developmental reforms.  Further, my research questions the democratic 
validity of the land acquisition process for the sake of development as executed under the 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act (2005).  All of my claims rely on rigorous surveys 
conducted with 65 villagers- 50 of which lost their land in the SEZ and 15 who were 
unaffected, lengthy interviews with 10 local and state-level government officials, 10 
interviews with key activists organizing against the SEZ and countless hours observing 
the daily relations and conversations of the Polepally people.   
II. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
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In the two months I spent collecting data in villages across the Indian 
Subcontinent, I learned a deep lesson in the subject of the self.  John Duvignard said, 
“For the most part, the village yields itself to the investigator and often [s]he is the one to 
take refuge in concealment” (Duvignaud 1977: 217).  I recall entering a dimly lit room in 
the midst of the July monsoon, expecting to conduct my questionnaire with a family of 
three.  Instead, I was greeted by 30-40 poker-faced men, all sitting Indian-style on a 
thatched rug.  They were eager to listen to an American girl, the age of their daughters, 
speak.  The men’s faces were lit only by candlelight as the perpetually- temperamental 
electricity had gone out moments before our encounter.  The farmers spoke raucously 
about how their lives are becoming increasingly instable, their cropping patterns are 
changing and the banks are failing them.  Then they prodded me incessantly about 
American technology and governance.  What are the top three crops in America, and how 
much does the market pay per quintal?  How much am I getting paid to do this research?  
How much did my plane ticket cost?  These were the daunting times in which “seeking 
refuge” looked appealing.  However, to do so would say that the village was unsuitable 
for me.  I, thanks to the encouragement of my advisor, stuck it out and tried to answer 
their questions honestly, constructively.  I remember leaving that particular evening; with 
three farmers approaching me.  One placed a gentle but hardened finger to my forehead.  
He said, “No one has ever listened to us like this. You are like our daughter”.  This sort of 
prematurely melted away much of my skepticisms of myself. 
When I went to Polepally, all of these skepticisms returned.  The initial 
conversations I had with people who had lost their land assumed a markedly different 
demeanor.  To make a gross understatement, people were not flattered by my presence, 
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let alone willing to summarize their woes so I could quantify them and put them in a 
spreadsheet.  In fact, on my first day in the village, the sarpanch (the village chief) 
openly declared war on me, “Who asked you to come here? I could tie you to a stick if I 
wanted to!”  Many people, it seemed, were bitter towards anyone with whom they 
associated with wealth, power, media, and the state.  I told them I was an American and 
they were repulsed; I told them I was a Bengali and they said “even worse”.  I realized 
that the answers they were giving me, an elite cosmopolitan, an American, an American 
Indian, a student, a property-owner, were a reflection of what they, peasants, Telugus, 
Indians, land-losers, subalterns viewed me as- an extension of the empire that crushed 
them.  The transfer of “misinformation” was certainly not one-sided.  Something I 
suspected but only confirmed after my stay in Polepally, was that my translator’s 
interaction with the people was reflective of what he, an upper-caste, intellectual, coming 
from a capitalist farmer background, perceived of their attitudes and statuses – hostile, 
insolent, and ignorant.  That is not to say that as time went on, Vijay, my translator, 
didn’t also admit some of his own ignorance.  However, to begin with he was often 
compelled to twist an arm as a means to extract information, for example, by spouting 
manipulative or exaggerated responses to the question “what will you do for us?”  One 
conversation, with a 59-year old Muslim land loser, Abdul Bharat3, in the dank, beer 
bottle ridden storage space of his corner store transpired as such:   
Abdul: What corporation are you from? What profit is it in you?  
3rd Man: profit to us or profit to you? 
Translator: This girl came to study here from America. This girl’s sir [as in “professor”] 
is an Indian. Her studies are totally about farmers losing their land. So, her 
professor is interested in this.  
Abdul: So then, it is profit to them. So what profit are you going to bring to us? 
                                                 
3 All names of respondents have been changed or kept anonymous unless I was given explicit permission to 
include their name. 
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Translator: Her professor and she will find out what is happening here and hundreds of 
people from different countries will come somewhere and she and her professor 
will explain to them what is happening here that she witnessed.  
Abdul: Those “sons”  [“sons” is rude, implying  “sons of bitches”] don’t know what’s 
happening here? Somebody has to see this to realize what’s happening? Those 
sons won’t know?  It’s not a topic about 10 rupees or 5 rupees. It’s not like you 
came to my house and fucked [as in “stole”] a kilogram of my gold. I don’t have 
anything and you fucked [as in “stole”] all my gold and this is not …[sentence is 
unintelligible]…. Aasthi [property] and sthira aasthi [fixed property] …[he 
pauses]… Both those properties are same for me. 
Translator: [Tries to clarify meaning of aasthi & sthira aasthi from Muslim Man.] 
Abdul: No, aasthi means rupees or something else that people can steal from you. Sthira 
aasthi means a fixed property like land for us, which you get from ancestors. 
Those sons of bitches don’t know that. And what is this about being a witness and 
all? On average they took 400 to 500 acres per village. And sometimes: thousand 
acres. We made so much noise …[sentence unintelligible]…Whose parents’ 
property is this – don’t they know? What are real pattalu [papers]? Whose land is 
this? Don’t they know? All these people are coming and writing and going. Don’t 
they know to whom the land belongs? Don’t they know that they have taken the 
land? Everybody is struggling. Right now, near my land, each acre is selling for 
20 to 18 lakhs. This guy’s and a few other farmers’ land all including about 30 
lakhs near highway is selling for 30 to 50 lakhs per acre. 50 for them 60 for me 
[sentence unintelligible]... I signed right in the middle only. Will you give me 
land or not, they asked. And they wrote that they will give money in short time of 
20 lakhs per acre so I signed. Then they turned back later and said they can only 
give up to 50 to 60,000 per acre. … I didn’t tear my hair, I didn’t go towards my 
land. Then on the land there are eeumlu [word unknown to this writer] and courts 
are involved. What about this situation? I didn’t take money yet and it’s been 4 
years. What is this?4  
 
The above passage, though disturbing, reveals several important lessons that can 
be learned by the serious student of academic research.  First of all, the broader point 
Abdul is explicating is that land in Polepally signifies something more than crude 
property.  We can extrapolate that he speaks on behalf of the lot of Polepally land losing 
farmers when he says “us”.  Abdul is telling Vijay and me something that he suspected 
we and “those bastards” [meaning the many catalysts of land acquisition] are ignorant of.  
Land, he asserts, is something deeper- something that has been bequeathed to them by 
                                                 
4 Bharat, Abdul. Interview. 15 July 2009.    
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ancestors.  It should not be understood solely as “mystical”, but rather as the consistent 
and abiding material basis off of which they live.  Land can be imagined as something 
that in English we do not have a single word for, which in Telugu is sthira.  In Sanskrit 
sthira means “steadiness”.  In ayurveda, there is another meaning.   
 
sthira (sthē·rä),  
adj in Ayurveda, “static” as a guna, one of the qualities that characterizes all substances. 
Its complement is chala. See also gunas and chala.5 
 
One Telugu-English translator described sthira aasthi as “fixed” property.    
Another important thing that can only be derived from the vernacular is the extent 
to which I am, according to him, implicated in his suffering.  Given that this is not just a 
colloquialism as it might be in English, he conflates me with the SEZ power holders i.e. 
when he says “I don’t have anything and you fucked [as in “stole”] all my gold…”.  This 
is brutal confirmation that he sees me as an extension or associated with those who led 
him to deprivation.  More poignantly, he repeatedly bemoans alterations of the question, 
“Those sons [implying sons of bitches] don’t know what’s happening here?” after Vijay, 
exaggeratedly, explains that I will present this work in an American forum to “hundreds” 
of people.  This part of Abdul’s lamentation suggests that he believes that America is not 
so remote (politically, geographically?) for it to be absurd to expect Americans to know, 
and care about his suffering.  One can extract that he further believes Americans to be 
part of the problem.   This is confirmed when he inquires, “What corporation are you 
from?” and “What profit is it in you?” 
                                                 
5 Source: Mosby's Dictionary of Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 2005. Edt. Wayne Jonas.  
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Despite the thick web clouding my vision, quite naturally spun by a less-than-
perfect Telugu-English translation, Abdul’s questions were recognizable and piercing.  
“What was in it for me?” seemed to be the most blatantly personal one of them all- it was 
far more personal than “What kind of crops do they grow in America?”  I rationalized to 
myself, I was not profiting from the research per se, as I was certainly not making any 
money from it.  On the other hand, I would, potentially, gain social prestige.  I might 
publish this material, and readers like yourself, would either applaud my work or snub it.  
Regardless, my work, my ideas would be received and hopefully transformed by other 
human minds.  Perhaps, more importantly, his testimony reminded me that the binary, 
between researcher and “object”, no matter how hard I wanted it to disappear, was 
flagrant, real, and urgent.  It was not going anywhere; it was backed with 200 years of 
colonial rule and a host of post-colonial, Orientalist depictions.  Out of this emerged the 
deeply ontological criticism of the nature of the dialogue I (and my translator whose 
thoughts and beliefs I was bound to by default) was bringing to the field.   
Two things had to be done.  First, knowledge could no longer be imparted or 
extracted unilaterally with one side giving and the other receiving.  “People are not 
machines or objects that can be worked on like motor cars.  They have to be worked 
with” (Jeffs and Smith 2005:70).  Traditional research, which works on people like cars, 
has a great tendency to enforce the binary between colonizers and colonized.  One party, 
the civilized Western elite, enters a village with a looking glass and insect repellent, 
while the Other, is objectified and often mystified.  In reversing the colonizing mission or 
the subject-object dilemma, the analysis must be made part of the act and every act must 
be an analysis (Friere 1970).  More incisively, “the true partisan [with the movement for 
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social justice] is the true scientist and the true scientist is the true partisan.” This view, 
claims K. Balagopal, a late Human Rights lawyer to whom much of my research is 
indebted, “does not…rule out the possibility of criticism, but where the act and the 
reflection are in truth aspects of one and the same, true criticism can only be self-
criticism” (Balagopal 1997:2253).  As Marx (1845) writes in his critique of Feuerbach, 
"The philosophers had merely interpreted the world," whereas “the point is to change it”.  
The realm of political science has failed in its job to provide critical social information on 
movements for land.  The result has been the domination of this information production 
by the Intelligence Bureau, facilitating a volatile “law and order” approach to the 
discipline6.  It is my aim to bolster other academics that are bold enough to contradict this 
trend.  Finally, a volume of literature in the realm of “political ecology”, mainly focused 
on Latin America, suggests that indigenous or marginalized peoples “do indeed produce 
their own knowledge about the situations they face, and furthermore this knowledge often 
constitutes sophisticated frameworks” on development (Escobar 2008:5).  In reference to 
Black and indigenous activists of the Colombian pacific who are fighting TNCs for the 
access to land and resources, Escobar asserts that subaltern views “can no longer be 
overlooked in any discussion of globalization...”(ibid).  My research is rooted in this 
paradigm, as it largely relies on interactions with adivassis (indigenous peoples) and 
Telugu marginal farmers in the village, Polepally, Andhra Pradesh.  I seek to define the 
alternative development narrative, that of the peasantry, as knowledge in itself. Using my 
experience, I carve out not only a dynamic subaltern history of the peasant struggle 
against the development regime of the state but also an alternative to existing political 
                                                 
6 Agrarian Myths and Facts, 1981.  Economic and Political Weekly.  
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theories, which are inadequate to explain the village level conflict that arises from neo-
liberal land transformation.   
III. WHO ARE THE SUBJECTS: CONCEPTUALIZING THE PEASANT 
There has been much discrepancy on whom or what exactly is the peasantry in the 
context of scholarly peasant studies.  Some such as Kurtz (2000) have point out that a 
lack of academic consensus as to how to conceptualize the peasant has caused 
incompetence in creating theory on peasant behavior.  Does “peasantry” denote simply an 
occupation or is it an identity?  Is there a qualitative difference between the owner and 
the non-landowner as distinguished by de Janvry (1981) and Deere (1986)?  Is it a 
prerequisite that the peasant experience a degree of oppression or subordination as 
Marxists and moral economists assert (Scott 1987)?  This analysis will rely on a broad 
material definition, as articulated by Mao Tse-tung, when talking about rural Chinese 
society in (1933): 
(1) A landlord is a person who possesses land, who does not engage in labor himself 
or merely takes part in labor as a supplementary source of income, and who lives 
by exploiting the peasants. The landlord’s exploitation chiefly assumes the form 
of collecting land rent; besides that, he may also lend money, hire labour, or 
engage in industrial or commercial enterprise.  
(2) The rich peasant as a rule possesses land. But there are some who possess part of 
the land they farm and rent the remainder…The rich peasant as a rule possess 
comparatively abundant means of production and liquid capital, engages in labour 
himself, but regularly relies on exploitation for a part or the major part of his 
income.  The exploitation the rich peasant practices is chiefly that of hired labour. 
In addition, he may also let a part of his land for rent, lend money, or engage in  
industrial or commercial enterprise.  
(3) In many cases the middle peasant possesses land. In some cases he possesses no 
land at all and rents all the land he farms…The middle peasant relies wholly or 
mainly on his own labour as the source of his income. As a rule he does not 
exploit other people; in many cases he is even exploited by other people and has 
to pay a small amount of land rent and interest on loans…The middle peasant as a 
rule does not sell his labour power.   
(4) In some cases the poor peasant possesses a part of the land he farms…in other 
cases he possesses no land at all, but only an incomplete set of instruments. As a 
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rule the poor peasant has to rent land for cultivation…While the middle peasant 
need not sell his labour power, the poor peasant has to sell a small part of his- this 
is the principal criterion for distinguishing the middle peasant from the poor 
peasant. [We will call the poor peasant the small peasant].  
(5)  The worker (including the farm labourer) as a rule does not possess any land or 
implements…A worker makes his living wholly or mainly by selling his labour 
power.  
 
Several things must be said about this classification.  One is that these labels are not only 
descriptive of an occupation but have become part of peasants' social identities, which, 
partially, was why Mao was able to mobilize people along these lines.  The other obvious 
part of Mao’s logic is that peoples’ relation to property directly affects their potential for 
revolutionary action.  In Democracy in America, Tocqueville’s painfully inapt statement 
“Most inhabitants of a democracy have property” was followed with a keen hypothesis 
“Men whose comfortable existence is equally far from wealth and poverty set 
immeasurable value on their possessions. As they are still very close to poverty, they see 
its privations in detail and are afraid of them; nothing but a scanty fortune…keeps them 
there from [waging revolution]” (Tocqueville 1889).  In 18407 Tocqueville was asserting 
that one’s relation to property directly impacts his capability to revolt.  This hypothesis 
has been bolstered by many 20th century peasant scholars such as Paige (1975), who 
mapped world agrarian revolutions according to the peasants’ dependence on land 
(versus dependence on capital).   As we will see, the mechanisms by which peasants are 
deterred from acting are miles away from what the aristocratic French historian was 
suggesting.  Tocqueville ignores any explicit mention of class, yet he is astute in 
suggesting that one’s political identity, specifically one’s willingness to revolt, forms 
around his/her relation to land.  This has determined the fate, and often the death, of 
organized rebellion in India and elsewhere.   
                                                 
7 Tocqueville began writing on his experience in America in 1840 but did not publish Vol.1 until 1889.  
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Secondly, in rural India, Mao’s divisions have become inextricably linked to the caste 
system.  Although the jati system as described by the Manusmriti did not have room for 
the different peasant distinctions, it originally divided the Hindu population into four 
mortal job categories: Brahmins, kshatriyas (warriors), shudras (servants and bonded 
laborers), and vaishyas (merchants).  It was only in the 1950s that the Government of 
India wrote into its Constitution a new order, demarcating Scheduled Castes (SC) and 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) from Other Backwards Castes (OBC), Backwards Castes 
(BC) and Forwards Castes (FC).  The Constitutional framing has, somewhat ironically, 
come to coincide with Mao’s peasant divisions.  SC and ST typically correspond to the 
worker and the poor peasant8.  For instance during the 1985-1995, 70% of the total 
members of the Scheduled Caste were marginal farmers (those having less than 1 ha.), 
16% were small farmers (those having 1-2 ha.); only 8% were semi-medium (those 
having 2-4 ha.).  Each of these cohorts would fall under Mao’s classification of a small 
farmer.  As a comparison, fewer (only 4%) SC was classified as medium (4-10 ha.) and 
less than 1% was reported as large (10 ha. and above).  Also under Mao’s small farmer 
classification would fall the whole of the Scheduled Tribe.  40% of the members of the 
ST cohort can be classified as marginal, roughly 24% being small and 20% semi-medium 
(Indian Agricultural Brief 1995).  BC, Backwards Castes, typically are middle farmers, 
whereas OBC denotes Muslims, who have historically been excluded from the caste 
system.  FC, it follows, signifies the landlord class.  There may be some overlap between 
the OBC and the FC.  It is important to note that not only for government census 
purposes has this classification been used but also the Scheduled Caste label has recently 
                                                 
8 The word Dalit is another term for those who have traditionally been classified as “untouchable”.  
Although the word Dalit is of Marathi origin, it designates an array of lower caste groups across India that 
speak many different languages.    
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been internalized to a certain degree.  Thus, when a peasant in Telangana is asked “What 
is your caste?” the response is often the classification as written by the Constitution i.e. 
SC, rather than their jati.  Finally, it must also be mentioned that divisions in class existed 
from time immemorial, but peasant cleavages have arisen not from inherent differences 
in the groups but rather out of differences in effective power associated with particular 
caste meanings and practices. 
IV. HYPOTHESIS AND BACKGROUND OF ARGUMENT 
In 2001 when the Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) forcibly acquired 1,000 
acres of land from two villages, Polepally and Mudureddypally, for the establishment of 
an Industrial Green Park, later to become a Pharmaceutical and Textiles Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ), only those belonging to the small and lower end of the medium 
peasant group questioned, protested, or tried to sabotage the land acquisition process.  
The easy explanation for this discrepancy is that the middle-large peasants were receiving 
large injections of fast, easy cash in a declining agricultural market, but this is not enough 
to explain why they would merrily sell their land for seemingly much below market 
value, publicly or secretively declare allegiance with SEZ developers, and why they 
would be openly hostile towards small peasants who were organizing for their rights after 
the compensation process was over.  A market economist might hypothesize that it was 
less of an opportunity cost for small peasants to participate in organized rebellion.   This 
hypothesis quickly falls apart: by observing the behavior of elite peasant groups, I found 
that they expended much time and energy by actively trying to work against the anti-SEZ 
movement.  One central question to be answered in this thesis is: who are these middle-
21 
 
large peasants in the Telangana milieu, and how did they come to be in a strategic 
position for co-option by neo-liberal advocates? 
Peasants have been imagined by many to be rational economic actors (Popkins 
1979).  The value at which the government formally compensated pattadors9 for their 
land–a scant Rs 36,000 ($720) was a little less than double the amount granted to 
“assigned land beneficiaries” (largely SCs and STs) - a meager Rs 18,000 ($360).  This 
amount was not only three times lower then the market value of land at the time of 
acquisition, but also it fails to take into consideration land as something more than a 
crude piece of property, or, as Abdul said, land as sthira.  Land is the only source of 
wealth for some 60% of India’s population.  Although the poor urban counterpart to the 
rural small farmer may make an overall higher income, there is no doubt he/she is less 
secure.  A study by the Arjun Sengupta Committee showed that 77 percent of Indians 
have a daily per capita expenditure of less than Rs 20 or less than $0.5.  Although an 
overwhelming majority of the 23 per cent Indians who have a per capita expenditure 
above the national average live in cities, the urban poor eat, access health care, educate 
their children even less than their rural counterparts10.  Other studies have suggested that 
child mortality is higher and women’s fertility is lower in poor urban communities than in 
rural areas (Chattopadhyay et al 2005).   
The biggest difference between the small farmer and the factory worker is that 
“farmers’ money makes money”, whereas a proletarianized man’s wage does not11.  
Neither of these disadvantaged groups has been given the proper training or opportunities 
                                                 
9 A pattador is any farmer who has inherited his/her land and has legal rights to sell and/or transfer the 
land.  This stands in contrast to “assignees” who are those who have been granted land by the state 
government and do not have legal rights to sell nor transfer the land.  
10 Mishra, Neelabj. Not One Naya Paisa. Outlook Magazine. November 2008.  
11 Ramanjaneyulu, GV. Interview. 30 August 2009.  
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to invest in capital, but the former does not need to know how to amass wealth.  He 
arguably has had enough to get by (even though some have argued that the peasant 
tiptoes a line of destitution; Scott 1985) via the safety net of the village.  The factory 
worker is arguably in a more precarious situation, being continuously dependent on a 
boss who may exploit or dismiss him at any point.  Therefore, when the small farmer 
finally loses his land to the big business, any wealth he is compensated disappears rather 
quickly.  The unawareness of the concept of investment—essentially not knowing the 
rules to the “capitalist game”— prevents him from investing in capital or land and 
quickly turns the small peasant into a wage worker.  Since migrating to slums to find 
construction work is the absolute last resort, he becomes subordinate to the hierarchy of 
the village.  Hypothetically, the elite forces in the village would be medium-large land 
holders.  But don’t the landlords also lose their land in the SEZ and migrate to cities to 
become entrepreneurs or get jobs in the companies?  
In Polepally it must be stated that, first, there were 1,000 acres acquired for the 
establishment of the SEZ and over 3,000 total agricultural acres in the village.  This 
leaves at least 2,000 acres of agricultural land after the land acquisition process was 
complete, all of which was patta land, land not owned by the small farmers, SCs, and 
STs.  Second, for reasons that will be explained in later chapters, there remains a 
dwindling population of landlords in Polepally, hence only a small population who may 
be Western-educated and know the rules of capitalism. Therefore, with the landed elite 
missing there remains mainly the middle-large peasant and BCs as proprietors of land.  
The middle peasants are neither wealthy nor educated enough to know how to invest in 
capital but also have not become landless laborers because, after acquisition, they still 
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own a portion of land.  They are bolstered by 1. A recent injection of liquid capital from 
land sales; 2. The fast appreciation of the remaining land value due to private and public 
investment in the SEZ; and 3. A new sense of nationalistic pride that comes from being in 
a position of power over the powerless.  Their mode of production, because not supported 
by capital, is now supported by a new class of landless laborers, who are increasingly 
dependent on their new “patrons”.  Indeed, they evolve into something that closely 
resembles Mao’s “rich peasant”, while small peasants become what he calls, simply, 
“workers”.   
Since the district in which the study takes place, Mahbubnagar, is one of the most 
backward districts of the country and traditional jajmani (caste-based labor exchange) 
still exists in many places, a semi-feudal system emerges from these ruins.  This is one of 
the ways in which the middle peasant has profited, but this still does not explain why they 
originally would have entered into such an agreement willingly- even joyously- with the 
Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC).   It is this mystery that this 
project will seek to unlock.  Although this thesis will explain why the SEZ is 
undemocratic, that will not be the central aim of this project.  My main purpose is to 
explain the mechanisms by which neo-liberal actors have passed massively unpopular 
reforms in the South Indian countryside.   Why has organized rebellion failed?   
 
CHAPTER 1: PRIVATIZING THE COMMONS 
In 2000 Shri Murasoli Maran, then Commerce Minister to The National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), made a 
tour of the Southern provinces of China.  There he visited the world’s largest Special 
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Economic Zone (SEZ), in Shenzhen.  The SEZ was introduced in 1979 according to Den 
Xiopeng’s vision as a “practice of market capitalism” within a community guided by the 
ideals of "socialism with Chinese characteristics".  In contrast, others have indicted 
Xiopeng’s philosophy to mean “sacrificing equity for growth”12, especially in lieu of 
rising corruption, speculations on the black market for foreign exchange, materialism, 
frauds and other economic crimes (Wong 2007:78).  “Shenzhen” meaning “deep drains” 
was notorious in the Ming Dynasty (thirteenth century) for its hilly intersection of 
snaking waterways and paddy fields.  It has since then become a 790 square mile, 
geographically-isolated industrial zone, a bourgeoning economy, and a major recipient of 
foreign capital (Wong 2007:75).  The gross industrial output of Shenzhen increased thirty 
fold from 60 million Yuan in 1979 to 1,800 million Yuan in 1984 (ibid).  Since 1984, this 
growth has been questioned due to its failure to attract foreign investment (except from 
Hong Kong), the limited FI being characterized by simple subcontracting or intermediary 
processing of light industries, its net outflow of foreign exchange, net drain on 
government fiscal resources, and social problems (ibid).  The Shenzhen SEZ still 
continues to be lauded as wildly successful with its “cheap contractual labor and world 
class facilities funded by foreign investment”13.  China used the model to virtually turn 
the country into the world’s biggest factory; Maran, inspired by China’s example, went 
on to incorporate the SEZ into the fabric of India.   
In 1991 India faced a nasty balance of payments crisis and was up against a wall; 
either they could let everything collapse or open its doors to the world market and make 
way for a Western style neo-liberal regime.  It chose the latter; some were so elated that 
                                                 
12 Upadhyay, Ashoak. SEZ idea must be re-visited. The Hindu: Business Line, 2006.  
13 Upadhyay, Ashoak. SEZ idea must be re-visited. The Hindu: Business Line, 2006. 
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they prematurely declared the Permit Raj dead.  It turned out that it was still very much 
alive, and the economic reforms did not attract the investment they were hoping for.  The 
market reforms of 1990s did not produce the desired results, especially in the Indian 
manufacturing sector, which witnessed a slump in the second-half of the decade.  Endless 
red tape, lengthy administrative procedures, rigid labor laws and poor physical 
infrastructural facilities were a blockage in the flow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).  
The environment for investments in India, despite the drastic liberalization of the 
economy imposed by the Central Government, was not congenial to the foreign market.  
Thus, after being stunned by China’s booming investment, Maran returned to India and 
swiftly introduced a Special Economic Zones (SEZ) scheme into the Export and Import 
(EXIM) policy on March 31st 2000.  This transpired with little opposition except minor 
complaints from parliamentary Marxists on the grounds that a “hire and fire” labor policy 
was totally absent from the scheme (Gopalakrishnan 2009).   
Apparently from January 2000 until the SEZ rules were approved in 2006, SEZs 
were functioning under the “provisions of the Foreign Trade Policy and fiscal incentives” 
and “through the provisions of relevant structures” (Indian Ministry of Commerce)14.  
Finally in 2005 “with a view to overcome the shortcomings experienced on account of 
the multiplicity of controls and clearances; absence of world-class infrastructure, and an 
unstable fiscal regime and with a view to attract larger foreign investments in India” the 
Special Economic Zones Act was drafted and sent to receive Presidential assent (ibid).  
Before Prime Minister Sing could even sign the document, at least 100 SEZ proposals 
had been given clearance in AP alone (ibid).  As of March 18th, 2010, according to the 
                                                 
14 http://sezindia.nic.in/index.asp 
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Department of Commerce, there were 574 formally approved SEZs, 350 notified as of 
February 2010 and 151 of valid in principal approvals.  As per December 2010 there 
were 105 operational SEZs in India, 61% of which are focused towards the IT/ITES 
(Information Technology/ Information Technology Enabled Services) sectors 
(Seethalaxshmi 2009:7).   
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 
Although the way the SEZ imagines space, redefines the urban-rural relationship, 
creates borders, introduces foreign players in a dominantly rural setting and sets a 
precedent for export-driven development is a largely modern realization, it has equally 
novel, less dramatic worldwide predecessors.  As will be seen, the evolution of the 
geographically-quarantined development project has become more aggressive, more 
oriented towards foreign investors and IT/ITES, and more corporate-driven rather than 
worker-friendly.  Conspicuously absent from the following outline is a description of 
land acquisition, which has been reserved to follow this section.  This is precisely 
because there has been a stark deficit of reporting and scholarly work on development’s 
relationship with land until very recently, where farmers and activists have started to raise 
consciousness on this issue.  The historical information in this section is taken largely 
from American and British news archives.  This section also sheds light on Indian policy 
precursors to the SEZ, descriptions of which are taken from Indian business news 
archives and government press releases.  
As far back as the early 20th century, highly industrialized nations such as the US 
and the UK were considering novel ways to transform rural geography to accommodate 
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high intensity development.  Emerging from the Depression and encouraged by recent 
economic boosts from World War II, one finds an invitation in a local Glasgow 
newspaper calling on the public to attend an “Industries Fair”.  It is apparently a tribute to 
the city’s first Industrial Estate: “The Hillington Estate represents a new departure in 
industrial planning, and its amenities will come as a revelation to those who have not yet 
made its acquaintance”15.  The Estate consisted of an area of 320 acres, prior to 1937 
utilized for agriculture only.  It became a highly technical manufacturing township with 
96 “tenant”-controlled, highly condensed production units.  It became a precedent for ten 
more Industrial Estates of its kind by the end of the 1940s16.  
What was called an Industrial Estate in Scotland (and elsewhere such as Hong 
Kong) came to be well known by the late 1950s as an Industrial Park in the US and 
Canada.  The first American park, Nela, was founded in 1910 in a suburb outside of 
Cleveland, Ohio.  It emerged out of a collective of electrical product manufacturers that 
sought to standardize and unite the nascent industry.  The group was dissolved by the city 
government of New York and told to operate under a “brand [corporate] name”; it 
thereafter became the world’s first Industrial Park17.  The Industrial Park, like the 
Industrial Estate, is a defined, geographically-isolated area that has been zoned and 
planned for the support of certain industries.  As was the first park, Nela, they were often 
constructed in remote locations several miles outside city limits and had strict 
                                                 
15 After Only Two Years: Industrial Estate Progress. The Glasgow Herald, 13 June 1939. 
16 Indistrial Estate Disappoints.  The Glassgow Herald, 17 December 1948.    
17 Mortice, Zach.  GE’s Nela Park: Modern Product Showroom in 18th-Century Garb. AIArchitect: Vol. 14. 
28 September 2007.  
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government controls to maintain an “attractive” façade and tolerable levels of pollution.  
The 60s-90s saw a worldwide rise in industrial parks as a means by which nations 
demonstrated economic superiority in the free trade world.  Take, for example, the 5,000-
acre Hsinchu Science Park (1986), labeled “a symbol of great Taiwanese pride”.   
Two years after India opened its economy to the free market, the Central 
Government introduced the Export Promotion Industrial Park Scheme (1993-94) to give 
impetus to “the State Governments in the creation of infrastructural facilities for export 
oriented production” (Government of India 1999). The scheme was updated in 2002 to 
include 100% tax exemption for developers.  A revised Draft Industrial Park Scheme was 
prepared in 2006 and was finalized in 2008.  It is notable that the 2008 scheme sparked a 
flame in the real estate world, as it contradicted portions of the agreement launched in 
2002 that granted a10-year tax exemption to industrial park developers.  Now, in order to 
gain the tax exemptions, a developer had to meet several stricter requirements than those 
of the 2002 agreement.  For example, the park had to maintain a minimum of 30 tenants 
(up from three) and a minimum area of 50,000 sq m (up from 15,000 sq. m).   Further, 
industrial activity which now accounted for a minimum 75% of the constructed area had 
to be centered on at least one of the following: (a) manufacturing (b) research and 
experimental development in natural sciences and engineering (c) development of 
computer software or (d) IT enabled products (Government of India 2008).  In short, the 
Government of India (GoI) wanted to make the park sector-specific and more attractive 
to large businesses versus small real estate companies.   
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One more step towards the hyper-capitalist export enclave is the Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ).  The EPZ is different from the Industrial Park in the fact that the 
former is specifically designed to lure foreign enterprises that are not interested in the 
developing nations’ comparatively small market but are ready to take advantage of low-
cost labor to produce for world consumption.  There are approximately 3,000 SEZs 
worldwide18, and the large majority operates in developing countries (ILO 2003).  
Further, EPZs are areas with more relaxed state controls and bureaucratic procedures in 
import, infrastructure and sometimes labor laws (Seethalaxshmi 2009). They are also 
industrial zones in which imported materials undergo some degree of processing before 
being exported again (ILO, 1998).  The investors are encouraged to process and export all 
intermediate products “without adversely affecting the domestic economy”19. Early 
precursors to the EPZ include the free trade zone in Colon, Panama (1948), which started 
off by offering 50% income tax exemptions to its foreign investors, upping it to 90% in 
1958.  The “fenced in zone” covers 96 acres, with 76 companies invested in it, including 
several large American corporations (Seethalaxshmi 2009:4).  The prime advantage of 
the zone is advertised as its geographical location.  It is “in the hub of hemispheric trade 
and shipping activity” and features the annual passage of 7,500 ships of thirty-four 
maritime nations through the Panama Canal and 7,000 air carrier arrivals and departures 
(ibid).  Being able to import unfinished products or raw materials into the zone without 
duties, bonds fees, or even import licenses with low labor costs to process materials were 
                                                 
18 Special Economic Zones: An Indian Perspective.  Seth Associates, Advocates and Legal Consultants. 
http://www.sethassociates.com/special_economic_zones.php 
19Bijoy, C.R. Special Economic Zones: Profits at any Cost.  22 October 2007. 
http://sez.icrindia.org/2007/10/29/special-economic-zones-profits-at-any-cost/  
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all part of “luring investors”. Similar models with slight moderations and different names 
such as foreign exchange zone or free trade zone were popping up all over the world in 
the 1960s.  By 1984 10% of all of the world’s trade was flowing through a free trade zone 
with 83 in the US, five in mainland China, three in Taiwan, two in Israel, six in Syria, 21 
in Spain, one in Gibraltar, and nine in Colombia20.  
The EPZ has come to be a similar but seemingly more austere version than what 
was observed in Panama.  In Taiwan the first Export Processing Zone (1967) was an 170-
acre light industries zone with a “high barbed-wire-topped wall” and “strict control of 
everyone who enters and leaves through its gates to ensure that products from the zone 
are for export only and cannot even be smuggled into the Kaohsiung (the metropolis and 
harbor in which the zone sits)”21.  Japanese and Dutch investors were prevalent, but 
American electronics manufacturers were clearly the largest investors.  The majority of 
workers were young girls from Kaohsiung, who came to do meticulous handwork such as 
garments, toys, jewelries, and furniture earning a monthly wage of $15 to $20 for a 48-
hour workweek. As a result, production was a third to a quarter cheaper than in the US 
and the zone was deemed a success (ibid).  Other EPZs were founded around the same 
time in Puerto Rico (1962), Mexico (1964), South Korea (1971), the Philippines and 
Malaysia (1972)22.  In Africa, EPZs were built in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Togo, and 
Mauritius, the latter being the only successful of the bunch.  The EPZ is often credited for 
the Mauritius nation’s catapult in the 1980s from low-income ranks to the middle-income 
                                                 
20 Dropping the Barriers: Free Trade Zones Springing up Around the World. Associated Press, 1984. 
21 Tillman, Durdin.  Industrial Zone Helping Taiwan. The New York Times, 13 Aug 1967.  
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category, as measured by the World Bank23.  The first EPZ in India was in Kandla, 
Gujarat (1965).  This was followed by the establishment of the EPZ in Santacruz, 
Mumbai, commencing operations in 1973.  After that, there were five more founded in 
Kochi, Chennai, Falta, Noida, and Vishakapattanam (1984).  The first private EPZ was 
that in Surat, Gujarat, which began operations in 1998 (Seethalaxshmi 2009).  Although, 
from 1991 to 2000, there was a relaxation of the bottlenecks, liberalization of the 
provisions, simplification of the procedures and various kinds of new units such as 
agriculture, trading, horticulture, re-engineering, trading, and aquaculture units were 
granted permission to set up their business in the EPZ, the Indian EPZ was still deemed a 
failure.  It could not achieve the generation of export growth that India had been 
expecting (Aggarwal 2006:4534).  Inimical to the interests of foreign investors, there 
were still many restrictions on how exporters did business…Often using the export-
processing zones meant more -- not less -- paperwork.  According to one reporter, India’s 
“stringent labor laws” exercised under the EPZ are one of India's “biggest barriers to 
foreign investment” which “[made] it difficult for large companies to fire employees or to 
use contract laborers.”24  Company shipments were deterred by regular strikes by factory 
workers, dockworkers and truckers.  In short, foreign investors were interested in setting 
up factories in the third world not only because of cheap labor, but also because they 
would not have to deal with rule breaking, so they thought.  And they had good reason to 
think so with the notorious NAFTA (North American Free Trade Act) making not one 
reference to labor laws in Mexico, aside from a delayed side agreement which “provided 
                                                 
23 Perlez, Jane.  Mauritius Thrives as Textiles Boom.  The New York Times, 10 September 1990. 
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weak mechanisms” for the enforcement of labor rights25.  This phenomenon of the 
anarchic island space did not disappear but became more ubiquitous with the SEZ, which 
did away with de facto labor laws and assumed the role of a township, whereas the EPZ 
was only meant to be an enclave.   
One last intermediary between the industrial estate and the SEZ worth mentioning 
is the Eco-Industrial Park.  Designed in 1993 by the American Indigo Development 
group, the EIP capitalizes on the recently popularized concept of “sustainable 
development” with a devotion to the field of “industrial ecology”.  EIPs are characterized 
by “a network of synergistic resource linkages among facilities within a defined 
geographical area” (Fons et al 2003:1).  Recently popularized, there are now national 
projects to develop new eco-industrial parks or to transform existing ones in North 
America, Australia China, Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam, with many smaller projects in 
other Asian, European, and Latin American countries26.  Although India has no national 
plan to implement the EIP, state governments such as those of Gujarat and Andhra 
Pradesh have taken steps to further this conceptual development style.  Eco-Industrial 
parks have been hailed as a new way to maintain waste and also heavily criticized by 
those who see development as not an end in itself but a means to an end.  For instance, 
Gibbs raises the poignant argument that since most EIPs are in their embryonic stages 
and would require building from scratch, a more fruitful approach is to “build upon 
existing and potential linkages within a locality, assisted by a pro-active policy to 
encourage interchanges” (Gibbs and Deutz 2007:1).  Other researchers provide empirical 
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evidence that EIPs actually increase pollution due to their remote locations and the heavy 
traffic they encourage (Fons et al 2003).  Also, the label “Green” has been used to 
convince locals of the state development project, in other words “ease” the idea of 
development onto people (land losers) who, for obvious reasons, might find it more 
desirable to have a green collar job (a corporate gardener or a horticulturalist) than a 
“brown collar” one (toilet scrubber).  It is a fantastical alternative that allows ex-peasants 
to work outdoors, keep their lives in the village and exercise their indigenous skills with a 
steady wage, rather than the volatile one that the international market has thrust upon 
them.  As in the case of Polepally, the label Green Park has become useful to populist 
politicians, while the actual contents of the space in no way reflect “environmental 
sustainability” or any of the other terminology associated with a Green Park.  
In India, the models discussed above have become chronological, evolutionary 
phases.  It is clear that the Indian SEZ most closely mirrors the Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ).  In fact, all of the existing EPZs in India were transformed into SEZs with the 
passage of the SEZ rules in February 2006.  The stated objectives of the SEZ, as stated by 
the Act of 2005, are similar to those of the EPZ.  They are: (a) generation of additional 
economic activity (b) promotion of exports of goods and services; (c) promotion of 
investment from domestic and foreign sources; (d) creation of employment opportunities; 
(e) development of infrastructure facilities (Ministry of Commerce 2010)27.   However, a 
quick glance at the financial incentives and conditions offered to developers and units 
within the SEZ reveals that the SEZ Act solidifies an attempt to do what the EPZ failed at 
doing.  It creates an atmosphere congenial to large foreign investors with rapid growth.   
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II. SEZ: NATION WITHIN A NATION 
The SEZ is so rooted in the pro-globalization paradigm that once a piece of land 
is deemed a SEZ it is no longer part of the Republic of India.  It is effectively deemed 
“foreign territory” for the sake of trade relations.  Supplies moving into the SEZ from the 
rest of the country are treated as exports, and SEZ developers are eligible for export-
related benefits.  Just as the developer is free from the obligation of obtaining a 
distribution license, the standard import license for importing raw materials or 
components is unnecessary.  Customs examinations are kept to the bare minimum, and 
for many procedures self-certification is sufficient.   
According to citizens groups, the SEZ is also “foreign” in the sense that local 
laws are rendered obsolete.  Massive neo-liberal land use shifts redefine space, and by 
doing so, they redefine local power.  In the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution, 
India finally acknowledged the need for village-level authority by introducing the gram 
panchayat system.  Although this move continues to bear brutal criticism for the lack of 
de facto autonomy it grants to the panchayat, there is no question that the SEZ further 
degrades primacy of gram sabhas by disallowing them access, decision making 
capacities, and governance over the Township.  As stated in a petition signed by over 100 
citizens groups to Pranab Mukherjee, chairman of the Empowered Group of Ministers on 
SEZs, “What is really going to challenge the governance system is the concentration of 
power in the hands of the Development Commissioner (DC) at the State level and in the 
Board of Approvals at the Centre”28.  An annexure to the SEZ Act from August 2009 
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stated that no agencies may carry out inspection, seizure or investigation without 
approval of the DC of the Zone concerned29.   There are also many recently documented 
instances of Commissioners prohibiting locals from entering SEZs.  In summation, the 
SEZ industrial township, often occupying the bulk of a village and spatially comparable 
to a medium-sized neighborhood, becomes autonomous with its private security systems 
and its exemption from government inspection, search or seizure without the DC’s 
permission.   
III. ENVIRONMENTAL DE­REGULATION 
SEZs are, according to the GoI “self-contained and integrated having their own 
infrastructure and support services.”30  However, despite their legal insularity, history 
shows that there are many externalities generated that are not taken into account when 
measuring the success of the SEZ.  In a nation where a significant part of the population 
utilizes common pool resources for grazing, foraging, and living, any resource-intensive 
export zone will threaten village autonomy and/or any traditional methods used to govern 
the commons.  Even with the increase in privatization after neo-liberalization it is 
estimated that over 20% of India is designated as forested lands, and 96% of these lands 
are publicly and communally managed (Foster et al 2001:3).  The SEZ shifts resource use 
and regulation from the hands of the village decision makers to the Development 
Commissioner.  The DCs, who do not reside in the village, are driven by profit 
maximization and are not concerned with the sustenance of the village ecology.  The fact 
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that they are totally exempt from the standard Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) 
means that SEZs are approved without any sort of social environmental assessment.31 
At a time where India is enduring its worst water scarcity crisis, with water tables in 
North Gujarat falling 6 meters (20 feet) per year32 and monsoons becoming increasingly 
erratic, this exemption has proven to be disastrous to village autonomy. Units within the 
SEZ are assured round-the-clock water and electricity through the establishment of 
independent power projects as Independent Power Producers (IPP).  Developers are 
allowed to make standby arrangements to draw power from the board, and they are 
granted automatic approval for the construction of captive power plants. Although units 
within the SEZ are declared a “public utility service” under the provisions of the 
Industrial Dispute Act (Bhatta 2003:1928), there is no evidence that SEZs seek to 
maximize public utility.   While encouraging resource consumption with constant 
electricity provisions, the policy gives no recourse to farmers whose droughty fields are 
further deprived of water or are adversely affected by increased effluents from the SEZ or 
power plants within the SEZ.  Medak District, of Andhra Pradesh, not far from my 
research site, makes a vibrant illustration of the SEZ’s relationship with the environment.  
Medak, home to over 250 industries in industrial estates and SEZs, sits adjacent to the 
Nakkavagu stream.  The companies have inundated Medak’s ground water and 
approximately 2,000 acres of farmland with toxic chemicals, which in turn has fostered 
the displacement of 30,000 residents.  In response to citizens’ direct action campaigns 
and media attention, the Supreme Court has granted only minor remedies to the public; 
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e.g., in 2003 it issued a directive for the companies to inform the community about the 
hazardous aspects of their industrial activities.  This directive has not been reinforced 
specifically in regards to SEZ.  Thus, it is clear that any panchayat seeking to preserve 
remaining forest and other commons lands is no longer able to do so.  The SEZ Act 
assures that developers do not have to work with local authority and are not held to any 
restrictive social or environmental rules of conduct.   
IV. DEGREDATION OF LABOR LAWS 
A further move from local autonomy is the relaxed labor standards in the SEZ 
(Bhatta 2003).  Firm labor laws have long been viewed by the World Bank and other 
market-driven entities as an obstacle to attracting foreign investment in India33.  
Although India was never truly a socialist nation, its’ constitution was written by Da
labor activists.  However, as a capitalist economy requires the ever-increasing, cease
production of goods, strikes and civil disobedience become viewed increasingly 
unfavorably.  In democratic, industrialized nations, this often leads to a sort of push-pull 
relationship between union activists and bosses.   In the new era of globalization, first 
world companies are able to circumvent labor laws and unionization through outsourcing 
to third world nations, which is often justified by capitalists as being “better off than the 
alternatives”.  “If they didn’t want the job, why wouldn’t they just quit and find work 
elsewhere?”  As will be shown, the physical enormity of the SEZ often leaves no room 
for alternative job options.  Further, with an economic policy calling upon such forceful 
government intervention, as does the SEZ, the invisible hand theory is crippled: no longer 
do market forces negotiate with the people.  In the case of the export enclave, it is the 
lit, 
less 
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state that sets the terms of agreement, and they have pushed fiercely to debilitate labor 
laws.  This was seen in the original version of the SEZ Act, where labor laws were 
completely stricken from existence.  It was only parliamentary Marxists that objected to 
these drastic measures.  Eventually, labor rights were recognized, but only in theory do 
they carry any weight in the SEZ.  In my fieldwork, interviews with numerous SEZ 
laborers show that a daily wage of not more than 150 Rs /day ($2.50), just slightly more 
than the wage paid by the government National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) 
program (which pays $100 Rs/day or $2), is standard in the SEZ companies.  Often work 
is back breaking; construction or toilet scrubbing are the most common occupations 
among land-losing locals, if provided an opportunity to work at all.  Hiring and firing 
happens indiscriminately under the dominion of the company managers.  The fact is that 
in the wake of the SEZ and land acquisition, the majority of locals are left jobless.  
Because there will always be another candidate to replace dispensable workers, 
developers can afford to turn a blind eye to pregnancy/sickness leave of absence policies, 
even in communities that have high birth rates and incidents of illness.  Due to the fact 
that they are contract laborers, they are not granted benefits, as would full time 
employees.  In 2009, as the government grew nervous in the face of a growing anti-SEZ 
movement, it had to issue an annexure reminding companies to follow labor laws.  
However, despite this measure a number of Indian labor organizations have still tracked 
the SEZ to be one of the most labor abusive institutions the nation.  This of course is 
enhanced by the fact that no searches or inspections can be carried out inside the SEZ 
without the Development Commissioner’s consent.  If one turns to Shenzhen, the Chinese 
SEZ that inspired the birth of the Indian SEZ as a model, these problems will only get 
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worse.  After several decades of operation the city of Shenzhen has evolved into a hotbed 
for crime. While the crime rate is almost nine-fold higher than Shanghai, the working 
class earns US $80 every month in the sweatshops inside the SEZ and the turnover rate is 
10 percent (Bhaskar 2007:2).  According to Howard French, the New York Times bureau 
chief, “Many [Shenzhen workers] turn to prostitution after being laid off” (ibid).  
V. BAITING BIG BUSINESS AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 
The financial carrots or “production incentives” used to lure foreign investors are 
multitudinous, the biggest of which is, of course, land acquisition.  However, as land 
acquisition is not directly addressed in the SEZ Act 2005, first I will begin with what the 
policy does say on procedural aspects.  First off, for all SEZs there is a prescribed 
minimum investment or net worth of the promoter company in the SEZ.  This essentially 
blocks out small businesses from competing with big foreign investors for the lucky 
position in a SEZ (also inimical to small businesses is the lack of ancillary units, which 
are essential for small businesses to thrive).  Accordingly, sector-specific SEZ developers 
must plough in a minimum investment of Rs 250 crore (about $550,000) or have net 
worth of Rs 50 crore ($100,000).  For multi-product SEZs, minimum investment is Rs 
1,000 crore (around $2 million) and net worth Rs 250 crore ($550,000).34  Further, 
whereas the average size of an Indian factory is measured in the number of employees, 
there is a minimum “developed land requirement” for SEZs.  The minimum bar is quite 
large.  For example in a multi-product SEZ it is 5,000 hectares (12,500 acres).  For one or 
more services the SEZ must be at least 100 hectares (247 acres), and for electronics, 
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hardware, software or IT/ITES SEZs there is a minimum of 10 hectares with a minimum 
floor area of 50 thousand square meters.  Promotion of IT/ITES development with a 
smaller minimum area requirement has paid off with 60% of the SEZs being geared 
towards these sectors.  
VI. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE DUTY­FREE? 
The SEZ becomes increasingly attractive with the slew of tax holidays granted to 
Developers and units, enjoying complete exemption from excise duty, custom duty, sales 
tax, octroi, mandi tax, turnover tax, income tax holiday for ten years, and exemption from 
income tax on infrastructure capital fund and individual investment.  They can set up off-
shore banking units with income tax exemption for three years and subsequently 50% tax 
for another two years.  The complete list of economic incentives offered to SEZ 
developers, as stated by the Ministry of Commerce35 include: 
• Exemption from customs/excise duties for development of SEZs for authorized 
operations approved by the BOA.  
• Income Tax exemption on income derived from the business of development of 
the SEZ in a block of 10 years in 15 years under Section 80-IAB of the Income 
Tax Act.  
• Exemption from minimum alternate tax under Section 115 JB of the Income Tax 
Act.  
• Exemption from dividend distribution tax under Section 115O of the Income Tax 
Act.  
• Exemption from Central Sales Tax (CST).  
• Exemption from Service Tax (Section 7, 26 and Second Schedule of the SEZ 
Act).  
Incentives offered to SEZ units are:  
• Duty free import/domestic procurement of goods for development, operation and 
maintenance of SEZ units  
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• 100% Income Tax exemption on export income for SEZ units under Section 
10AA of the Income Tax Act for first 5 years, 50% for next 5 years thereafter and 
50% of the ploughed back export profit for next 5 years.  
• Exemption from minimum alternate tax under section 115JB of the Income Tax 
Act.  
• External commercial borrowing by SEZ units up to US $ 500 million in a year 
without any maturity restriction through recognized banking channels.  
• Exemption from Central Sales Tax.  
• Exemption from Service Tax.  
• Single window clearance for Central and State level approvals.  
• Exemption from State sales tax and other levies as extended by the respective 
State Governments.    
The 2006 SEZ rules were what made the SEZ ultimately more efficient and more 
appealing than the EPZ.  Their intention: to provide drastic simplification of compliance 
procedures and documentation “with an emphasis on self certification”.  In short they 
were to cut away red tape by introducing single window clearance on the establishment 
of SEZ and formation of units within SEZ (Ministry of Commerce)36.  The single 
window clearance took the shape of a 19-member Board of Approvals (BoA), who is 
referred to as the “Board” in the SEZ Act (2005)37.   
VII. APPROVAL MECHANISM 
The birth of the SEZ occurs when the applicant, who can be any Indian 
individual, NRI, Indian or foreign company (in the case of a private SEZ) or the state (in 
a public SEZ), submits the proposal for establishment of SEZ to the concerned State 
Government or directly to the BoA.  The State Government has to forward the proposal 
with its recommendation within a certain time to the BoA.  The BoA then gives an “in-
principle” approval valid for one year with options for renewal.  Land acquisition, which 
will be addressed in the subsequent section, can now take place.  Meanwhile, the 
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proposal is handed off to the respective Development Commissioner, who will inspect 
the proposed SEZ site with “special attention to the quality of the land- if it’s double 
cropped it should not be utilized for SEZ purpose”, according to IAS Officer Pandey,  
director of Noida SEZ38.  They also confirm that the plot is contiguous and vacant.  
According to Pandey, “All of these conditions must be met before approval can take 
place”, although, contrarily, in March 2007 there was an amendment that greatly relaxed 
the conditions for contiguity and even allows government intervention to acquire land in 
order to maintain contiguity.39  After the Development Commissioner has finished the 
above inspection, he/she will issue a Letter of Permission to the applicant, thereafter 
referred to as the “Developer” (Seethalaxshmi p.5 2009).  Then the BoA will review the 
proposal and issue the Formal Letter of Approval (LoA), which is valid for three years.  
The developer can now begin operations, prior to the final step where the Central 
Government confirms that all requirements have been met in regards to land under 
section 3, sub-section (8) of the SEZ Act and “notifies” the SEZ.  They then announce in 
the Official Gazette the birth of the SEZ.  
The Approval Committee, consisting of the Development Commissioner, 
Customs Authorities and representatives of State Government, approves all the proposals 
for setting up of units in the SEZ at the Zone level.40  All minor post-approval clearances 
including grants of importer-exporter code numbers, changes in the name of the company 
or implementing agency, broad banding diversification, etc. are provided at the Zone 
level by the Development Commissioner. The Approval Committee periodically monitors 
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the performance of the SEZ units and units are liable for penal action under the provision 
of Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, in case of violation of the 
conditions of the approval (Ministry of Commerce)41. 
The above mechanism is advertised as a “single window clearance”, a political 
measure that seeks to again contest the reputation of India’s unstinted bureaucracy.   The 
slew of tax exemptions and financial incentives offered to both developers and operating 
units and the legal exemptions that make the SEZ exceedingly attractive to Western 
investors, may fall under the free market “liberal values” paradigm.  Yet the free market 
analogy dissipates inspecting primary measures taken to secure land for the SEZ.  In fact 
some have called the state-based land acquisition “draconian” and emphasize its assault 
on purportedly “liberal values” such as the “right to life” and the “right to self-
determine”42.  Thus, despite the SEZ policy’s devotion to relaxed bureaucracy, “the 
single largest concern delaying projects across the board [being land acquisition]” has not 
been addressed43.  Previous studies have proven that land acquisition has not been a 
subject that has been taken lightly by the Indian people and 70% of Indian urban 
infrastructure projects are delayed due to land acquisition “problems”, as noted by the 
India Infrastructure Report 2009 by Infrastructure Development Finance Co. Ltd (IDFC). 
According to the study, 60 projects being implemented by the Indian Railways, 40 by the 
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National Highways Authority of India and 28 power projects are “facing difficulties” in 
acquiring land44.    
CHAPTER 2: LAND ACQUISITION 
I. DEFINIING CHARACTERISTICS 
‘Land acquisition’ refers to the process by which the government forcibly 
acquires private property for public purpose without the consent of the landowner, which 
is different from a market purchase of land.  However, when the SEZ Rules came into 
effect in 2006, the words “land acquisition” were nowhere to be found in the policy.  
How did these vast swaths of land materialize in a country, where 65 percent of the 1.1 
billion population relies directly on agriculture for their livelihood?  The answer can be 
traced back to the second half of the 19th century, at the origination of the principle of 
eminent domain.  “The idea that all land within its territory ultimately belongs to the state 
was used by the British colonial state to progressively deem state property all land 
without identified private ownership”45.  The colonial administration itself assigned 
private ownership titles in cultivated land through elaborate survey and settlement 
operations which ultimately resulted in the austere zamindari system which will be 
described at length in later chapters. The land claimed by the state included ‘waste’ lands, 
or village commons that were not cultivated and other uncultivated or uncultivable land 
farther from the villages.  This included all of the pastures and forestlands that were, until 
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this point, village or tribal commons maintained by the adivassis (indigenous people of 
India) to either constitute or supplement their livelihoods. 
The same principle was invoked to justify the right of the state to expropriate 
land, even if it was in private ownership, when it was needed for what the British called a 
“public good” (ibid) or a “public purpose” 46.  It must be kept in mind that often what the 
British deemed “public purpose” they used as leverage to justify the idea of the 
benevolent colonialist, such as the establishment of the railway networks, despite the 
blatant fact that these projects often did not benefit the majority of Indian peoples.  The 
hypocrisy inherent in this was displayed more flagrantly when the East India Company, 
what was essentially a private enterprise backed by the state, acquired land for roads and 
canals in the name of “public purpose”.  In 1870, shortly after the establishment of the 
British Raj, the colonial government decided to rectify a formal law that was to depict 
land acquisition as a pillar of its (benevolent) civilizing mission.  What was earlier called 
the ‘Indian Expropriation Act’ was now renamed the ‘Land Acquisition Act’47. The law 
eventually took the consolidated form of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  After 
independence the republican Constitution of India, by article 372, allowed all colonial 
laws to remain in practice until they were repealed by Parliament.  The Land Acquisition 
Act remained essentially unaltered, except for minor changes.  In obtaining much of the 
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land for the Industrial Parks, EPZ, and the SEZ, the post-colonial government has, hence, 
referred to the colonial Land Acquisition Act, 189448.   
II. DISTORTION OF PUBLIC PURPOSE 
The 1894 Act permits land acquisition if the land is to be used for a “public 
purpose”, with “acquisition” referring to the act of forcibly obtaining land from the 
landowner, and “public purpose” encompassing a host of imaginative projects.  “Public 
purposes” are listed as the establishment of village-sites, town or rural planning, land for 
residential purposes for poor or displaced due to natural calamities, land for planned 
development (including education, housing, health and slum clearance), land needed by a 
state corporation49, or land needed for a public office, which “does not include 
acquisition of land for companies” (emphasis added) (Land Acquisition Act 1984 part 1, 
section 3; definitions).  Although the act made this delineation, it was more likely to 
block out competition rather than to protect Indian people from predatory business.  It is 
well known that the Empire saw India as the jewel in the British crown, in other words a 
wildly profitable endeavor that they were willing to go to dire lengths to protect from 
competing interests.  Similarly, the label “public purpose” has become widely 
controversial in contemporary India, where the Indian government has created state 
corporations that function as enclave “Developers”.  It is in the name of these Industrial 
Infrastructure Corporations, the state is able to attain land.  Again responding to citizen 
                                                 
48 This act was last amended by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984.  
49 State corporation is defined as a “corporation owned or controlled by the ‘State’, or any body corporate 
established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, and includes a Government company as defined 
in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), a society… established or administered by 
Government and a co-operative society…in which not less than fifty-one per centum of the paid-up share 
capital is held by the Central Government, or by any State Government or Governments or [partially by one 
or the other]” (Land Acquisition Act 1894 part 1, section 3; definitions).   
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outrage, the Commerce Secretary issued a June 2007 circular dictating that State 
Governments not undertake any “compulsory land acquisition” on behalf of private 
companies until “persons interested in the land have either not submitted any objection 
under Section 5A or have withdrawn the objection” (Ministry of Commerce 2009, 
Instruction no. 29).  As we have seen in the case of the Andal Aerotropolis, where 3500 
acres were acquired in 2008 by the West Bengal government, this measure was largely a 
symbolic gesture.  Although they have not deemed the Aerotropolis a SEZ it is local 
knowledge that it will become a SEZ50.  Thus, without the actual amendment or upheaval 
of the Land Acquisition Act, the state government is able to circumvent the much lauded 
circular by upholding the “public” premise during the time of acquisition while the 
intended private interest, or the SEZ, lags only a step behind.  The fact that there are still 
many anti-land acquisition agitations transpiring, such as the March 24th 2010 uprising of 
agricultural laborers and sharecroppers in Andal- met with police brutality- is proof that 
this circular did not put an end to non-consensual dispossession of land and property.51  
Further, according to the notification, land acquisition is still legal with “acquiescence” of 
the farmers, which, as this study will show, co-optation of higher caste Hindus has led to 
the façade of compliance.  Other field studies suggest that “undemocratic and often 
coercive” methods have been used to this end (Seethalaxshmi 2009:35), and farmers who 
did not comply have been “punished for not parting with their land”.  For example, 
unlawful registration bans, deterring farmers from taking out loans or voluntarily selling 
their land to any other party than the government, have been imposed by district officials 
                                                 
50 Bandopadhyay, Syagnik and Icore Ekdin.  “Aetropolis generates unrest in Andal”.  Sanhati, 20 March 
2010. http://sanhati.com/excerpted/2277/ 
51 Ibid. 
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on the farmers in Irugulam Village, Andhra Pradesh who refused to surrender their land 
to the Sri City Reserve Infra City Private Ltd SEZ (ibid).  In Polepally, similar coercive 
methods were applied.  One farmer said he asked to give his thumb print on a piece of 
paper which he could not read, due to his illiteracy52.  Multiple farmers reported to me 
collectors had bribed farmers with arrak (a local alcohol) before convincing them to sign 
the documents.53 One of the farmer activists summarized the process by saying, “The 
collector put a gun to our heads…they said ‘you either sign or get nothing’”.54  Perhaps 
the biggest source of deception, however, lies in the false promise of jobs.  In Polepally, 
prior to the acquisition of land many were promised jobs in a Green Industrial Park in 
which they could use their indigenous skills.  Most of these tactics seem to take 
advantage of the remarkably low 39% literacy rate in Polepally, according to 2001 census 
data.     
The notification has further limitations, as the Act in itself has crucial components 
missing such as a comprehensive rehabilitation package for land losers. So what does the 
Act say in regards to the rights of land losers?  In the Act (including amendments), the 
procedure for acquiring land includes the public announcement of the proposed project 
via the Official Gazette, two daily newspapers circulating in that locality- one of which 
must be in the regional language and placed in convenient locations on the property of 
the landowner.  Thereafter, it is lawful for an officer to enter the property of the 
landowner and conduct assessments, which includes any necessary alterations to the land, 
e.g. digging bore wells.  The owners of the land must be compensated for any damages.  
                                                 
52 Interview, 10 July 2009.  
53 Group Interview, 12 July 2009. 
54 Srinivasulu.  Interview, 12 July 2009.  
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Government officials are not allowed to enter into any enclosed area attached to the 
occupier’s house “without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in 
writing of his intention to do so.”  The owners have a right to voice any objections to the 
Collector, given that it is filed within 30 days of the preliminary notification55.  The 
judiciary is then accorded the role of arbitrator in case of dispute over the compensation, 
and whatever they conclude on this matter is the “final word”.  Under the LA 
Amendment Act 1984, after the passage of one year from the preliminary notification, an 
“official declaration” may be issued in a similar fashion.  This declaration in itself 
constitutes “conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a 
company”.  The Collector shall, under section 11, measure and assess the land in order to 
make an award which must be granted within a period of two years from the date of the 
publication of the declaration; once the award is made the Collector may proceed in 
acquiring land and evicting the owners.  If no award is made within that period, the entire 
proceeding for the acquisition of the land will lapse.  Those who are dissatisfied with the 
compensation values are able to go to court to protest the value that was set by the 
Collector.  The amount granted by the court, if anything, cannot be lower than the amount 
granted by the Collector.  
This process may seem surprisingly levelheaded for a colonial government, but 
only to those who fail to read the entire Act.  In Section 17, one finds the title “Special 
Powers in the Case of Urgency”.  “Urgency”, occurring whenever the appropriate 
Government so directs, allows that the Collector take possession of the land fifteen days 
after the primary notification, barring the window of opportunity for landowners to file 
                                                 
55 LA Act 1984 subsection 2, section 5A 
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complaints.   It also overturns the necessity of a Declaration in the Official Gazette and 
the agreement to compensate the landholder prior to land acquisition.  With the Urgency 
Clause being used in almost all cases of land acquisition today (Seethalaxshmi 2009), 
Indian modern history has witnessed the complete assault on the rights of landowners.  
Further, although land losers have historically taken up their cases post-acquisition to 
protest compensation value, it is well known in colonial accounts that judges more often 
than not sided with the district officials in any given dispute.  In recent times, however, it 
has played out so that those with resources to navigate the legal system are able to better 
their lot while others, usually the poor and uneducated, are left behind56.   
III. FLAWED COMPENSATION PROCESS 
A number of Supreme Court cases have highlighted concerns related to fair 
compensation, valuation of land, definition of 'public purpose' and other issues related to 
land acquisition.57  Today, the compensation process is being contested on three grounds: 
it undervalues the true land value, its calculation is made using a flawed and inconsistent 
“method” and it enforces village-level economic and social inequalities.  The method 
used by the Collector is purportedly based off of “market value” as recorded the 
individual property transactions for that mandal over the past three years.  In rural India, 
one farmer explained to me, it is a widely known phenomenon that much of Indian 
                                                 
56 Kannan, Kasturi.  Of Public Purpose and Private Profit, February 2008. SEZ Symposium on the Recent 
Economic Policy Initiatives.  http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/582/582_kannan_kasturi.htm 
57 Civil Appeal No. 1137 of 2007, Nelson Fernandes vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Goa (2007), 
Viluben Jhalejar Contractor vs. State of Gujarat (2007), Numaligarh Refinery Ltd vs. Green View Tea & 
Industries Ltd (2007), and Pratibha Nema vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007).  
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agricultural land is registered at a value much below the true market value for various 
reasons such as tax evasion58.  Even if the final compensation package, after court 
proceedings and all, is comparable to the actual market value of recent years, the sum 
will be no match for the newly competitive land market.  As soon as the first road into the 
future SEZ is paved, the market value of adjacent land skyrockets.  Real estate 
speculation has also attributed to the sharp increase in land values.  Given that often 
compensation comes after acquisition (refer back to the Urgency Clause), it becomes 
nearly impossible for the peasants to purchase new land after their own has been 
acquired- even if they do have the faculties to do so.  
To truly understand the bureaucratic volatility of land assessment and 
calculations, it is useful to turn to the land acquisition procedure from a specific example.  
The following information is based off of the land acquisition documents produced by the 
Mahbubnagar Revenue Divisional Office after acquisition (2005) in regards to the 
Polepally village.  In understanding land acquisition in Telangana, one must know the 
distinction between patta land, which is land that was inherited or purchased by the 
landholder, versus assigned land, which is distributed to the landholder by the state. 
About 52% of the total land acquired in the Polepally village was of the patta land 
category.  179 of the families that lost their land were pattadors.  It was only for patta 
land that the government produced any documents explaining their methodology in 
setting a compensation value.  Its value was calculated using local land transactions from 
the past three years, which, as stated before, were not comparable to the true market 
value.  That was the first major issue in the Polepally land acquisition.  The second 
                                                 
58 Khomeini, Biju. Interview. 8 July 2010.  
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problem is that in the documentation the process of price setting is completely 
inconsistent and hard to follow.  Out of the 80 transactions made in the past 3 years, 79 
are omitted for spurious reasons.  For example, seven lands are “not similar in nature” to 
the ones undergoing acquisition thus omitted, 28 are “combined sales”, 34 are “far 
away”, several have gardens on them; all of which are cause for omission.  This leaves 
the compensation value to be based off of only one transaction.  This is simply because of 
its similarity “in nature and fertility” to the land being sold; the documents do not explain 
why it is “similar” and what factors they counted in measuring “nature” or “fertility”.  
Needless to say, one plot cannot be inherently “similar” to the various plots of 179 
families, e.g. the land belonging to farmers who had invested into bore wells, will not be 
similar in “nature and fertility” to that of farmers who did not.  
Thus, in Polepally it is difficult to tell what the true market value might have 
been.  My research yielded varying results.  A non-land losing BC member of Polepally, 
who was in favor of land acquisition, stated that the price of land was Rs 4,000 ($85.43) 
per acre at the time.  It was a “very fair price” he stated with conviction.59  If one looks at 
the omitted land sales in the land acquisition documents, one finds something different.  
In averaging the first 10 land sales of 2001, one finds the registered market value to be Rs 
33,200 ($709.10) per acre, with the lowest value being Rs 5,500 ($117.47) per acre and 
the highest being Rs 154,000 ($3,289.18) per acre60. Only one of these lands was 
classified as “wet”. Thus since much of the land that was acquired in 2003 was wet (as 
shown by my survey), there is even more evidence that the value would be even higher 
                                                 
59 Interview, 6 July 2009.  
60 Land Acquisition Documents, Government of Andhra Pradesh Revenue Divisional Office, 
Mahabugnagar, 2 March 2005.   
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than the average calculated using all past sales at registered value.  Further, in my survey 
I asked the 15 unaffected-by-SEZ farmers whether they had sold any land in Polepally, 
and if so what year they sold it and what they were paid.  The furthest back anyone had 
sold land was in 1993, and he was compensated Rs 40,000 ($854.33) per acre.  This was 
also the lowest price anyone out of the 15 had sold any of their land at61.    
The farmer who cited the value of land in 2001 to be Rs 4,000 ($85.43) per acre 
explicitly recognized that the price of real estate went up following acquisition but did 
not state to what value it escalated.  He also did not see this immediate rise in value as a 
reason for higher compensation for those who lost their land62. On the other end of the 
spectrum, in a group discussion with four Dalit63 families, each patriarch stated their 
grievances with what they deemed as an insultingly low compensation.  Their primary 
complaint was that it took until 2006 to receive their compensation and by that time the 
value of the land had skyrocketed64.  According to Matthews, it was in 2005-2007 that 
the price of land surged dramatically in Polepally65, and at that time the government was 
selling land for Rs 7 lakh ($14,000) per acre to the companies (Comptroller and Auditor 
General’s Report, 2007).  Thus, if the government was selling the land at Rs 7 lakh per 
acre to the companies with the promise of “affordable land”, it is safe to say that the true 
market value of land in Polepally was far more than Rs 7 lakh.  It should be noted that 
this farmer’s situation is an anomaly in that he was compensated much later than the 
average land loser, with the average length of time following acquisition to receive 
                                                 
61 Survey Polepally Land Losers, 2009.  
62 Anon. Interview. 5 July 2009.  
63 Recall, Dalit is a term for those who belong to the oppressed castes that were traditionally referred to as 
“untouchable”.  
64 Anon. Interview. 15 July, 2009.  
65 Matthews, Biju. Interview. 2 June 2009.   
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money being 1.5 years (mid 2002)66.  Even so, judging by previous information the 
amount they were given would have been glaringly insufficient to purchase new land.  
This is, of course, not even taking into consideration the fact that most farmers do not 
have necessary skills to convert cash into capital.   
The end result was a situation where only six respondents of the 50 surveyed 
“affected” persons used their award compensation to purchase new land (12%)67.  This 
directly contradicted the narrative of one of the wealthier Reddys68: 
“My vision of the future is that my village will one day become a modern village.  
Already 2-3 lakhs of people are being employed in good jobs.  People who are 
losing their land are being paid a reasonable price.  The problem is, some idiots in 
this village threw away all their money buying arrak (local alcohol), mobile 
phones, and TVs.  The majority of the people in this village used their 
compensation to buy new, better land.”69 
Paradoxically, of the six investors, only one of them was not a pattador, and he (the 
assignee) purchased six acres at the cost of Rs 120,000 ($2,563) per acre in 2003.  This is 
further evidence that the price of land had gone up even before the 2005-2007 real estate 
boom, making it impossible for any assignees (compensated on average Rs 15,000 
($320.37) per acre) to invest in new land.  Tangentially, I later found out that the one 
assignee that was able to purchase new land was only able to do so through the 
subordinate sales of all of his cattle, which prior to 2003 was a thriving business for 
him70.   
                                                 
66 Survey Polepally Land Losers, 2009.  
67 Ibid. 
68 The Reddy caste is a group that has garnered political power throughout Andhra Pradesh at alarming 
rates in recent years.  I will further explain this phenomenon in later chapters.  
69 Reddy, Ravinder.  Interview. July 2009.  
70 Anon.  Interview. July 2009.  
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IV. THE CASE OF ASSIGNEES: POOR MAN’S LAND IN RICH MAN’S HAND 
Shortly after independence, the GoAP undertook steps to enforce ceiling laws, 
which were to redistribute and assign surplus lands to those who were living in the most 
economically weak conditions of Andhra Pradesh.  This reform was exceedingly limited 
in that it declared only 3.03% of the total owned land surplus, and of that only about one 
half was redistributed.  Most of the land was dry land.  Overall, only about 7.61 percent 
of the composite marginal farmers and landless laborers benefited from this “reform” 
(Parthasarathy 1995:1).  Later, between 1969 and 1984 some 1.5 million hectares of 
wasteland was distributed, but it is unknown as to how much of this land actually went to 
the poor (ibid).  However inefficient these reforms may have been, the Andhra Pradesh 
Assigned Lands (prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, was enacted to protect those who 
did receive assigned (ceiling) or waste lands.  This prevented the alienation of assigned 
lands to any third party that didn’t include the original beneficiary of assigned land.  
Mahbubnagar, often referred to as one of the poorest districts in Andhra Pradesh (District 
Profile 2009:6), was one of these beneficiaries, although the aforementioned studies have 
shown that land reform was weak in its distributional affect on Andhra as a whole.  This 
village, Polepally, an anomaly, was abundant in assigned land.  In the land acquisition 
process, 160 of the total land losing families were assignees (commonly referred to as 
“assignees”).  How could the GoAP first distribute this land to the poor and then acquire 
it, especially in lieu of the AP Assigned Lands Act?  Controversially implemented in 
synchronization with the Special Economic Zone Act (2005), the GoAP amended this act 
in 2006 to allow transfers of land that “is either not being used for the purpose it is meant 
or being sold to third parties”.  “In such a situation”, said Mohd Ali Shabbir, the State 
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Information Minister, “the Government would be able to acquire such lands”71.  
According to officials, the motive behind this act was to redistribute assigned lands back 
to the poor, but at the same time the Government would be allowed to use these lands for 
“public purpose”.  As we have seen before, the meaning of the word “public” is 
controversial and was transmuted by the colonial government so as to include private 
enterprise.  But didn’t this amendment come after the land in Polepally was acquired? 
Petitions from civilian groups have suggested that similar illegal sales of assigned lands 
were going on throughout the state.  For instance, The Andhra Pradesh Vyavasaya 
Karmika Sangham (or self-help group) released a document that listed 8,700 acres of 
assigned land as grabbed and also lists 90 key public, industry and real estate figures as 
responsible for the misappropriation.  A public interest litigation filed in the High Court 
(writ petition no.14795/05) pointed out that influential persons had grabbed land worth 
over Rs 50,000 crores ($10.27 billion) in violation of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned 
Lands Act72.  The fact that the Chief Minister of AP, Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR), 
was in possession of at least 310.57 acres of assigned land is testimony to the nature of 
lawlessness surrounding the assigned lands issue73.  With this information coming to 
light the AP Assigned Lands Act ordinance was quickly changed to allow peopl
“voluntarily” give up their assigned land within 90 days without facing prosecution
e to 
                                                
74.      
V. COMPENSATION FOR ASSIGNED LANDS 
 
71 CBI to probe IMG Bharata land deal, 2006. Hindu Business Line Home. 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/09/30/stories/2006093002901900.htm 
72 Ibid.  
73 YRS Surrenders 997 acres Family Land. Business Standard, 4 January 2007.  
74 Ibid. 
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The further crass treatment of assignees is displayed in Polepally where 160 
assignees lost their lands, and the local government produced no written documentation 
of the method used to calculate compensation value for their property.   Assigned land 
was arbitrarily valued at Rs 18,000 ($384.45) (a little more than half of the patta land 
value, Rs 36,000 ($768.90).  There was no explanation given for this deviation of prices.  
One government official at the Jadcherla mandal office defends this by asserting, “It was 
a charitable donation… Rs 18,000 ($384.45) is much more than their land was worth 
anyways. The farmers are getting a deal.”75  First of all, the idea that the farmers are not 
entitled to any compensation (that any amount given is “charitable”) is not a legal claim 
but rather a classist and crude remark.  The Land Acquisition Act allows for transactions 
to happen from landholders to government officials only if there is a public purpose, and, 
even under that archaic law, all land losers have the basic “right” to compensation 
according to section 11.  Further, according to a law passed in 1992 (GO 1307), assigned 
land holders are legally entitled to the minimum amount given to pattadors, though they 
are still exempt from the right to go to court for the enhancement of the amount. But, 
again, in Polepally even that minimum amount was not granted to them.   
On the other hand, from a purely market-driven analysis, there should be no 
delineation between assigned land and patta land, as the distinction makes no pragmatic 
difference in, say, constructing a railroad or a freeway.  An economic analysis would 
prove that the assignees’ land is of equal or higher value than the pattadors, depending on 
the quality of its soil, irrigation, proximity to roads and other public works.  One might at 
the same time argue that assignees deserve higher compensation because of their 
                                                 
75 Interview 10 July 2009.   
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disproportionately higher need.  It is dangerous that the government is making a 
normative statement that assigned land is less valuable, for it may set a precedent for 
developers to selectively target assigned land areas.  Assigned land holders are less 
“entitled” and don’t require justification for compensation values; they are incapable of 
demanding adequate compensation that more closely mirrors the market value because 
their land is seen as a retractable handout rather than a valuable, productive asset.   
More disturbingly, it emerged over a wave of bickering in the interview with four 
Dalit families that one assigned land holding farmer was only sanctioned Rs 9,000 
($192.22) per acre, exactly half of the correct entitlement for assignees.  Later, I realized 
this was a common phenomenon; my hypothesis was that it was only a trend among 
participants in the SEZ and that the government used this tactic as a disciplinary measure.  
Thus, one of my survey questions for all land losers was: “What type of land [assigned or 
patta] did you lose?” and another was “How much were you compensated per acre?”  Of 
the 33 assigned land losers I interviewed, the average compensation was Rs 15,000 
($320.37) to Rs 3,000 ($64.07) less than what was promised per acre.  10 farmers 
reported a compensation value less than Rs 18,000 ($384.45) per acre; one farmer was 
compensated a meager Rs 5,000 ($106.79) per acre.  The explanation, according to the 
farmers, is always “the middle man ate it up”, meaning collectors took a bribe before the 
compensation was properly sanctioned.  Some implicate specific officials, namely the 
sarpanch at the time of acquisition, Jangayya Gajja.  However, interestingly, it should be 
noted that of these 10 farmers who were cheated out of a portion of their compensation 
against their will, eight were SC, two were ST, two were widowed women who lost their 
husbands during the anti-SEZ struggle (which will be discussed at length), and eight were 
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active participants in the struggle.  Three of them fielded themselves as candidates in the 
local election and thus are considered highly public figures.  In the patta land-loser 
category the compensation proved, overall, to be well above the promised amount of Rs 
36,000 ($768.90) per acre.  Only three people reported unwillingly receiving less than the 
promised value of compensation out of the 32 patta land losers I surveyed, while five 
willingly rejected the compensation all together and received nothing.  Thus, out of the 
27 willing acceptors of compensation, the average compensation was Rs 56,481 
($1,206.34) per acre.  Out of the three people who were non-consensually deprived of 
part [or all] of their compensation, one of them was a mentally disabled member of the 
SC, one was a key SC figure in the anti-SEZ struggle (who received nothing), and the last 
was one of the rare members of the BC community who fought alongside the Dalits in 
the struggle.  This final respondent explains that she wrote songs about the struggle for 
land.  I was privileged to get a dose of her devotion when she performed one of her 
political songs for us, breaking into tears as the lyrical Telugu words left her lips.  Also as 
a matter of concern, all of those (five) who initially rejected compensation as an act of 
protest against the acquisition were later punished for this deviance.  All reported that 
their money was supposed to be sent to the district court but the government is, to this 
day, withholding the money from them.  This contextual information provides true the 
hypothesis that the compensation process, specifically to what extent persons were 
compensated the full amount, were lowered according to ones vulnerability (given that 
assignees are more economically and socially vulnerable than pattadors) and possibly the 
degree to which the person was involved in anti-SEZ activities.   
V1. THE POSTCOLONIAL CONDITION AND PEASANT RESISTENCE  
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62 years following independence the postcolonial condition continues to plague 
the Indian subcontinent.  By invoking the colonial land acquisition act, the GoI has 
essentially reduced the Indian people to colonial subjects once again.  For example, in the 
Polepally case the government made a surplus profit of 10/15 crores (roughly $2-3 
million)76.  By no means is the government required to be accountable to anyone in its 
expenditure of this unprecedented extraction.  This corruption invokes images of the 
drain of wealth imposed on Indian peasantry during the British era, leaving the Indian 
countryside in shambles.  In a 2007 circular, the GoI defended itself against those who 
indicted the SEZ as a scam with the idea that land acquisition shall be extended to 
increase the number of entertainment outlets e.g. golf courses and shopping malls.  It is 
this mentality that propels the post colonial condition, where entertainment is seen as 
“forward” and subsistence is seen as “backward”.  Instead of valuing the life behind the 
subsistence farmer, a sterilization mob mentality is operating in the pro-globalization, 
neo-liberal camp.  India's first private sector-run SEZ was built at Mahindra City, 650 
miles southwest of Mumbai.  It is a $2 billion technology, electronics and textiles 
enterprise, spanning 1,400 acres adjacent to a new six-lane highway.  In the Wall Street 
Journal, investors are told consolingly that while Madras might be a rat-infested cesspool, 
there is hope within the walls of the export zone.   The SEZ is a “sprawling complex with 
roads, water, sewage and phone lines” and “has two stable and independent sources of 
power and enough water for a whole city.”   Schools, houses and a golf course are also 
described as part of the Mahindra City vision.  It has its own processing for all state and 
federal approvals and its own customs office so that the computer hard drives, auto parts 
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and shirts that leave the complex won't face delays at Madras's inefficient port77. 
Essentially, the insular SEZ creates a world-class city that circumvents the realities of 
Indian rural poverty.  
Ultimately, the “public purpose” line leaves the rural poor excluded from the 
nation’s “purpose”.  I must be clear that my argument is not that farmers should be forced 
to remain in an undesirable profession and I do not romanticize the precariousness of 
village life.  Outside of the fact that acquisition is not and has never been predicated with 
the requirement that farmers have an alternative livelihood, the hyper-industrialist 
paradigm does exactly what I fear the most; it robs the farmer the right to self-determine.  
It is a valuable inquiry: how much does the development rhetoric impact the subaltern 
farmers’ willingness to defend their property and their lives?  Of course, when it comes 
down to life or death, humans have the tendency to fight for life, which is why we see 
pocketed outbursts and unsuccessful rebellions.  Regardless of the attention they draw, 
they are too little, too late.  For example, one might turn to the ghastly example of 
Nandigram, where the government of West Bengal attempted to transfer 14,000 acres of 
agricultural land to Indonesia’s Salim Group to establish a SEZ.  Nearly 3,000 villagers 
revolted, and security forces responded with a deluge of violence upon hundreds, killing 
14 villagers on March 14, 200778.  Nandigram, receiving a slew of media attention, has 
come to be a euphemism for “state-sponsored corporate violence against peasants”.  As 
founder-director of the India Development Foundation (LDF) Shubhashis Gangopadhyay 
says, “There is no reason for Nandigram to happen in a democracy. It is a disgrace that in 
                                                 
77 Bellman, Eric. “Mahindra Satyam’s New Owner Tries to Move Past Disgraced Owner”. The Wall Street 
Journal.  July 23rd, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB134830819046244189.html 
78 Phadikar, Anshuman. “Nandi’s Chickens Come Home to Roost.” The Telegraph. May 14th, 2010. 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100514/jsp/bengal/story_12447702.jsp 
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this day and age the only way a person can be heard is by being shot, or raped.”79 Tracing 
the chronology of the anti-SEZ peasant struggle, Tehelka points to the Goa struggle in 
2008.  Purportedly, massive public protests over the span of a few years led to the 
government to reconsider the SEZ policy in Goa altogether, and twelve of the fifteen 
proposed SEZs were “scrapped”.  Further, militant struggles have also transpired in 
Orissa with the POSCO steel project, which has been touted as India’s largest FDI.   It is 
expected by developers to bring in Rs 50,000 crore, yet it has been stalled continuously 
since 2006 due to the widespread public opposition.  Another anti-SEZ, anti-land 
grabbing struggle received considerable media attention in the towering Mahamumbai 
SEZ in Raigad, Maharashtra80.  
Despite these rare peasant “victories” in the militant movements in Bengal, Goa 
and Maharashtra one must question: Why it is that in most situations peasants are failing 
to predict the life threatening situation that land acquisition puts them in?  Even if 
peasants retroactively protest the acquisition, it is usually at a stage that is too far down 
the line to obtain tangible results.  
 
CHAPTER 3: VOICES FROM POLEPALLY (FIELD WORK) 
In the short time I was immersed in the field, I was able to make several 
observations about the nature of the interaction between hegemonic power and the 
subaltern and the demobilization that comes as a result. I shall start with a story of the 
establishment of the Polepally SEZ, the struggle and where my role as a researcher fit in, 
                                                 
79 Government Must Have Greater Transparency While Creating SEZs, 2007. Tehelka. 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main30.asp?filename=Bu020607Punditspeak_7.asp 
80 Shrivastava, Aseem. The Peasant Mutiny of 2009. July 18th, 2009.  Tehelka. 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main42.asp?filename=cr180709the_peasant.asp 
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because, as stated before the aim of my research was to play an entirely interactive role in 
fighting oppression. Thus the interviews, the surveys, and activism I engaged in while in 
Polepally are valuable mediums to analyze resistance. 
I. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF RESEARCH 
When I entered Polepally, a small village about 80 km outside of the Andhra 
Pradesh state capital, Hyderabad, I had been instructed to expect apathy.  I had spoken to 
renowned activist-writer, Bijay Matthews, days before I embarked on the road to 
Polepally.  He said “Don’t expect that they warm up to you right away”81, but I had no 
precedence to imagine the pervasiveness of their hopelessness.  I remember my first 
Polepally interview was in the Gund Lagga Tanda (colony) with a 40-year old Lambada 
woman, Rukmini82. 
Rukmini was so distressed and revolted with the idea of speaking to me, that she 
greeted me with a plea of death.  Before I could muster the words to introduce myself she 
yelped, “Do you have any poison? Because I want to die!” She then proceeded to flail her 
ornamented body about in the sweltering sun.  Beads of sweat were accumulating on her 
corpulent neck and eyebrow ridge.  Her dirty toes were adorned with gaudy toe rings, a 
symbol of being a married woman.  They dug deep into the crumbly red soil.  Her 
                                                 
81 Matthews, Bijay.  Interview 10 August 2009.  
82 The Lambada is a community among other tribes notorious for their hard agricultural work and trade, 
their gaudy clothes and their Lambani song and dance homage they pay to the gods in the high hopes of a 
good harvest. Indigenously, they were concentrated in the arid land of Rajasthan but bled outwards like the 
murky smog of a dessert fire to find agricultural work and trade in many other parts of India. The Lambada 
belong to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) Caste, as classified by the Andhra Pradesh State Government. STs have 
been characterized as marginalized; despite the constitutional amendments put in place to protect them 
from outside encroachment (see Schedule 5). Although adivassis live in all different geographic biomes, 
this can be attributed to two broad reasons:  1. They are often located in tandas distant from the village and 
have trouble accessing power 2. They rely directly on India’s rapidly deteriorating natural resource base to 
sustain their livelihoods and their habitat.   
64 
 
graying hair was parted and collected messily into what looked like two silver medallions 
on each side of her head.  I later learned these medallions are called chotla.  I noticed 
myself fetishizing these gaudy symbols of tradition, as did the media in covering the 
struggle.  It was a realization that disgusted me.  In the distance, several toddlers roamed 
in the nude.  Their bodies looked like little potatoes rolling across a mound of cow dung. 
In the foreground, the lightening bolt of energy was leaving Rukmini’s body; she retired 
to the rough jute bag rug upon which I sat cross-legged, along with three other women 
dressed in similar “garb”. One of the women held a six-or-so-year-old girl who had 
puppy dog eyes, long eyelashes, and two feet that curled under like the tail of a kitten. 
She couldn't walk, so she had to be carried everywhere she went. She was very shy, 
unlike the voluptuous Rukmini, who in response to my intimidated request to talk to her, 
asked, unreservedly, “Why should we talk to you? What are you going to do for us, give 
us back our land?” It was a question I was about to encounter a lot in the coming days.  I 
felt like I was the host of a bad television show: the White, male host goes into a 
degrading Black neighborhood and interviews cowering women about their abusive 
relationships.  You, from your arm chair, are protesting, “Why don’t you help them?”  I 
realized I was the elite talk show host.  And I obviously could not help them.  
Before I could think of anything to say to her rhetorical question, another woman 
had started speaking in a shrill tone, and then another started shouting over her.  They 
were having a yelling match about their land loss.  It was clear they knew I was here to 
ask them about the SEZ, and it was almost as if they had planned out their grief and 
summoned it here to share with me.  Once the time came to execute the performance, 
they couldn’t decide who would take the leading role.  They took their frustration out on 
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each other and their audience, who was paying to watch the show.  The reality was that 
dozens of reporters, activists, politicians and lawyers had been prying their way into the 
“Polepally disaster” after the 2009 MLA election, where 13 farmers stood as independent 
candidates to protest their losses.  In fact, what initially attracted me to Polepally Village 
was an article I stumbled upon in The Hindu titled “Polepally Thirteen Protest SEZ 
Killings in Jadcherla” written by Palagummi Sainath.   Although the stunt was intended 
to draw people to the village to hear the voices of Polepally, most of the Polepally people 
had lost complete faith in the movement by the time I arrived in July and had no interest 
in outsiders.  After struggling for so long, with their demand of “land for land” remaining 
unfulfilled, many seemingly wanted their normal lives back- as normal, of course, as life 
could be in the absence of the one thing that sustained their dignity and livelihoods.   
II. BACKGROUND ON THE POLEPALLY VILLAGE 
Polepally lies in the heart of the Mahbubnagar district, consisting of 64 mandals, 11 
towns, and 1,545 villages (1476 inhabited villages and 69 uninhabited).   Its name came 
from Mahabugnagar, its headquarters town, which was named after the erstwhile 6th 
Nizam, Mir Mahabubali Khan, in 1929.  The district was earlier and continues to be 
known by many as ‘Palamuuru’.  Its boundaries are: Rangareddy and Nalgonda districts 
(to the North), Nalgonda and Guntur districts (to the East), the rivers Krishna and 
Tungabhadra (to the South) and Raichur and Gulbarga districts of the Karnataka state (to 
the West).  Its total area is 18,432 sq. kms (District Profile, 2009).  
Mahbubnagar is one of the poorest districts of India with 52% of its population 
living below the poverty line.  A further indicator of the pervasive poverty is that one 
fourth of the 3,503,876 population falls either in the SC or ST category (as per the 2001 
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census).  The ST population is largely made up of the Chenchus, Banharas and 
Lambanis.  Tribal peoples in this district have the lowest female illiteracy in the state, 
plummeting as low as 3.1%.  Overall literacy in Mahbubnagar is low but comparable to 
that of the state.   
The district is almost entirely rural (89.40%), with little urbanization and few 
farm opportunities.  In fact, Mahbubnagar has seen increasing ruralization over time, 
contrary to the growth trajectory of most of the state (with 10% higher rural population 
than that of AP as a whole) (ibid).   Its inegalitarian social practices are perhaps the best 
indicators of the poverty inherent in the district.  For example, the atrocious jogini 
system83 is still practiced ubiquitously in both the villages and the mandal headquarters.  
Further, Mahbubnagar’s palamuuru, or large-scale migrant labor system, has brought the 
district considerably infamy and has been referred to as “the largest migration in the 
world” (ibid).  The practice has its origins in the colonial era, the British using bonded 
labor groups to further “public works” such as highways, railway tracks, and irrigation 
projects.  The Nizam of Hyderadad recruited labor from the district as early as the 1920s.  
In 1934 Mahbubnagar citizens formed the work force in the construction of the famous 
Nizamsagar dam.  The exploitative practice hasn’t disappeared with economic liberalism, 
with industrial dams all across the nation being constructed on the backs of Mahbubnagar 
citizens (ibid).  Accordingly, between 10-15 lakh (1-1.5 million) people go out in search 
of work every year.84  Workers are recruited by village administration by giving 
advances of as low as Rs 5-Rs 10 (.21 - .32 ¢).  This practice, according to CARPED, 
                                                 
83 Jogini is the practice of enslaving young Dalit women as prostitutes for the use of forwards caste 
patriarchs.  
84 Iyengar, Pushpa.  Migration is a way of Life in Mahbubnagar. The Times of India News Service.  
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“underlies every other social evil [of the district]- be it child labour, female illiterac
gender inequality, poverty and powerlessness” (i
y, 
bid).   
In Polepally, the majority of the total workers (2,517) were considered “main” 
workers (2,336).  A little less than half of the total workers were considered “laborers”, 
while a little more than half were considered “main” cultivators. This means the majority 
was gainfully employed in agriculture. Those who are classified as “laborers” could 
either be workers on a landlord’s property or migratory contract laborers.  Seeing as how 
in the census data there is a category for “marginal” workers who only account for 181 
persons, it can be assumed that the majority of the “laborers” category was not migratory 
(Census 2001).   In my survey, ten out of 51 land losers reported that they left the village 
for more than 60 days in the past three years (about 20%).  On the other hand, none of the 
15 non-land-losers reported labor migration.  This suggests that landlessness degrades 
ones capability to resist out migration.  Also, seeing as how there were very few landless 
people in Polepally prior to acquisition, it would be interesting to know how many of 
these 10 were contract laborers in the pre-SEZ era.  
III. POLEPALLY ANTI­SEZ STRUGGLE 
“We, Polepalli SEZ Vyathireka Aikya Sanghatana are contesting these elections 
as we find all political groups have cheated the poor farmers and are responsible for their 
deaths. All political parties are silent on this major crime that’s taking the lives of people 
in the name of the SEZ”.  These powerful words were endorsed in a press release by the 
“Polepally Thirteen”, the label conferred upon the SEZ-affected Dalit farmers who ran as 
independent candidates in local elections.  The election was a political move “to split the 
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votes of the dominant parties who are responsible for the state [their] people are in 
today”, explained a younger member of Polepally to a reporter from Tehelka85.  The 
Polepally Thirteen plus two other non-land losing farmers did in fact cost the Telangana 
Rastra Samithi (TRS)86 legislator his seat in the May 2008 Jadcherla election. An even 
more impressive story was the garnering of 77,568 votes in contesting the 2009 
Parliamentary election for the Mahbubnagar seat in the Lokh Sabha.  The media went 
wild with the mere idea that uneducated farmers would speak back to power and 
implicate corrupt politicians as direct participants in the decline of the village.  It seemed 
to outsiders like a Zapatista-style revolution was happening in Southern India.  
The idea of a united farmer struggle disappears when you immerse yourself in the 
village.  First off, it was clear not everyone was ideologically committed to the anti-
imperial movement, as many had implied.  In fact, most people were not.  Many did not 
care or understand the broader need for rethinking the development model across India, 
nor did they seem particularly moved by the movements’ “politicization” of their 
community.  This is not to say that the movement did not politicize the people, but in a 
myopic sense the people found this transformation useless.  Politicization on its own 
terms is futile unless there is something to fight for; the farmers at this point saw nothing 
left to do.  One of the many times people asked me why I was so persistent on recording 
their narratives, I responded something to the tune of “The more your voice is heard, the 
more common people will understand the problems inherent in land acquisition, and we 
can stop this from happening to other farmers across India”.  The audible scoff at this 
answer rendered my own concern disingenuous, in my head at least.  I knew I honestly 
                                                 
85 Asher, Manshi. “Land from Landless”. Tehelka, 9 August 2008.  
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=cr090808landfrom_landless.asp 
86 The TRS was the local ruling party when the “Green Park” was introduced in 2001. 
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did feel that it was extremely important to publicize the atrocities caused by the SEZ 
policy.  However, my motives were insensitive for several reasons.  Aside from my elite 
cosmopolitanism, allowing me to escape the reality of the situation I was in without 
risking financial or physical jeopardy, I was coming from a distinctly anti-imperial 
perspective.  I was fantasizing about waging a national peasant revolution, creating a 
vehicle for an international solidarity struggle.  However, in reality an anti-imperialist 
ideological struggle seemed beyond their scope of immediate attention.  As Scott 
describes, the peasant is subject to a certain kind of localization (Scott 1983).  They are 
more or less confined to their village, exiting only for work, to visit the market in 
adjacent mandals, or, if they are privileged, visit relatives in the nearest major city, 
Hyderabad.  During times of famine in Vietnam, explains Scott, there were villages 
where nobody went hungry, adjacent to ones where everyone did.  Sharing with someone 
from within the village was second nature and turned out to be the only way people 
survived, yet sharing with someone from another village was unheard of (ibid).  But I 
cannot attribute the peasants’ localized interest entirely to their lack of experience. 
Localization occurs at all levels of society; even among cosmopolitan activists.  I 
can say that it was my own localization that prevented me from initially seeing the whole 
picture.  Whereas the corruption inherent in evicting poor farmers to start sweat shops 
was clear as day to me, I was blind to the deeply-rooted issues (caste hierarchy, 
landlordism and local politics) that were catalyzing and allowing land acquisition to 
continue.  As VB Rawat, from the Center for Social Development, reminded me, “When 
you fight against American Imperialism, you have to fight against Indian imperialism”87  
It was Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar, the first “untouchable” statesman and caste reformer, who 
                                                 
87 Rawat, Vidya Bhushan. Interview, 10 August 2010.  
70 
 
said during the freedom struggle that the Indian village is marred with religious 
fundamentalism and casteism.  Although, as we will see, this hierarchy has reached all 
time heights in the post-independence era, it was a salient issue long before Ambedkar’s 
time.  Thus, to liberate the Indian people, one had to attack the core of social hierarchy 
and oppression.   In his critique of those who unilaterally saw freedom in economic 
reform, he declared rather poignantly, “Men will not join in a revolution for the 
equalization of property unless they know that after the revolution is achieved they will 
be treated equally and that there will be no discrimination of caste and creed” (Ambedkar 
1944:10)  
In brief, it was clear by the farmers’ first and foremost intention- rehabilitation- 
that they did not subscribe to the anti-globalization ideological battle.  In reconstructing a 
subaltern history, one must recognize the motives of the people and how they arrive at 
that point.  It is instructive that in the earliest phases of land acquisition, there was hardly 
any anti-development action taken by the farmers. When HRF (Human Rights Forum), a 
network of lawyers working on behalf of marginalized folks in Andhra Pradesh, 
attempted to mobilize the Polepally people in 2001, knowing the potentially harmful 
manifestations of the SEZ, the Polepally farmers were not inspired by their enthusiasm.  
“We read them their rights and asked them if they were ready to rebel.” However, “They 
were not ready”88.   
In numerous interviews farmers were asked, “Why did you sign the land acquisition 
documents?” Other than being coerced through explicit threats or being bribed with 
alcohol or other gifts, there were three common responses. 
                                                 
88 Balagopal, Kandalla. Interview, 5 August 2009. 
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(1) Hopes for finding a new frontier.  According to one account, small farmers 
were suffering from poor soil, with semi-sandy and rocky lands; the prospect of 
buying new land elsewhere was tempting89.   
(2) Overcoming geographical isolation. In anticipation of the construction of the 
new airport in Shamshabad there came, alongside a flurry of media-driven 
hyperbole, the hype over the road: National Highway Number 7.  In Polepally, 
several miles from No. 7 with only two daily rickshaw rides to and from it, 
farmers were motivated by the thought of buying land closer to the major road, on 
which they could sell their goods.  Others were under the impression that if they 
had better access to the road, they could go in search for jobs more easily.  32-
year old, Narsima, recounted his story:  “In 2003, when I found out my land was 
being acquired I sold all of my cattle and bought a small housing plot near the 
road in a neighboring village.  Now I don’t have anything left.  If I were properly 
compensated I could build a house there.” 90  
(3) Gaining reliable employment. Other farmers, I found, were driven by the idea of 
steady employment in the anticipated “Green Park”.  One farmer of 
Mudureddypally said he thought the Green Park would become a “plantation”91.  
Others had the impression that they would become paid horticulturalists in the 
new companies.   
IV. MAHBUBNAGAR: STRUGGLE FOR LIVELIHOOD 
                                                 
89 Anon. Interview, 10 July 2009.  
90 Anon. Interview, 8 July 2009.  
91 Asher, Manshi.  Land From Landless. August 9th, 2008. Tehelka.  
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=cr090808landfrom_landless.asp 
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In Andhra Pradesh, there are 80 lakh (170,866) acres under irrigation. But in drought-
prone areas, farmers are not aided by government programs any more than the ones that 
are irrigated.  The district of Mahbubnagar, where Polepally lies, is often referred to as 
karuvu jilla (drought district). It has massive expanses that are officially declared as 
“drought affected”, and cultivation is only possible for four months during the kharif 
(monsoon season) (District Profile, 2009).  On the other hand, drought-plagued districts 
have overcome their crisis through a wide range of tactics.  With the use of indigenous 
knowledge, environmental think tanks have formulated an array of models to combat 
drought, which range from watershed management to subsidizing indigenous drought-
tolerant crops.  The problem is that these programs to alleviate drought have been largely 
neglected or underfunded by the government.  
Further, according to my survey, the most common crops grown in Polepally were 
wheat, corn, and BT-cotton.  There is evidence that BT-cotton has caused a mass of crop 
loss, which has led farmers down a winding tunnel of debt (District Profile, 2009).  In 
Polepally, as my survey showed, most farmers are in a situation where they are 
perpetually indebted to usurious market lenders92.  On average, each responded was Rs 
43,800 ($935.49) in the hole.  20% of the total respondents said they used all of their land 
compensation money to clear debts.   
As a result of the unattended drought situation, people who have only four meager 
months of agriculture, for the remainder of the year are left to migrate to find contract 
labor.  As mentioned before, Mahbubnagar’s palamuuru, or migratory labor system, has 
                                                 
92 Interview July 2009. 
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been referred to as “the largest migration in the world”, and between 10-15 lakh (1-1.5 
million) people go out of the district in search of work every year.93   
V. AWAKENING TO POLITICAL ACTION IN POLEPALLY 
It was not until 2005 that the farmers realized that the Green Park was slated to 
become a pharmaceutical SEZ; from 2003-2005 their land sat fallow.  The news that the 
government was selling 75 acres to both Hetero Drugs Pvt Ltd and Aurobindo Pharma 
Ltd at the price of Rs. 7 lakhs/acre marked a turning point in the struggle94.  The fact that 
farmers were then mobilized at this point can be explained by two main factors.  The first 
stems from the fact that farmers then realized that they would not after all be granted the 
horticultural jobs they were promised.  They would either be reduced to menial jobs in 
the companies, or even worse, full time dependence on palamuuru.  The second reason 
for mobilization is, to put it plainly, the feeling of being gypped.  Gurr asserts that 
“relative deprivation is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and…the more 
widespread and intense deprivation is among members of the population, the greater is 
the magnitude of strife” (Gurr 1968:1105).  What can further be extrapolated from Gurr’s 
hypothesis is: the likelihood and magnitude of rebellion comes from the gap between 
what a person is getting versus what the person thinks he/she deserves, or one’s perceived 
deprivation.  As such, the Polepally farmer was discontented with the initial amount 
granted, but when he saw the APIIC profiting at a rate that was nearly 38 times the rate 
he was paid, not too long after his land was acquired, the likelihood of rebellion 
increased.   
                                                 
93 Iyengar, Pushpa.  Migration is a way of Life in Mahbubnagar. The Times of India News Service.  
94 Balagopal, Kandalla. Interview 5 August 2009.  
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The initial upsurge, however, was rudimentary and militant.  One woman recounts 
her experience partaking in this battle: 
In the beginning [2003], there were only three of us, Kurumaya, Garuma and 
Venkatama We made a suicide threat to the [SEZ] officials with a vile of poison.  
We sabotaged all of the water pipes.  We cut a fire trail all around the perimeter of 
the park and set it ablaze.  We chopped down the trees that used to belong to us.  
The developers built a fence to keep us out, and we chopped that down too.  At 
that time, I had so much energy to fight the companies. 
 
By 2006 (after they learned of the sale to Hetero and Aurobindo), the group of 
three militants had grown into an association consisting of roughly 45 farmers.  
One day we set up tents on our fields and we brought our rice and we cooked our 
lunch right there.  Whenever someone walked into the SEZ, we would chase them 
and threw hot chili powder on their backs.  One night the police came to arrest us, 
and we didn’t want our husband to fight them….so we stood in front and said 
‘Remove your armor. We will fight you!  You people have cars… in your asses… 
and phones in your ears, come fight us! Then we were arrested and beaten with 
lathis. Anjamma [another woman from her caste community] suffered blows to 
her spine.  There were so many of us in the jeep, that several of our men jumped 
out of the back and ran.  When the police stopped to get them, many of us 
escaped. The men ran into the fields, where there were many thistles.  The men 
took their white lungis off and tied them under cloth on their heads so that they 
could not be seen.  The thistles [of the fields] were scratching…. their legs as they 
fled the police… half naked….[laughter erupts]. 95 
 
Another group of women recalled, “20 of us were taken into custody, we were in the 
prison for 2-3 days, we had to borrow money to post bail. It was very costly”.96   
 
 It was not until April of 2008 that a social reformer, Sujata Surepally, had come 
in from the outside and joined with another activist, Madhu Kagula (who had entered in 
2006), to direct this energy into a political campaign with five primary demands: 
• Scrap Polepally Pharma SEZ 
• Hand back the acquired lands to the farmers 
• Pay compensation for the loss of crop on acquired lands for the past 5 years 
• Order an enquiry by Supreme Court judge on the faulty land acquisition process 
                                                 
95 Anon. Interview, 5 July 2009.  
96 Group Interview, 15 July 2009.  
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• Stop further allotment of lands in Polepally SEZ and hand over the remaining 
land with immediate effect 
• Repeal SEZ Act 97 
  She nationalized their struggle through elite mediums such as blogs and activist 
forums in both English and Telugu.  They staged bhu satyagrahas98 and dharnas99.  Ms 
Surepally helped organize anti-SEZ mass meetings.  Representatives from all political 
parties except the ruling INC came to a Citizens Round Table in Hyderabad to discuss the 
Polepally land acquisition.  All political parties made promises to help the Polepally 
people.  The label 13 Dalit farmers fighting against injustice was romantic and attracted 
many activists and media to the village, including myself.  The newspaper, Tehelka, 
deemed it “one of the most creative and audacious and creative strategies that any 
grassroots movement has used in recent times to challenge existing power structures”100.  
Indeed, the farmers cost the local Telugu Desam Party MLA his seat in the Lok Sabha 
(the lower house of the Parliament of India) and raised a lot of awareness, but were they 
ultimately successful in realizing their demands?    
VI. PURCHASING DISSENT: VILLAGE­LEVEL PATERNALISM 
What can be quantified in the results of this hard fought battle, other than jail 
sentences and debt, is a series of marginal concessions granted by government officials.  
Each of the “affected”101 people technically received Rs 70,000 ($1,495.08), access to a 
communal ten-acre graveyard and a 36x50 ft plot to construct a home on.  These 
                                                 
97 Fighting Injustice in Polepally SEZ.  http://polepally.wordpress.com/ 
98 Bhu means land. Satyagraha is a form of non-violent resistance developed by Mahatma Gandhi during 
the Freedom Struggle.  Bhu Satyagraha, it follows, is resistance on land, or “land strike”.  
99 A dharna is a non-violent “sit-in”.  
100 Asher, Manshi.  Land From Landless. August 9th,  2008. 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=cr090808landfrom_landless.asp 
101 This word, is actually misleading as everyone in the village was affected in one way or another, given 
the gargantuan nature of the SEZ and the way it drastically altered group and individual relations in the 
village 
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concessions were confined to writing in many ways.  The supposed housing plots lay in a 
ditch, which would cost roughly Rs 10 lakhs ($21,358.33) to properly level, a huge sum 
that the government did not intend on providing.  Interviews with the government agents 
prove the volatility of these awards.  While state level decision-making officials spoke in 
terms of “philanthropy”, they simultaneously used a drawn-out award process to divert 
the attention of the actors within the movement.  This in turn allowed rank and file 
officials to now effectively or justifiably deflect responsibility for the plight of the 
farmers.  When confronted by farmers, rank and file officials are hard pressed to look 
them in the face.  Although they have jumbled information and are often incompetent at 
even recalling the most basic details of acquisition, they spout the same types of 
responses and remedies that are given by the APIIC. “Rome was not built in a day” was a 
favorite of these responses.  This was to say that the long-term benefits of land 
acquisition and the SEZ were yet to materialize.  The impatient, uncivilized farmers 
would have to sacrifice their “uncivilized” lives for a broader good of development.  
Rome was, after all, built on the backs of slaves.   
I actually began my trips to the government offices because I found out halfway 
through my stay in Polepally that 26 people, one of which was Narsima, had still not yet 
received the above Rs 70,000 ($1,400).  After countless hours and rupees of traveling 
back and forth to fight with government officials (actually Narsima had a very detailed 
booklet of all of the paisa he had spent traveling back and forth to revenue offices- the 
word countless would be inaccurate), Narsima had given up at trying to understand why 
he had not received this extra boost.  The boost, although not as valuable as land, would 
be enough money for him to build a small house on the miniature plot of land he had 
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purchased a long time back in another village.  I knew the local officers spoke some 
English, so I decided I would secure a rickshaw for us to travel to Jadcherla, where the 
Mandal Revenue Office was, to inquire about Narsima’s situation.  After waiting in a 
winding line for over two hours, Ravinder Reddy, one of the village officers, rang a bell 
and told us to approach his desk.  I introduced myself, strategically, as an American who 
had come to do research on Polepally SEZ.  I then introduced Narsima as a friend and a 
farmer of Polepally; we had come to ask him for help.  He then, with what I suspected 
was amusement in his eye, said, “Please, sit down.”  There was one plastic chair.  I 
offered it to Narsima first, and Mr. Reddy said, “No, you sit”.  Narsima was expected to 
stand.  This was not unusual behavior of a rank and file officer towards a land losing 
farmer; on another occasion the villager I was with was expected to assume the role of 
the chai-walla.  It did not matter that the intention of the meeting was to discuss her 
property.  It was clear the official had adopted a condescending and paternalistic persona.  
In regards to Narcima’s deprivation, Mr. Reddy did not have clear answers. He gave me 
several explanations for the missing sum, all of which were bogus.  He did, however, 
vehemently defend the APIIC.  He said “It was not their responsibility to take care of 
these poor farmers”, and “They were being generous by sanctioning the money in the 
first place”102.  At the end, for his precious attention, he expected us to pay him a bribe. 
Other officials gave similar defenses of the company’s neglect of some of 
Polepally’s poorest.  Although we were able to finally obtain a straightforward answer 
from one government official, the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO), it took us several 
trips of this nature to learn that the money was being granted in installments by the two 
existing corporations in the SEZ, Aurobindo LTD and Hetero Drugs.  The former 
                                                 
102 Reddy. Interview. 7 July 2009.  
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company was sanctioning money to half of the land losers while Hetero to the other half.  
We sent several letters of the following nature to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Sateesh 
Chendrah, who had the most direct interaction with the Development Commissioner of 
the SEZ:  
 
79 
 
Figure 1: Letter to Revenue Divisional Officer on Behalf of Polepally Farmer  
In the final days of my stay in Polepally, after camping outside Mr. Chendrah’s 
office for a total of ten hours, we managed to secure his personal cell phone number.  As 
he thought he’d elude us by being out of town, we retorted we’d meet him “half way” in 
his journey back into town.  We encountered him half an hour later at a government 
guesthouse.  After a cordial introduction, we were able to convince the official to make a 
personal visit to Hetero Drugs.  On the final day I was in Polepally, I received word that 
they had sanctioned the remaining installment.  This indeed was a bit of positive 
affirmation as to what I believe the real essence of research is and can be for all social 
scientists.  In my trips to the government offices I learned many things about the nature 
of governance at the village level.  I learned that local democratic institutions are either 
nonexistent or wield very little autonomy by any [institutional] political standards.  
Under-qualified, underpaid and dispassionate bureaucrats carry out decisions, while the 
lot of the people can have varying degrees of influence according to their caste and class, 
and the mood of the official in question.  In regards to Polepally, I learned from many 
officials who stopped to chat, curious of our intentions, that the word “Polepally” struck a 
sour chord in the bureaucratic score.  Some felt compelled to tell me they were 
“terrorized” by Polepally activists.  It seemed almost impossible for a farmer who 
participated in the anti-SEZ actions, like Narsima, to access power, let alone assert his 
right to information in this hostile environment.   This interaction led me to wonder, 
“Would a total rejection of this compensation, with a militant “no concessions” bottom 
line have been more beneficial to the people of Polepally?”  Clearly, an air of despair was 
a factor in the activists’ advice to take these band-aid allowances, especially with the 
mounting “unnatural deaths” among the ranks of the Polepally people.  But the 
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concessions had allowed even the rank-and-file officials to assume a paternalistic 
relationship with the farmers.  As my survey showed, 100% of the land losers now rely 
on the Public Distribution System (PDS) and have white ration cards, which are procured 
for those who earn less than 10,000 Rs/year or less.  Aside from the PDS, there are seven 
other welfare schemes that are provided by the state government.  Although most of these 
programs “do not serve the purpose if the beneficiary does not have money to meet part 
of the cost of the product i.e. margin money for building a house under Indira Awas 
Yojana”, a study by CARPED stated that dependence of welfare schemes has gone up in 
Polepally in the post-SEZ years (Bhushan 2010).   People complained that they have 
come to rely almost entirely on the PDS as a result of reduced availability of farm 
produce.  Further impoverishment has prevented Polepally residents from affording 
market prices of goods, thus purchasing more of their food from ration shops.  Out of a 
survey population of 370 respondents, the following results were measured: 
Welfare measures availed by 
respondents  
Yes percent No percent Not 
mentioned  
Total 
Do you have a ration card? 362 97.84 7 1.89 1 370 
Have you availed Indira Awas 
Yojana? 
90 24.32 279 75.41 1 370 
Do you have old age pension? 178 48.11 191 75.41 1 370 
Do you receive pensions for 
being physically handicapped? 
16 4.32 353 95.41 1 370 
Do you take part in NREGA? 185 50.00 184 49.73 1 370 
Do you participate in a thrift & 
credit group (SHG-IKP)? 
221 59.73 147 39.73 2 370 
Do you avail services of Rythu 
Mithra Group? 
4 1.08 365 98.65 1 370 
CARPED 2010 
Figure 2: Village Welfare in the Post-Acquisition Period 
Although it is not clear exactly to what degree the Polepally farmers’ dependence of 
welfare has increased, as there is no comparative data from pre-SEZ years, some of this 
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information is common sense.  Although farming is not a lucrative endeavor in the 
Mahbubnagar district and cash crops such as Bt-Cotton have failed on a mass scale, data 
that I collected in my survey showed that people were successfully growing a variety of 
food crops without a high incidence of crop failure.  The problems associated with 
increased welfare dependence are endemic, and it has long been known that welfare 
programs act as “instruments of manipulation” for paternalistic actors (Friere 2006:152).  
Local officials gain leverage over poor farmers, as they can choose with whom to build 
linkages.  One result has been the neglect of large portions of the poorest farmers, or 
those with the least political clout.  For example, one member of the ST described the 
relationship between the people in the Gundlaggada Tanda and the welfare system: 
We used to earn up to Rs. 1.5 lakh/yr. and now we are getting only Rs 10,000/yr.  
Under the ration program we get 1.5 kilo sugar, ½ kilo red gram, 4 kg rice per 
head, per month….Some have left the Thanda for other work….We cannot get 
NREG [National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme].  The government hasn’t 
included us. All tribes have one chief, the Darmanayak, who is the head of the 
ward.  But all wards are [in practice] headed by the Sarpanch [village chief].  The 
Sarpanch neglects us.  Only if we talk coolly can we get some special benefits.  
Most of the time we don’t have access to these things.103 
As Friere explains, this selective distribution, spoken about by this member of the 
Lambara Tribe, has the grave potential to “splinter the oppressed into groups of 
individuals hoping to get a few more benefits from themselves” (Friere 2006:152).  Those 
who do not receive aid “grow envious”, further diverting the people’s rebellious energy 
into finding ways to become the “ideal” poor man (ibid).           
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Interview, 11 July 2009.  
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VII. THE AFTERMATH: DESPAIR IN POLEPALLY 
Although the struggle ignited a flame, the acrimonious ending was a damp 
blanket.  As I was leaving the Tanda on that first day in Polepally, one of the women 
present in the interview asked me sarcastically if I was going to “take her photograph”.  I 
soon learned that a couple months back a big shot reporter had come to do a story on the 
struggle and had brought very fancy photo and video equipment.  Another activist I later 
met had filmed a short documentary on them.  Although I was the first to do academic 
study on the people of Polepally, it is common for activists who have visited the village 
to say they are suffering from “research fatigue”104.  A deluge of highly educated folks 
have entered the village to dissect, analyze, and give suggestions on the suffering of 
Polepally people, while people such as Abdul view our wealth and wonder, “What we 
will do for them?”  The agitation and desperation plaguing the village today is visible and 
urgent.  42 people had died of suicide or stress-induced heart attacks since the beginning 
of the battle in 2003, according to villagers.  Often women are left to bear the financial 
burdens (clearing the debts left behind by their husbands) and social burdens, widows 
being historically stigmatized and outcaste from the village.   
In the remainder of the interview with the men in Abdul’s shop, I asked the 
question “How has your life changed since the 2005 land acquisition?” 
Abdul: When we had land this corner and that corner: houses, vehicles, juurlu [word 
unknown to this writer], milk [i.e. everything was nice] 
Another Man: [makes unintelligible comment] We were eating out of what we grew 
[writer thinks this is what was said]. Now we are not getting anything unless we 
buy it. We are not getting vuluvalu [a type of grain], kandulu [writer thinks this is 
a type of grain or legume], legumes, [and some other items unintelligible to this 
writer]. We used to get red lentils. If they eat vuluvalu, they were not having any 
BP [blood pressure] sugar problems and now we are not getting them and we are 
facing BP sugar problems. 
                                                 
104 Rawat, Vidya Bhushan. Interview, 15 August 2009.  
83 
 
Abdul: Grains, milk, curd, everything we used to get and we used to be happy. So what 
profit is in this for us now? 105   
 
As seen above, the lack of protein seems to be a perpetual problem the depraved farmers 
have resigned themselves to shrugging off.  Farmers no longer have a steady source of 
nourishment to fuel their struggle; malnourishment-induced diseases such as anemia have 
become especially common in Polepally.  Many have picked up the hobby of consuming 
arrack two or three times a day.    
 
Other interviewees when asked the same question alluded to the fact that the 
impoverishment caused by landlessness is exacerbated by external factors such as illegal 
chemical dumping from non-SEZ companies.  Overall health and welfare was on the 
decline, which was often attributed to external factors such as the declining quality of 
water in recent years.  An elder, Janglimma, complained, “See this water [holding out a 
vassal of water]?  It is from the company, Pavani. It is making everyone in the village 
sick.  We used to be so energetic about getting our land back; now I have become 
lethargic.”106  A handful of farmers, on separate occasions, complained of “chicken 
roaming disease”, which they claim has “taken over the village”.  The apparent 
symptoms of the illness are headache, fever and delusional behavior.  Everyone attributed 
it to the freshly poisoned ground water.  One villager who was blind in one eye said that 
she was washing her dishes in the local stream, when she bent down to wash her face and 
the acidity of the water blinded her.  Another added, if you put your finger in the pond, 
the “skin will corrode off your bone”.   
                                                 
105 Bharat, Abdul. Interview, 5 July 2009.  
106 Interview July 2009.  
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Other villagers had seemingly lost their usual vim after the “defeat” of the 
struggle.   Anglimma, age 34, “used to sing all the time”, reflected her neighbor 
Laxmama. “Now she doesn’t use her instrument [her voice].  You see… She says there is 
nothing to sing for anymore.”107  Another elderly group of women I interviewed 
belonging to a SC family, explained how they fought for their lands.  They were arrested 
and thrown in jail.  Now they had “become weak”.  When I suggested, “you are the most 
knowledgeable people of Polepally- you have been here the longest and know the most 
about the land” they responded “What do we know?  We are illiterate.  We do not know 
anything about the land value or the papers. We know nothing.  We are almost 70 years 
old; we have nothing left to live for.”108  Another common complaint is the rampant 
bachelordom in Polepally; without land elders no longer have a dowry to offer to the 
families of male suitors.  According to one of the elders, Biju Kingola, age 69, it is 
almost impossible to marry off the daughters of Polepally.109  There seemed to be no 
light in the end of the Polepally tunnel.   
                                                
Although the Polepally activists have asserted, “The Polepally struggle proved 
that it doesn’t take money bags to stand up to power” 110, the campaign they waged, 
again, was costly.  Aside from the fact that the poorest members of Polepally still 
complain of the debt they are still struggling to pay off from campaign-related costs they 
incurred (traveling to and from the capital, paying bail after the arrests, etc.), broader 
strains came of the struggle.  The government officials who the farmers now rely almost 
entirely on for their food provision (whereas before they only used ration cards to 
 
107 Anon. Interview 3 July 2009.  
108 Anon. Interview July 5 2009. 
109 Kongola, Sinu. Interview, 5 July 2009.  
110 Surepally, Sujata. Interview 10 July 2009.  
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supplement their food stock) have come to despise Polepally farmers.  When I asked one 
village officer, what he thought of the 42 post-SEZ suicides, he retorted, “Most of those 
were old bastards…”.  111  This type of common remark displays the extent to which 
officials have come to think of Polepally citizens as wasteful, unappreciative and 
uncivilized.   
 
CHAPTER 4: CAUSES FOR DEMOBILIZATION 
Indeed, the Polepally farmers signed the land acquisition documents, and there is 
compelling evidence that they were coerced into signing.  The question remains: Why 
didn’t anyone take action after they realized the vulgarity of the process?  Why, since 
they knew the land acquisition was illegitimate and unlawful, didn’t the farmers succeed 
in reclaiming their entitlements?  As mentioned earlier, the entire process could be 
contested with the claim that illegal means were used to obtain land.  Or, as in 
Nandigram, they could put political pressure on the government via civil disobedience 
with the demand to return the acquired land and terminate the SEZ.  Neither of these 
opportunities was tapped, which seems quite odd given the vibrant history of rebellion in 
Telangana (which I will outline in Chapter 5).  In attempting to understand the multi-
tiered nature of peasant demobilization in Polepally, one should take seriously the 
following continuum charts (Figures 3 and 4).  The deductions that lie ahead in these 
charts and in this chapter rely primarily on qualitative analysis that was rendered from my 
interviews, although I used quantitative data, as provided in my surveys of 65 individuals, 
quite extensively to support my conclusions.  Figures 3 and 4 are intended to be a firm 
                                                 
111 Reddy, Ravinder. Interview 20 June 2009.  
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foundation to which the reader should refer while ingesting the more intricate pieces of 
my argument.  In conjunction, they lead back to one basic premise which is that elite 
patrimonial actors have used populist linkages to co-opt different sects of the Polepally 
peasantry.  To these particular sects (as represented in Figure 3), elite actors offered a 
series of “prizes” for cooperation in the passage of a massively unpopular land 
transformation, the SEZ.   Flowing from left to right, Figure 3 displays the qualities that 
would make a candidate more likely to be bought off or co-opted.  Those who are further 
to the left and represented by darker orange are more likely, while those who are 
represented by the lighter orange boxes are less likely to be co-opted.  Figure 4 
represents the other end of the land acquisition spectrum; just as certain individuals were 
rewarded, other individuals were chronically excluded from these linkages and actively 
“punished”.  These specific prizes and punishments will be summarized later on in 
Figure 6.  For now, I will begin by deconstructing the mechanism by which elite actors 
intentionally created cleavages in Polepally in order for certain parts of the village to 
become clients of the SEZ.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Continuum of those who are most likely to be co-opted by the SEZ actors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Continuum of those who are most likely to be neglected by SEZ actors.  
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 I. LAND ACQUISITION LEADS TO ATOMIZATION 
Land acquisition creates new heights of atomization.  As mentioned before, there 
was already a qualitative difference between the legal rights of pattadors and assignees.  
Again, 179 land losers were pattadors, whereas 160 assignees lost their lands.   The local 
government produced no written documentation of the method used to calculate 
compensation value for their property.   Assigned land was arbitrarily valued at Rs 
18,000 ($384.45), a little more than half of the patta land value, Rs 36,000 ($768.90).  
This distinction was illegal, by GO (Government Order) 1307 (1992), which says that 
assignees are entitled to the minimum award amount granted to pattadors.  It was clear 
that the assignees and pattadors were not equal in the eyes of the state.  However, it is not 
until during and after acquisition that this divide is imprinted upon the collective psyche 
of the people.  Following land acquisition assignees become a different breed of folk, as 
various interviews with pattadors indicate.   
An interview with a Reddy displays this attitude: “Only the assignees did not use 
their money wisely.  They took their money and enjoyed [as in wasted] it...The pattadors 
invested our money.”112  This new hierarchy was further enforced with social penalties 
for those who tried to violate the boundaries (e.g. the five BC and OBC persons who 
initially rejected compensation as an act of protest, who were then punished by having 
their money withheld after they had become vulnerable).  Another putative instance of 
such “castigation” is the mysterious death of Upender Reddy, who was one of the only 
Reddys who fought alongside the medium and small farmer activists.  Although the cause 
of his death was unknown, many of the villagers suggest that he was murdered.  Whether 
                                                 
112Anon. Interview, 11 July 2009.   
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this is myth or fiction, the story serves the same function as an official sanction against 
the BC members.   Simultaneously, Upender’s closest living relatives, all active 
supporters of the land acquisition, speak with contempt about Reddy’s contribution to 
Polepally.  An interview with his brother-in-law, whose father was one of the remaining 
landlords in Polepally, with over 50 acres in possession, revealed that all of his living 
relatives were active supporters of the land acquisition.  “We did not support [Reddy’s] 
activities. He was confused about many things”.113   
The divide between the Reddy community’s condemnation and the Dalits 
community’s praise of Upender essentially serves the function of telling upper caste 
folks, “This is what happens when you cross boundaries”.  Adding fuel to the conjecture 
about the significance of Upender’s death, there have been more recent incidents of 
“strange occurrences” involving Sarpanch Balaswami Goud.  Goud, a BC but obviously 
not a Reddy, was moving upward in the economic ladder as indicated by his motorcycle, 
Western-style clothes, running water and steady supply of dairy.  He was, like Upender, a 
champion of the Polepally struggle.  Although the Polepally people have their usual 
qualms with him—lack of responsiveness in welfare schemes, etc—he was certainly an 
outspoken member of the struggle for land, as he too was a victim.  Peculiarly, in 
December 2008 he was physically attacked by a group of unidentified goons when 
returning to the village from an errand.   
  In my second week in Polepally, I interviewed two women who had defended 
their husbands from the police brutality upon their arrest for the illegal occupation of 
their land.  One of the ladies, Janglimma, said something that struck me as very peculiar.  
“All of the Reddys in the village have stopped calling us for work [agricultural labor]. 
                                                 
113 Anon. Interview, July 2009. 
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‘We don’t want work from activists’ they say.  Every day we are stuck doing daily wage 
labor.”114  This seemed like a strange development.  Although the medium to large 
landholders had not been as blatantly debilitated by acquisition, it seemed odd that they 
would have such hostility towards the small farmers who put their lives on the line to 
defend Polepally. The struggle had, after all, allowed all of the affected persons to gain 
certain concessions, however minimal they may be.  It also seemed paradoxical that they 
would not employ these newly landless laborers; especially in lieu of the fact that they 
could now presumably bind their labor, given the precarious situation they were in.  The 
most logical hypothesis was that the alienation of these members was a measure taken by 
higher caste persons to “scold” them or coerce them.   
In understanding this atomization, one must understand fundamental facts about 
the nature of land acquisition.  I asked 50 land losers— proportionately chosen from their 
respective caste communities according to how many were SEZ-affected from each 
community—how much land they owned prior to acquisition and how much they “lost to 
the SEZ”.  My survey revealed striking evidence that one’s economic class (poor peasant, 
small peasant, medium peasant, and landlord) plays a direct role in determining if he/she 
will benefit from land acquisition.115 
                                                 
114 Anon. Interview. 12 July 2009. 
115 Survey. Polepally Land Losers, 2009.  
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Figure 5: Average Amount of Total Land Lost to SEZ  
 
Figure 5 shows that small and medium farmers (those with 10.8 acres on average 
or less) were far more likely to lose proportionately more land to the SEZ developers 
than were the medium to large landholders.  Sampling 50 land losers, I arranged 
respondents from those with the most land to the least land in descending order.  Each 
point on the graph represents the average ownership of 10 consecutive landowners.  I 
found that those who owned 14-35 acres (or 19.95 acres on average) lost 64% of their 
land on average.  All of those who owned eight acres or less lost at least 90% of their 
total estate.  Most interestingly was the large leap from the 10.8 acre cohort to the 19.95 
acre one, where the average amount of land lost went down by 31%.  Since land is the 
primary source of wealth in Polepally this provides evidence that those individuals who 
were in the top income quintile were able to retain a significant amount of land after 
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acquisition, while medium and marginal farmers lost almost all of their estate. Not only 
did the largest landholders lose the least but they also profited by the dramatic increase in 
property value in the post-development period.  This information explains why the largest 
landholders were in favor of acquisition, but it doesn’t explain why the land was acquired 
in this fashion and why it would be in their interest to conspire against Polepally small 
farmers.  
After talking to a series of people who had participated in the struggle, 
particularly widowed women whose husbands had died during or after the struggle, I 
learned that their patrons were not the only ones who had “scolded” dissenters.  Some of 
the village panchayat, too, namely the ex-Sarpanch, Jangayya Gajja, age 38, had 
allegedly been bribed and instructed by the developers to pacify the activists.   
“What happened was” explained one farmer activist, Lingama, “the higher caste officials 
formed a committee to strike a deal with the developers.  [The developers] would give the 
Reddy’s some money as long as they kept us quiet…Since then, the panchayat has not 
sanctioned my entitled materials under Indirama Awas Yojana (state housing 
construction welfare program)”116. 
Another woman explained to me that the Development Commissioner (DC) of the 
SEZ asked some of the village elders to provide him information as to who was “causing 
the trouble”.  Accordingly, Jangayya gave the DC a list of names, and “the next day all of 
[those on the list] were fired”. 117  When conducting interviews, six people explicitly told 
me they were fired because the DC didn’t want “land losers” to cause trouble or that they 
were having trouble finding jobs because of their stigma as militants.  At the same time, 
                                                 
116 Anon. Interview, 16 July 2009. 
117 Anon. Interview, 20 July 2009. 
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the same alleged informant, Jangayya, is one of the two lucky candidates whose family 
was granted salaried employment in the SEZ. 
Further, as shown in my section titled “Compensation for Assigned Lands”, a lot 
of the money to which the assignees were legally entitled disappeared.  Almost all 
victims attributed this to the “middlemen crisis”, vaguely.  I once asked, “Who exactly 
was responsible for this misappropriation?”  One woman, Moglimma, identified the same 
ex-Sarpanch, Jangayya, and his cronies as the root of the disparity.  “They tell the 
government officials that they will give the money to the people and then they eat it 
up.”118 
Why would the APIIC sanction the money to these elite officials, instead of 
directly to the people?  I later learned that the entire process of land acquisition from the 
beginning was slanted on the behalf of this select group of people.  According to the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (refer to Chapter 2), the correct procedure for granting a 
“consent award” involves one-on-one consultation with landowners.  If the compensatory 
value is not sufficient, the landholder—save the assignee— is able to go to court.  
However, according to K. Balagopal, human rights lawyer, the government co-opted a 
group of clients, or “elders” to circumvent the cost and trouble of legal procedures 119.  
Explaining a trend that he had observed over the course of the past ten years in the 
trajectory of land acquisition, Balagopal said, “The government takes advantage of these 
people and tells them ‘I will give you 50% more than what you would otherwise get (in 
the legal process).  You take it and get everyone else [in the village] on board”.  In 
Polepally, “They gathered some of the elders of the TDP (Telugu Desam Party) and told 
                                                 
118 Anon. Interview, 23 July 2009. 
119 Balagopal, Kandalla. Interview, 5 August 2009.  
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them there were some development projects: ‘You will get some work- some contracts to 
build a wall or a road- and you will receive 50% more for your land than what you would 
in the courts’”120.  Here, Balagopal is explaining the mechanism by which the legal 
system is bypassed and village elders are co-opted.  In summary, the elders are promised 
that if they don’t challenge the acquisition of their property in court, the government will 
grant them a higher payment for their land along with promising employment in the 
construction of the industrial township.  Perhaps equally importantly, through my 
interviews I learned from several SC farmers that these “elders”, specifically Mr. Gajje, 
were used to persuade the smaller and marginal farmers into selling their land, and spread 
misinformation about the nature of the “Green Park”121.   
My first interaction with a higher caste member of Polepally was with a younger 
boy named Srinivas, son of a wealthy landlord.  The juxtaposition to the greeting I 
received from other members of Polepally was alarming.  He was not cold and jaded; he 
was overly optimistic and determined to prove to me his proficiency in the English 
language.  He was wearing a Western-style polo shirt and was doused in musk, both 
atypical to the common Polepally male attire (a dothi with a cotton shirt).  At this point, 
all of the villagers knew I was still trying to find a place where I could stay over the 
course of my research.  Although none of the poorer families had the resources or the 
energy to put me up, I remember him insisting that I stay in his guest room on the third 
floor of his home.  It was obvious this would be a conflict of interest with my research, 
but I decided to humor him anyway by taking a glance at his spare room and taking up 
his offer for tea (something that is offered to any entrant in the medium to wealthy homes 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 Anon. Interview, 12 July 2009. 
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in the village).  The room was very large and had a Western-style toilet.   This shocked 
me even more, as not a single home I had been to had a toilet.   Most of the farmers are 
left to defecate in the fields.  This family was clearly well off.  As we were leaving the 
home, one of the few poor farmers who had taken to me in that first week came running 
up to us from the main road of the village.  He wore a concerned look on his face; 
although he greeted Srinivas respectfully he did not employ his usual jovial attitude.  He 
took my translator aside and whispered something. I was summoned to leave.  As we 
were walking away, the farmer, Narsima, explained to me that we should not associate 
with this man, as he was “unfriendly to the cause”.   
It eventually became known to me that dozens of people in the village were 
covertly rallying the people in favor of the SEZ, most of whom belonged to the Reddy 
caste community.  The Reddys, largely BC, dwell in the high lands of Polepally farther 
from the main road.  They are geographically separated, and own un-acquired lands in or 
around Polepally.  When I tried to talk to them, I was often turned away.  I did, however, 
get to speak with them on unexpected, whimsical occasions.  I recall a time I was 
traveling to the village, and I saw that there were several cars parked about 200 meters 
into the SEZ.  As I was very curious to see what was going on, I informed the person who 
I was hitching a ride from to let me down in front of the SEZ.   By the time I had reached 
the meeting had dissolved.  I did, however, flag down Jangayya Gajja on his motorcycle 
(also a strong sign of wealth) as he was departing.  It was surprising to me to see any of 
the villagers inside the SEZ because, in the past, the DC has actively kept them from 
entering (except those who work construction for one of the companies).   
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Jangayya was kind enough to respond to some of my inquiries.  He told me 
proudly that he was meeting with the company officials to “get a job for one of the boys 
in Polepally”122.  He said at least ten others had gained salaried employment in this 
fashion.  As stated before, Mr. Gajja himself is one of the two candidates whose family 
was granted salaried employment in the SEZ units.  My survey asked respondents if 
anyone in their family “was granted employment in one of the SEZ units and, if so, for 
how long”.   According to Mr. Gajja’s responses, four of his family members are 
currently employed in Aurobindo Pharma LTD as salaried workers.  The only other 
worker who reported salaried pay for their family was another man from the BC 
community, another Reddy.  In fact, of the 65 villagers I interviewed (which includes the 
unaffected people), only 27 of them said they had one or more family members employed 
in the SEZ companies.  All but the two aforementioned said these jobs were daily wage, 
which consist of construction, canteen work or toilet scrubbing, where they were paid, on 
average, Rs 100 ($2) per day.  The longest anyone had continual employment was 1.5 
years. Many complained that they or their family members were fired after 6-12 months, 
depending on their level of involvement in anti-land grabbing activities.  This provides 
strong weight to Janglima’s account regarding the higher castes’ conspiratorial role in 
removing the lower caste anti-SEZ actors from the companies.  Further, there is evidence 
that the TDP was able to patronize several more of the elite Reddy farmers by 
guaranteeing them subcontracting positions123.  Similarly, in Mudureddypally, some of 
the Reddy families willingly surrendered their land124.   
                                                 
122 Gajja, Jangayya. Interview, 19 July 2009. 
123 Bhushan, Bharath. Interview, 4 August 2009.  
124 Kumar, Jeevan. Interview, 6 August 2009.  
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All of the tactics used by middle and large peasants who dominate the gram 
panchayat such as bribery, spread of misinformation, false promise of employment, 
rescindment of employment and welfare items, and social castigation are [relatively] 
newly developed tools for demobilization.  Sundarayya observed in 1985, that landlords 
had recently “changed their tactics of fighting the growing people’s movement”.  No 
longer do they solely employ brutal terror and repression; but instead they 
…adopt tactics of dividing the ranks of the people.  They promise [grazing, 
communal and waste] land and actually give it to certain sections of the rural poor 
based on castes and communities….They incite certain sections against other 
sections who are already cultivating the land and are under the influence of kisan 
[peasant] or agricultural labor organizations of the Communist Party.  They 
actively support toddy or arrak [liquor] contractors against ordinary toddy-
tappers.  They utilize the community projects, the cooperative societies, the loans 
for purchasing tractors, the electricity for wells, the fertilizers…They try to 
monopolize all the key administrative posts in the government departments. They 
resort to every foul means to dominate the village panchayat…and try to garner 
all the benefits… (Sundarayya 1985:123).  
Although the above part of Sundarayya’s argument is correct, his partisan interest allows 
him to draw the conclusion that these practices have turned the middle and rich peasants 
to seek power in the Congress, even in areas where the Telangana “agrarian movement” 
has been strongest.  In fact, Sundarayya’s analysis is incomplete in the sense that the 
Congress party is only one vehicle in which middle and rich peasants have garnered 
political clout.  As stated earlier, all parties (including the pro-Telangana statehood TRS) 
were supportive of the Polepally SEZ, with the TDP taking an active role in the business 
of SEZ development.  Furthermore, in the introduction of the SEZ a new level of 
clientelism is rendered necessary.  Not only do government actors rely on large and 
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medium peasants for retaining the vote, but more importantly these peasant elites play an 
integral role in smoothing over dissent to these massively unpopular reforms.  In 
exchange, elite peasants are rewarded with jobs, benefits, etc.  I have summarized the 
dynamic of this relationship in Figure 6: 
Figure 6: Sticks and Carrots used in Passing SEZ Reforms.  
Punishment for Opposing Land 
Acquisition: 
Rewards to Clients who Coerced Small 
Farmers to Sell Land: 
‐Holds on public welfare benefits   ‐Part or most of property remains in tact 
‐Registration bans 
‐Remaining property escalates in value due 
to speculation 
‐Insecure employment in SEZ   ‐Secure employment in SEZ  
‐Lower land compensation   ‐Higher land compensation 
‐Annulment of land compensation  ‐Political access 
‐Termination of employment by high 
caste landlords 
‐Social power over lower castes/newly 
landless 
  
 
It is clear that clientelist measures have played a huge role in debilitating peasant 
movements.  As will be seen in the following section, the state government of AP has 
mastered the pro-farmer dialogue.  Both at the state and central level, officials say that 
the SEZ will generate millions of jobs and nothing less125.  Marginal farmers are falsely 
promised both short term and long-term reparations.  Short term, quick injections of cash 
are common and prevalent enough to keep farmers pacified until the acquisition process 
is over.  Long-term prosperity, on the other hand, is provided to only the elite few, 
usually being high caste, landed farmers.  This causes atomization and a nightmarish 
alienation for the marginal lot. 
II. NEO­LIBERAL REFORMS AND AGRARIAN POPULISM 
                                                 
125 In 2007, Gopal Krishna, Commerce Secretary of the GoI, said that SEZs will create 3-4 million jobs by 
2009.  Source: Observer Research Foundation, 31 July 2007. 
http://orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/report/ReportDetail.html?cmaid=9657&mmacmaid=9658 
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In the 1990s the neo-liberalization of the economy, led by Rajiv Gandhi 
encouraged the withdrawal of a significant portion of public welfare programs and the 
degradation of remaining agrarian extension programs.  Recent evidence from a report 
titled Public Distribution System and Other Sources of Household Consumption 2004-
2005 (GoI, 2007), which presents data from the 61st Round of the National Sample 
Survey (NSS), establishes that the process of “targeting” which was designed in 1997 to 
make distribution more “foolproof” has led to higher rates of exclusion of needy 
households from the Public Distribution System (PDS) and a clear deterioration of 
coverage.  At the all-India level about 70% of all poor families are unjustly excluded 
from the PDS.  Further, according to an NSSO survey, only 6% of Indian farmers now 
rely on the extension agencies and even less (3%) on government agencies (NSSO 2009). 
With neo-liberalization, NGOs were erected to mitigate the effects of 
globalization rather than change the systemic causes of poverty.  Thus, more radical 
peasant movements, that tried to resurrect the unfulfilled promise of land reform, were 
paved over with “the NGOification of society” (Ray and Katzenstein 2005:4).  India has 
since increasingly parroted the language of the World Bank, who admonishes Indian 
politicians like children.  Instead of promoting rural economy, India should be 
encouraging mass migration to the cities without “worrying about the sizes of cities, 
metropolises, cities and towns” (World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic 
Geography).  According to the 2009 report, state intervention to encourage and spread 
economic activity geographically should be abandoned.  Instead, it is “far better for 
markets to pick the place [and] far better for government to push the pace,” says Indermit 
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S. Gill, director of the report.  In 2008, Finance Minister Chidambaram of India stated 
that that in 20 years 85% of India will live in cities126.   
Villagers in India eat even less than the national average, the per capita 
expenditure on food in rural areas being just Rs 363 ($7.75) per month127, while those in 
urban India spend Rs 517 ($11.04) per month.  This may make the World Bank’s 
pipedream appear somewhat viable.  However, a more holistic look at agrarian India will 
show that urban poor are in an inherently more precarious position than are rural 
dwellers. A study by the Arjun Sengupta Committee showed that 77 per cent of Indians 
have a daily per capita expenditure of less than Rs 20 (or less than $0.5).  Although an 
overwhelming majority of the 23 percent of Indians who have a per capita expenditure 
above the national average live in cities, the urban poor eat, access health care, educate 
their children even less than their rural counterparts128.  The divide is exacerbated by the 
fact that a large number of urban poor live in slums, where people’s illegality 
compromises their access to resources.  Even the Planning Commission of India has 
admitted that slum dwellers face greater health hazards due to over-crowding, poor 
sanitation, lack of access to safe drinking water, and environmental pollution (Tenth Plan 
Document 2002-07).  Life in slums, where the government can demolish one’s home at 
any given time, is inherently less stable than that in the village, where true homelessness 
is an anomaly.  This is especially true given the fact that longstanding communities often 
serve as a safety net in times of crisis.   
                                                 
126 Tehelka, Vol 5, Issue 21.  31 May, 2008. 
127 The monthly average for all consumer expenditure per capita is Rs 695 per month in rural India and Rs 
1,312 in urban India.   
128 Mishra, Neelabj. “Not One Naya Paisa”. Outlook Magazine. November 2008. 
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It is clear to most Indian actors that the hyper pro-urbanization attitude is not only 
completely unviable in India but political suicide.  Instead of adopting this Western 
rhetoric, the personalist political actors of India embody exactly what the World Bank 
dictates against: populist handouts.    Populism in the ideological sense relates to a 
distinctly “pro-poor, pro-farmer” rhetoric and in the political sense focuses on the 
deinstitutionalization of power, or the direct paternalistic relationships between populist 
leaders and their clients (Roberts 1995:87).  Some would say that populism has become 
the “leitmotif of the Indian government’s policies”129.  From the colonial period onwards, 
India consolidated power through populism and patron-client relationships.  After 
independence, the INC most notoriously maintained their base for twenty years through 
the purchasing of the vote, the most lucrative form of rent.  The Indira Gandhi 
government (1966-1977) was notorious for its poverty alleviation programs.  More 
recently, the Union Government has been praised for its schemes such as forgiveness of 
crop loans and NREG.  Indian populist parties have garnered power at an unprecedented 
rate due to politicians’ unusually high degree of control over the Central bank and ability 
to manipulate monetary policy to their own political ends (Chibber 1999:9). 
At the same time, isn’t this archaic populist model incompatible with privatization 
and market reforms, as asserted by the dominant view?  After all, neo-liberal reforms 
require the annihilation of public goods and the abolishment of the idea of land reform 
(Kurtz 2004).  Instead of relying on inefficient and often corrupt state regulation of the 
economy and distribution of resources, free market reforms allow the invisible hand to 
dictate wealth.  The SEZ is a perfect example of how geographically, socially and 
                                                 
129 Acharya, Shankar. “Dump Populism, Let India Grow.”  Rediff India Abroad. 28 December, 2005.  
http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/dec/28guest1.htm 
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economically devastating these reforms can be.  However, a recent body of scholarly 
work has suggested that neo-liberalism and populism are not as irreconcilable as 
originally suggested.  Unpopular market reforms have left a major void in democracy, 
where rural citizens feel perpetually unsatisfied.  This provides a perfect space for new 
political actors to navigate power by “striking a chord with the citizenry”.  Because new 
political actors are “not affiliated with traditional ruling parties” and display a constant 
devotion to breaking free “from the shackles of the past” they are able to win the hearts 
of the masses (Ayyangar 2006:2).  Such a model of political behavior has come to be 
known as neopopulism.  In other words, neopopulism can be described as the promotion 
of neo-liberal reforms without discarding populist strategies to maintain power.  Graham 
(1995) has suggested that the two are not contradictory but in fact they complement each 
other because populism acts as a compensatory palliative for the adversities introduced 
by neo liberal reforms (ibid).  Since neo-liberal reforms often rely on government 
intervention, especially in transitioning or mixed economies, populist actors are able to 
aid in the introduction of these reforms.  For example, as explained in earlier chapters, the 
SEZ relies almost entirely on government intervention for its establishment.  In exchange, 
political actors are able to obtain rents from neo-liberal regimes in the form of stocks or 
labor contracts.  
Polepally has provided a blank canvass for the populist game to play out.  
According to local accounts, one of the first politicians to visit Polepally was Davender 
Goud, from the Praja Rajyam Party (PRP), a party which arrived on the Andhra political 
scene in 2008 as a champion for social justice, albeit widely contested among the SC 
Madiga community.  Goud rallied the farmers, especially appealing to the SC Malla 
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community, against Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy (commonly referred to as 
YSR), Chief Minister of AP and a strong advocate of the SEZ.  At the same time, Peda 
Reddy, left hand man of Goud, was taking part in contracting work for the APIIC and 
helped lay the roads for the SEZ130.  Similarly, Laxshma Reddy from the notorious 
Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), who has trumpeted Telangana statehood since its 
formation in 2004, condemned the SEZ-driven displacement.  Behind the scenes, this 
same Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) was leasing his house to the Aurobindo 
agent to the SEZ.  The brotherhood between the two actors played out when Aurobindo 
proposed to withdraw from Polepally, surrendering its property to agitating farmers.  
Reddy, allegedly, cajoled the Aurobindo agent to resume its construction131.  With the 
TDP’s introduction of the Green Park, in no way was their affinity for the SEZ policy 
latent.  Similarly, the fundamentalist BJP could not openly object to the SEZ, as they 
were the driving force behind the SEZ Act (2005).132 
Roberts explains how the Peruvian Fujimori regime was able to employ novel 
forms of populism during the 1990s economic collapse and the subsequent neo-liberal 
revolution which happened in a political vacuum after the collapse of the party system.  
Fujimori’s personalistic demeanor, heterogeneous social constituency with widespread 
lower-class support, and the paternalistic relationship with constituents all have been 
alluded to in labeling Fujimori the “poster” populist politician.  While he campaigned 
vehemently against the conservative Vargas Llosa’s neo-liberal “shock” programs to 
revamp the economy, two weeks after his inauguration he began what was the first 
                                                 
130 Bhushan, Bharath. Interview, 5 August 2009.  
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid. 
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injection of an even more draconian neo-liberal package than that proposed by Llosa 
(Roberts 1995).  
Interestingly, Ayyangar (2006) has rather perceptively compared the neo-populist 
nature of the Fujimori strategy to that of Chandrababu Naidu, the ex-Chief Minister of 
Andhra Pradesh (1995-2004).  Ayyangar attests that Naidu is the perfect Indian 
counterpart to Fujimori (Ayyangar 2006).  Aside from their obvious differences, each of 
these politicians has assumed a distinctly “pro-poor” allure while simultaneously fiercely 
advocating IT/industry/big business.  Aside from these more obvious neopopulist traits, 
like Fujumori, Naidu came to power at a time when his state was going through an 
economic crisis.  Fiscal deficit led to a predicament in which AP was not able to pay its 
state employees for months on end.  Ayyangar argues that during this time of strife, each 
politician orchestrated their signature poverty alleviation schemes (FONCODES and 
Veluga) with the help of international actors.  The IMF loaned funds to Fujimori 
primarily because they saw him as a “lesser evil”, since at least he was congenial to the 
neo-liberal agenda.  Similarly, as stated by Sen and Frankel (2005), Naidu borrowed 
nearly $2 billion from the World Bank and the Department for International 
Development, accounting for nearly one third of all assistance to India.  A significant 
portion ($111 million) of that loan went towards social spending to initiate the District 
Poverty Initiatives Project, ‘Velugu’ (quoted by Ayyangar 2006:9).  Most interestingly, 
each of these poverty alleviation schemas has been one-sidedly manipulated for the actors 
to reach their own political ends (i.e. through adopting more populist means when 
nearing elections and more technocratic means in the off seasons), thereby detracting 
from valued benefits.  One common feature of this model is that it does not rely on 
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efficiency, rather it has been on promoting a gimmicky populist rhetoric; the result has 
been inequitable and flawed distribution (Ayyangar 2006).    
A more recent example of neopopulist politics in AP manifests itself in the 
political legacy of Chief Minister, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR).  He took an array of 
eccentric steps to set himself apart from the “old” model of politics.  Perhaps most 
notably, he devoted himself to a lengthy padyatra133 in 2003 in preparation for the 
assembly elections the following year.  Clad in a farmer’s clothes he trekked 1,476 km 
through all three regions (Telangana, coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema) of AP and 
metamorphosed into a highly popular figure.  This bold gesture bolstered his image as a 
populist statesman in touch with his voters at the grass roots level.  It also helped revive 
the Congress party’s power block, which had been “inoperative for ten years” 
(Srinivasulu 2009).  In addition to this dimension of his populist methodology, he fit the 
mold elsewhere.  Similar to Fujimori and Naidu, YSR consolidated power in a time of 
economic calamity (ibid.).   Thus, despite the fact that he was the father of the highly 
unpopular AP SEZ, pushing the state to become India’s leader in the SEZ, he managed to 
mask his elite economic interests with a populist pro-farmer gumption.   Accordingly, his 
support from the masses was an impressive and dramatic fanfare.  His death last summer 
was allegedly followed by the widely-cited “60 suicides” of loyalists who “couldn’t 
withstand the loss” of their beloved YSR.  At the time of his death he was portrayed as a 
“God”, a “Doctor on the Finger on the Public Pulse”, a “champion of social welfare 
reform” 134.   In summation, the rampant populist overtones in the Andhra state have been 
                                                 
133 A padayatra is a walking journey undertaken by a politician through usually rural parts of the country to 
interact more closely with and galvanize his supporters.   
134 Obituary: YS Rajasekhara Reddy.  September 3rd, 2009. BBC. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8235283.stm 
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detrimental to the advancement of the farmer cause.  Personalistic elite actors have 
become experts at diverting the energy of collectivist movements into the maintenance of 
their own political popularity.  It follows that in the national fight against land grabbing, 
the constant promises of a better future would confuse and delays farmers’ ability to 
respond effectively to their demise.  Neopopulism as it stands today poses a great 
challenge to the future of anti-SEZ and land-for-land farmer mobilization.    
 
III. TANGENTAL CAUSES FOR WEAK MOBILIZATION 
A. NON­TRANSFERABLITY OF ELITE ACTIVISM 
 One of important cause for vulnerability of the anti-SEZ movement was that the 
farmers were never the decision makers.  Just as democratic means are omitted from the 
SEZ, democracy was never an element of the anti-SEZ movement in Polepally.   It was 
largely a top-down struggle.  One activist stated proudly to an unnamed source that local 
politicians were asking her to run as a candidate in the Dalit elections.  She practically 
became a celebrity overnight. In this nature, while the elite, educated activist orchestrates 
the action, the farmer is pushed to a new type of subalternization.  They fit a very useful 
role; they can tell their stories when the media asks, which provides legitimacy to the 
movement.  To make matters worse, after the media campaign failed, the activists left the 
site of confrontation, thus rendering a pervasive sense of defeat in the farmers, whose 
resistance was defined by the actions of outsiders.  This one-sided nature of the 
“movement” prevented it from becoming something that was self-sustaining.  When a 
group of women who were once highly involved in the campaign asked what they 
learned, they openly declared their ignorance.  They attribute the mastery of the 
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movement to the aforementioned activist.  “Without her, we are nothing”, one group of 
women cried to me.  
This is not to say that the activists had any external motivations, besides maybe 
personal glorification.  They abandoned their cozy lives in the cities, and were committed 
to the struggle to ultimately help the farmers; it was certainly not to make any money, as 
both activists were living very frugally and were forced to work menial jobs to support 
themselves during this period.  Yet their pride seemed to stand in the way of achieving 
broader goals for the lot of the farmers.   In sticking to two principles--refusing to 
exercise legal routes and total non-negotiation with local officials--they seemingly 
surpassed many opportunities to better the lives of the people.  For example, there were 
several legal remedies available to the Polepally people, which the activists outright 
rejected.  For example, since the land acquisition process was completely faulty, they 
could have contested the faulty compensation for assigned landholders under GO 1307.  
They could have also contested the extralegal consent award assessment.  Finally, they 
could have worked with the government officials to help remedy what were complete 
bureaucratic failures.  Many factors deciding whether a farmer is able to sustain oneself 
derive from toeing a tenuous line with officials, who may chose to either pocket a ration 
if in a bad mood or distribute it if in a good one.  Instead, the Polepally elite activists 
cultivated a volatile relationship with officials, who in a totalizing opinion of the village 
of Polepally said they were “terrorized” by them135. 
B. LACK OF PERIPHERAL SOLIDARITY 
Another major problem in the anti-land acquisition struggle was the deafening 
lack of solidarity between Polepally farmers and outside farmers.  As Bhushan said, 
                                                 
135 Reddy, Ravinder. Interview, 10 July 2009.  
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“there were too few farmers fighting in Polepally to even call it a movement”136.  
Peripheral villages that were also affected by the SEZ like Mudureddypally were not 
engaged in the struggle.  Balagopal suggested that this would be one of the only ways to 
win an anti-SEZ battle: to convince the farmers from these villages that the SEZ, once 
fully developed, will be detrimental to everyone in the district137.  The pharmaceutical 
SEZ is, after all, a highly polluted site, with multiple chemical manufacturing factories 
exempt from environmental regulations, in a concentrated zone.  Instant ground water 
transformation, chemical poisoning in humans and cattle sickness are indicators of this in 
the post-SEZ era.   
Polepally and Mudureddypally seem to be situated in a strategic position for an 
anti-corporate development drive to develop, being so close to the major metropolis of 
Hyderabad, whose Metropolitan Corporation is actively trying to expand the city 
outwards.  Even more relevantly, in 1981 Mahbubnagar was “scarred” by the Srisailam 
Project, where 65 villages of Kolapur, Wanaparthi, and Alampur taluks (or a collection of 
villages) were submerged.  Over 100,000 people were forcibly uprooted from their homes 
without compensation (District Profile 2009).  However, it is not just Polepally that has 
not “learned its lesson” from these seemingly instructive examples.  Just 45 miles away 
sits the Shamshabad airport, another controversial example development-driven 
dispossession.  Farmers were driven off 5,400 acres of land when the Hyderabad Ministry 
of Civil Aviation announced plans for the construction of the Rajiv Gandhi International 
airport.  Originally, according to Kumar, the farmers’ qualms rested solely on the issue of 
                                                 
136 Bhushan, Bharath. Interview. 5 August 2009.  
137 Balagopal, Kallada. Interview 3 August 2009.  
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compensation138.  Assignees were promised jobs in the airport, compensation and 
housing plots.  The pattadars who were, again, from wealthier castes were content in 
selling their land.  In 2002 the government had compensated the pattadors to the tune of 
several lakhs, while allegedly most of the assignment holders were left without any 
compensation.  In the end, assignees assumed lives of abject poverty and were given only 
small 250-square yard “open plots” in what is now called the Shamshabad “airport 
colony”.  These houses are subject to flooding, poor drinking water quality and 
encroachment by the government who is proposing to build a road through the colony.  
Forty-eight women are supporting the assignee families by picking seasonal flowers in 
the airport estate; their wage is a meager Rs 80 ($1.60) per day139.  The following farmer 
narrative enforces the need to address the divisive nature of land acquisition: 
When we protested in 2002, the big Reddy pattadars also joined hands, since the 
talk was about better compensation. But when that happened and they got their 
share, they withdrew from the movement. Most of us who had assigned lands 
come from poorer backgrounds. We staged several protests between 2002 and 
2004. We submitted the affidavit in 2005. But we have no energy or resources to 
continue fighting as we also need to work for our survival. When we see the 
terminal and the runway we are filled with remorse, and sometimes anger.… Our 
children have not even been provided jobs in the airport as a matter of right. 140 
 
This poignant observation is evidence that the high caste Reddys in Shamshabad were not 
bought off in the beginning as the Mudrajs were in Polepally, but they were co-opted 
midway.  What the government conceded was not to the masses, but rather, to a select 
                                                 
138 Kumar, Jeevan. Interview, 5 August 2009.  
139 Ibid. 
140Maheshwari, Uma. “Small farmers whose lands were acquired for the Rajiv Gandhi International Airport 
face an uncertain future.” India’s National Magazine. Volume 27 – Issue 02. Jan. 16-29, 2010 
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few.  Further, it shows that village members who may be “holding hands” during a 
dharna141 may even have polarized interests, which, as shown in the Shamshabad 
struggle, could later be cause for conflict142.  In other words, the lack of solidarity in anti-
SEZ peasant movements is flagrant and real, even when the media might portray an 
action as being supported by multiple facets of a community.  It is exceedingly important 
to investigate where exactly money is being transferred underneath the surface.   
C. THE REDDY RAJ 
Why did the Reddys become ideal clients of neo-liberal actors? This can be 
attributed to two main historical phenomena: the articulation of the Reddys in the 
Telangana movement and the creation of Reddy patrons by the Congress Party to 
consolidate their voter base.  Of course, the Reddy syndrome has taken shape of not just 
Reddys but also other lone BCs like Jangayya Gajje.  However, the general trend is easily 
observable: caste elites have been wildly successful at securing power through the 
aforementioned strategy of neopopulism.  
CHAPTER 5: ORIGINS OF TELANGANA SOCIAL HIERARCHY  
In the colonial era, the region that now comprises the state of Andhra Pradesh was 
made up of two parts.  One was directly ruled by the British Governor General, including 
coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema, and the other by the Nizam of Hyderabad which 
                                                 
141 Recall, a dharna is a sit-down strike.  
142 On the other hand, Shamshabad, though mirroring the dire fragmentation of Polepally, does shed a ray 
of hope for another marginalized group of agricultural workers- squatters- or those who have settled on the 
unoccupied land without titles.  According to activists, under Indian law, squatters have no legal rights, 
even if they have created a livelihood out of the land.  It doesn’t matter how many years they have been 
there; the farmers in Shamshabad have refused to succumb to this.  An association of squatters who were 
displaced during the acquisition were able to conduct a militant struggle and force the government to 
compensate them.  This, according to one Hyderabad attorney, has set a legal precedent for squatters all 
over India.  Importantly, those who were revolting were folks who government officials had no obligation 
to, squatters and landless tillers.  They were not originally targeted by government propaganda and populist 
nature of land acquisition.  As the hand did not feed them, they were not tempted not to bite it.   
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comprised of eight Telugu-speaking Telangana districts, three Kannada, and five 
Marathi-speaking districts (Srinivasulu 2002).  It is arguable, in several regards, that the 
areas governed by princely rulers such as Hyderabad were plagued by even more 
polarizing policies than those implemented directly under British dominion.  Though the 
Nizam was legally autonomous, his official title of “Faithful Ally” bequeathed to him by 
British royalty hints at his dominant position as a client.  The British Governor General 
appointed bureaucrats to take up residency in the Princely States to keep order.  At the 
same time, the British-imposed industrial reforms such as the introduction of canal 
irrigation never saw the light of day in some of the princely territories.  Telangana, for 
one, remained dry and technologically primitive.   
It has been estimated by scholars such as Barry Pavier that during the depression 
of the 1930’s indebtedness of small and tenant peasants to moneylenders and landlords 
increased by 89 percent (cited by Balagopal 1983).  Although many scholars blame 
market exposure and inability to pay the revenue demand for this lopsided 
impoverishment (see Dhanagare 1982), others such as Balagopal (1983) claim that the 
market analysis has been hyperbolized by Trotskyites who ignore important existing 
social dynamics.  The unprecedented land alienation that took place in Telangana during 
the 1930’s and, again, during the Second World War with peasant debt soaring by as 
much as 120 percent, must not be forgotten to advance crude, market-oriented 
explanations for land inequalities.  This was undoubtedly due to the system established 
by the British (Thirumali 1991:477) which caused local Deshmukhs (once local chiefs) to 
grab large tracts of land and extract rents at their own will (Balagopal 1983: Sundaryya 
1973).   
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The Deshmukhs, who were promoted to the status of revenue collectors and given 
pension by the government, were grabbing land as early as the 1870s until the 1940’s 
when the feudal system was “abolished”.  International market-driven economic crisis 
definitely magnified this phenomenon by further crippling the peasants’ ability to pay 
taxes, ceremonial duties, and landlord-imposed fines, but “to treat it as the genesis [of the 
problem] is misleading” (Balagopal 1983:711).  Although some seek to impose a parallel 
between forcible land grabbing and the increase of cash crops such as castor oil and 
groundnuts as a measure of accruing quick, effortless wealth, it seems the Deshmukhs 
more so indiscriminately grabbed land regardless of cultivability as a part of the strategic 
maintenance of feudal relations.   They grabbed all of the following: 1. cultivable land to 
extract rent; 2. forest and bush land to extract grazing rent (pullari in Telugu); and 3. 
marginally cultivable land to prevent the landless from acquiring land—“a prerequisite 
for feudal social domination” (ibid).  According to anthropologist, Heimendorff, in 
Adilabad, landlords who accumulated thousands of acres of land kept nearly 70% of it 
uncultivated (ibid).  Thus, from the 19th century onwards, the Nizam had perpetuated an 
extremely austere and hierarchical landlord-tiller relationship, sustained not only by 
capitalist extraction, but also more infamously by bonded labor.  As one may recall from 
the previous section on Mahbubnagar, bonded labor is particularly integrated into the 
fabric of Mahbubnagar, the district in which Polepally sits.  The form of bonded labor 
common to this region, vetti, is a relationship even more austere than corvee in the 
European feudalistic fashion, where peasants had to slave over the landlords’ fields.  
Under vetti, this was the bare minimum that a Dalit had to do.  In fact Dalits were forced 
into carrying out all of the daily work of patron landlords and materializing any products 
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or gifts (e.g. cattle, grains, leather products, jewelry, agricultural instruments such as 
bullock carts, etc.) upon the demand of the landlord (Sundarayya 1973:10).  To give a 
few examples, some backward castes such as boyalu, bestalu, and chakali were forced to 
transport the families of landlords long distances on their shoulders to attend festivals or 
visit relatives, while others were forced to run alongside the special carrier (pallakis or 
menas) as a path-clearer or escort, young girls were kept as slaves in the homes of the 
landlords’ families and then gifted to the landlords’ daughter in-laws upon marriage, and 
toddy tappers were required to keep five to ten toddy trees for the landlords and bring 
toddy to the homes every day (ibid).  This polarized system degraded not only the lives of 
landless Dalits and small peasants but middle peasants as well.  The Deshmukhs presided 
over legal system so that any resolution over a dispute was in favor of the landlord143.  
Overall, there is no doubt that during colonial rule, these relationships became 
strengthened as they did elsewhere in India (Thirumali 1991:477). 
I. TELANGANA ARMED STRUGGLE 
The inequality that this system bled, both locally and inter-regionally, created a 
breeding ground for Maoist insurgent activity in the early 20th century.  The Andhra 
Maha Sabha (AMS) was formed, which is the cultural organization that has spearheaded 
the Telangana peasant struggle.  Formed in 1928, it was originally dominated by the 
Congress Party’s moderation, but by the 1930s it came under the control of communists 
who saw the INC’s efforts as dominated by “bourgeoisie compromising theories of 
bringing a certain amount of mass pressure to get certain concessions- without allowing 
                                                 
143 For a more extensive description of the vetti system see the book of Telangana fighter P. Sundarayya, 
Telangana People’s Struggle and its Lessons (1973) or the abridged version in the Social Scientist 
“Telangana People’s Armed Struggle 1946-1951” p. 9-13 (2006). 
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the anger and surge of the masses to go beyond its control to revolutionary channels” 
(Sundarayya 1973:18).  Although the Gandhian freedom struggle was transpiring in 
British territories, it failed in princely states for two reasons:  1. The INC adopted a 
principle of “non-interference” in these princely states and 2. They largely abandoned the 
agrarian issue that was felt so strongly by all agrarian workers in Telangana.  In fact, the 
nationalist leaders worked in alliance with landlords and “would not think of rousing the 
peasant for agrarian revolution” (Ranadive 1984:1).  Many, along with Sundarayya, opine 
that Gandhi’s exclusivity was detrimental to the lower ranks of agrarian hierarchy.  
Namboodirapad states, “[Gandhi’s] scrupulous adherence to non-violence has served to 
restrain the mass of the workers and peasants”.   The “passiveness” of the peasant could 
be attributed to the “coincidence” of Gandhian non-violence and the “brahminical 
interest” 144.  More incisively, though, Gandhi believed that pocketed rebellions grounded 
in an issue uncommon all classes, specifically the landed class, would threaten the 
likelihood of Hind Swaraj.  To maintain control, he and Congress cut their remaining ties 
with anti-landlord movements and peasants who pined for radical change (Jani and 
Sreenivas 1999:22).  Gandhi threatened to call off the Non-Cooperation movement when 
villagers killed policemen and made moves to violently overthrow their landlords.  Land 
reform and agrarian wage reform were issues put on hiatus by Congress and Gandhi’s 
politics.  
Overall, Gandhi’s belief that in order to shake the yoke of feudalism, one had to 
first shake the yoke of imperialism fell short of the needs of those who 1. Saw 
revolutionary uprising to be the best course of action and 2. Felt their oppression most 
acutely in the landlord-tiller relationship and directed their anger towards princely rulers, 
                                                 
144 Namboodiripad 1988:353. In Sources of Indian Tradition Vol 2. Edited by Stephen Hay.  
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rather than British overlords.  Nonetheless, many rural youth in Hyderabad and other 
princely states crossed into British territory and participated in the nationalist movement 
in 1930-32.   Many were arrested for their involvement in the Salt Satyagraha and acts of 
civil disobedience and were subsequently released and radicalized.  They carried a 
revolutionary fervor back to their home states.  These individuals saw that the movement 
was insufficient in changing the status of agrarian laborers in the British-governed states, 
where “even boycotts of land revenue, apparently dangerous as a strike against the 
leading guise source of provincial finance could be countered, usually effectively by 
threats of confiscation of defaulters’ holdings” (Charlesworth 1980:259).  Thus, they 
engaged a radical turnaround in the AMS and thrust the most imminent peasant concerns 
into the public arena- abolition of vetti, protection to tenants and the demands of ‘land-to-
the tiller’ (Sundarayya 1973).  The extent of their radicalism was seen in the police 
response, with 4,000 Communist cadres and fighters thrown in detention camps for 
periods of 3-4 years, 50,000 people violently brutalized for days on end in police camps, 
tens of thousands of people in “thousands of villages” subject to police and military raids, 
millions of rupees worth of property damaged by interrogators, and thousands of women 
were molested.  “The entire region was subjected to a brutal police and military terror 
rule, for five full years, initially by the Nizam and the Razakars…and subsequently by the 
armed forces of the Union Government and the State Government of Hyderabad”  
(Ranadive 1984:5).  As widespread as it was, as in any other movement, the central thesis 
of the subaltern scholars must be addressed; history is rarely constructed from below.  
Elite depictions have tended to be just as polarized as the landlord-tiller relationship- 
either the movement was  “heroic, revolutionary, inspirational” or “sectarian, dogmatic, 
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or individual terrorism” (Sundarayya 1973:5).  In order for there to be an academic space 
for social movements, the lazily constructed continuum of “heroism vs. cowardice” and 
“winners v. losers” must be rejected in its current form.  A materialist analysis must be 
used to understand the “anti-Nizam” and “anti-feudal” peasant struggles led by the 
Communists and the response calculated by the ruling Congress Party causing an uneven 
political articulation among the peasantry.   
The Telangana struggle has been described by many, especially the 
revolutionaries, as driven by the “peasantry”.  For instance,  
“During the course of the struggle, the peasantry in about 3,000 villages, covering 
roughly a population of 3 million in an area of about 16,000 square miles (mostly 
in the three districts of Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam) had succeeded in 
setting up gram raj on the basis of fighting village panchayats.  In these villages 
the hated landlords- the pillars of the Nizam’s autocracy in the rural areas- were 
driven away from their fortress-like houses (gadis) and their lands were seized by 
the peasantry.  One million acres of land were redistributed among the peasantry 
under the guidance of the people’s committees” (ibid).    
 
I quote P. Sundarayya at length, as he is considered the foremost leader of the 
Telangana armed struggle, and his voice serves as an “authentic” bearer of history.  He 
refers to the peasantry thrice in the three lines above, yet not once does he delineate any 
qualities of these peasants that would help the audience understand to which agricultural 
group (i.e. see Mao’s classification) he refers.  The only intimation he gives us is their 
geographical location (Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam) and that they are, quite 
obviously, not landlords.  It is understandable why he writes in this essentialist manner; 
he was making a political statement to unite his followers.  Some defenders of the text 
might claim that it was necessary to write like this in order to debunk the image of the 
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peasant struggle as “individualized, sporadic”, to create a discursive space for Telangana 
to be taken seriously as an organized group of individuals mobilizing for their rights.  But 
is this not the same type of essentialism that he detested in Gandhi’s mobilization?  Other 
scholars who seek to redeem the legacy of communists in the struggle for independence 
also hail these revolutionaries for being the only group to address peasant grievances.  He 
quotes the Manifesto of the Communist Party to the Ahmedabad session of the National 
Congress (1921), which berates the Congress for ignoring the Kisan Sabha (or peasant 
union).  Communists yielded a “scientific understanding” of peasant movements because 
they addressed the peasant- landlord conflict (Ranadive 1984:7).  True, they may have 
appeared to be pro-tiller in their rhetoric, which shows in their successful mobilization in 
Telangana.  However, academics and activists alike must ask for whom was the struggle 
effective or ineffective and why, and, more essentially, which groups were participating 
in decision-making.  Was it truly a bottom up Marxist uprising, as characterized by 
Sundarayya and Ranadive, and if so why did certain groups of the oppressed peasantry 
consistently dominate through the end of the struggle into the Nehruvian age?   
II. FORMATIONS OF ELITE PEASANT CLEAVAGES 
It is true that the Telangana movement was intersectional in its mobilization: 
peasant, artisan, service and laboring Dalit castes were broadly mobilized to fill the 
struggle’s militant ranks.  This is not to detract agency from Dalits or to suggest that they 
were “acted upon”.  Rather, it is to understand that it was a particular section of the 
peasantry, the middle peasant, who dominated the leadership positions in the dalams 
(armed squads) and panchayats (Srinivasulu 2002:6).  This strategy drew on the second 
instruction of Mao’s 1947 command to all cadres in the Chinese Revolution, “Firmly 
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unite with the middle peasants; do not attack their interests” (Huang 1975:271).  
Unfortunately, Mao’s first instruction, “Satisfy the demands of the poor peasants and the 
agricultural workers; this is the basic task of the land reform” was largely dismissed.  
Thus, in the transformation to the Communist-backed AMS, four of the six original 
leaders were Reddys: Ravi Narayan Reddy, Baddam Yella Reddy, A. Lakshmi Reddy 
and Kodanda Rami Reddy (Sundarayya 1973:18).  As the struggle grew into a mass 
movement, panch committees were formed to deal with the redistribution of the land of 
the Brahmin-Karanam, Reddy and Velama doras (Srinivasulu 2002:6).  The homogenous 
caste composition of the panch, largely Kapu-Reddy, allowed for the land redistribution 
to become a function of caste power; fertile lands of doras were distributed among the 
Kapu-Reddy ryots and tenants, whereas only common pastures and waste lands became 
the lot of the landless Dalits and other lower castes (ibid).  Therefore, the agrarian 
struggles in coastal Andhra and Telangana contributed to the emergence of a peasant 
stratagem belonging predominantly to the Kamma and Reddy castes, respectively.  In 
Reddy’s study, he maps the power in the village, M. Reddy Pally, where by 1971 the 
Kapu-Reddy stronghold still persisted.  At this point, all households belonging to the 
Kapu and Reddy castes are landowners, while only a few from the Chakali (washerman) 
caste own land.  Meanwhile, no member of the Mangali (barber) has ownership of land, 
and the wild majority of the Scheduled Caste families compared to other castes are 
landless (Reddi 1990:326).    
Srinivasulu’s account also alludes to the fact that there was a limited degree of 
political leadership among landless laborers.  For example, since the Nizam’s despotic 
government was not allowed in the villages during the movement and the deshmukhs had 
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fled for their lives, elected administrative units called Gram Raj committees were 
established by the revolutionaries (Sundaryya 1973:49).  Agricultural workers inflicted 
pressure upon the newly established rich peasants for wage increases through strikes and 
demonstrations and by protesting to the Gram Raj (Sundaryya 1973:50).  The stark 
question remains: why were the landless laborers so neglected to feel the need to wage 
their own “movement within the movement”?  The fact, inadvertently conceded by 
Sundarayya, was that the elite Kapu-Reddys fiercely resisted wage increases even after 
the “tremendous gains they got from the united struggle against the Government and 
zamindars” (emphasis added) (ibid).  Thus, no matter the degree of “equality and mutual 
respect” exercised in the guerrilla squads, the revolutionaries did not break the peasant 
class hierarchy.   
III. STATE VIOLENCE AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS 
 
 President Nehru tried desperately to ignore the violent agitations that occurred in 
the early 1950s as a result of lingering colonial policies and unequal development.  The 
‘Vishalandhra’ movement, which was separate from the Telangana armed struggle, was 
transpiring at a rapid pace.  Potti Sriramulu, who was an advocate for the Telugus in the 
Madras Presidency area, championed this struggle, demanding a separate Andhra with 
Madras as the capital.  When Nehru refused to acknowledge his plea, in fact he was 
“totally unmoved by [the movement] and propos[ed] to ignore it completely”, Sriramulu 
declared a “fast unto death” and died after 58 days without food (Guha 2007:196-97).  
“The news of the passing away of Sriramulu engulfed entire Andhra in chaos’ 
Government offices were attacked, and trains were stopped and defaced…” (ibid).  Nehru 
vehemently opposed these movements, but was forced to concede to Andhra.  Again 
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upsetting the people of Telangana, there was a proposed Gentleman’s Agreement, which 
would merge Telangana with the broader state of Andhra.  The Chief Minister of 
Hyderabad State, Burgula Ramakrishna Rao, wrote to the President of the INC a few 
months prior to the decision:  
There is, no doubt, considerable agitation in Telangana on this important question. 
When I say considerable, it is of course nothing of the type we come across in 
Bombay. The agitation…is spread over the whole province and not restricted only 
to cities. My estimate of the views of the people of Telangana is that the people 
by majority would desire Telangana to remain a separate state…. There is a strong 
section of the people holding the other view, that is in favour of Vishalandhra, but 
the majority is decidedly in favour of retaining Telangana as a separate province 
as recommended by the SRC.... They are afraid there would be an immediate 
exploitation in land and even in trade, small and big. They have got many 
instances where Telugus from Andhra do not hesitate to exploit the Telugus from 
Telangana economically when they get an opportunity to do so. This is by far 
their biggest fear (Rao 1956).   
 
Nonetheless, the Nehruvian government’s agenda was impervious.  It began its ruthless 
reign of terror on the Maoists.  Nehru’s lack of sympathy towards the separatists was 
obvious, but it was unclear as to what limits the regime would go to crush the movement.  
His police cadres molested, raped, and beat women who were participating in the land 
movement on a large scale.  Their husbands and brothers were arrested, tortured and 
killed, with the women often left to take care of the house after the disappearances of 
their family members (Sundarayya 1973:261). The new president was determined to set a 
precedence of accelerated development.  He was willing to go to any limit including 
state-sponsored terror, particularly to send a message to those who threatened centralized 
power.   
The underlying development motive was seen in the government’s tempestuous 
obliteration of the Bombay-based Samukta Maharashtra movement, alluded to in Rao’s 
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above note, through blackmail, over 400 arrests, and indiscriminate police brutality.  
Fifteen thousand policemen were dispatched, leaving a dozen protestors dead in the 
aftermath (Guha 2007:204-205).  Nehru’s States Reorganization Commission (SRC), 
appointed to deal with the separation of states, orchestrated the blackmail action on 
behalf of the bourgeoisie industrialists, who sought to keep Bombay apart from the rest 
of the hinterland Maharashra.   The state envisioned Bombay a “miniature India run on 
international standards” (ibid).  In all of the instances where subalterns were either 
violently or non-violently organizing for economic liberation, the INC responded with an 
iron fist.  Singing the language of “Indian unity”, Congress appealed to the nation’s 
psychological memory of the freedom struggle by equating economic separatist 
movements to “Balkanization” (ibid).  It shocked many to see Nehru so eager to squash 
these movements in a sweeping blow, when he was so recently fighting on behalf of the 
same subaltern lot.  In the end there was the creation of several states, Andhra Pradesh 
being the first, but that did not end the tradition of state-induced civilian warfare.  The 
use of paramilitary force in areas declared ripe for the capitalists’ picking has been 
continued into the era of the SEZ.  The unequal development scenario has caused a tidal 
wave of Maoist insurgency, with Singur and Nandigram being the harbingers but not the 
whole of Naxalite145-driven anti-SEZ peasant rebellion.   
IV. NAXALITES AND THE STATE 
Since the Telangana armed struggle, the Maoists have diversified and 
strengthened their base; they are not confined to localized pockets in India.   Over 195 
                                                 
145 The origin of the Naxalites can be traced to the 1967 split of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), 
leading to formation of Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist). The radical communist uprising 
originated in West Bengal, but has spread via underground groups into the rural parts of central and eastern 
India.  Chattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, along with 15 other states, are all considered “Naxalite-
affected”.  
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districts can be considered Naxalite-affected today, with the government being inefficient 
in countering their attacks.  Just recently, the Naxalites “massacre” of 76 Central Reserve 
Police Force members was a testament to this.  It cannot be ignored that Naxalites have 
seized control and power the most rapidly in areas where Dalits and tribals have seen 
their resource bases deteriorate the most rapidly.    
While the Naxalites commit heinous acts of terror, there is evidence that they are 
addressing the needs of the people far more stringently than the government.  Whereas 
government promises for drought alleviation and welfare programs seem fictitious in 
their capacity to reach the bottom, Naxalites have achieved tangible results for people.  
For example, in one region where adivassis were growing and selling the tuber leaf, an 
essential component of tobacco, for next-to-nothing wages the revolutionaries boycotted 
the leaf. Thus raising the market value and achieving tangible results.  When people in a 
Naxalite-controlled territory were questioned, 40% said they would rather be subject to 
Naxalite rule than the state government.  Another 30% said they’d prefer the state 
government but only without the SEZ.  Thus, these 30% of folks would rather be ruled by 
the Naxalites than live within the bounds of a SEZ, which is anarchic as it bars local 
rule146.  Some scholars have pointed to the conspicuous timing of the unprecedented 
strengthening of the Naxalite base and the passage of the SEZ Act147.  In September 
2004, just months before the passage of the SEZ Act, well into the period of land 
acquisition for Industrial Parks, the PWG and the MCC (the two dominant Maoist groups 
in India) merged to form a “dangerous” alliance.  They ended the peace talks hyped up by 
                                                 
146 Mahapatra, Sangeeta. Lecture: Rise of Red Terror: The Ethics and Effectiveness of Maoist Violence in 
India. April 30th, 2010  
147 Ibid.   
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the Congress party after the discovery of covert government-backed “combing” or search 
operations in Maoist territory148.   
The main problem in assessing Maoist extremism mainly stems from the profuse 
range of “solutions” that are all rooted in a distinctly British tactic of winning popular 
support by increasing state-backed retribution149.  Maoists are considered, above all, a 
threat to national development.  At the same time, the correlation between disarticulated 
economic growth and terror is scarcely recognized by policy makers to create and 
exacerbate the Naxalite problem.  Instead, they encourage this model of development as 
an imputative tool.  At the same time, they employ shrewd and egregious use of state 
apparatus to control and subdue the peasant response.   
As we saw before, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh was the first site of armed 
Communist struggle in India.  Although the mid nineties saw an array of armed radical 
Communist Dalams flourishing in the forested areas of Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, 
Orissa, Chathisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, AP has been 
cited as one of the “most Naxal-affected states” in the Red corridor.  Andhra Pradesh 
bred the proper leaders to unify the armed groups, formulate common dogma and 
policies, coordinate intelligence gathering by over ground informants and sympathizers, 
start centralized armed training of core cadres, build a strong arms and explosives 
procurement network, and develop guerilla tactics with overwhelming local 
superiority150.   
                                                 
148 Farooq, Omer.  Why Peace Collapsed in Andhra Pradesh.  BBC, 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4183997.stm 
149 Indian counter-insurgency tactics and strategy, Vijendra Singh Jafa notes, “have remained 
fundamentally conservative and traditional, influenced substantially by accounts of British experiences.” 
150 Achuthan, Col JK.  Strategic Defense Review. Issue: Vol 25.2 Apr-Jun 2010. 
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It is ironic that AP is now being praised for its “successful” anti-Naxalite 
measures, namely rooted in the Operation Grey Hound program.  The Greyhounds have 
used a mix of hyper-technical intelligence and an extensive network of internal spies to 
seek out and kill Naxal leaders and their families.  Again, the link between neo-liberal 
reforms and state sponsored terror is evident in the strategy of Operation Grey Hound, 
with explicit reference to using accelerated development as a means to pressurize the 
Naxalite forces.  In this framework, anyone who objects to power is brutally 
exterminated.  There are many problems with this program; it subjects the whole of the 
anti-displacement, anti-development, or anti-terror lot to extralegal ramifications.  
Anyone who is objecting to the development program, in so far as it is an obstruction of 
his or her livelihood, becomes a Naxalite.  This is displayed in the recommendations of 
the judges of The Independent People’s Tribunal, who coalesced to hear the voices of 
those affected by the programs of Operation Green Hunt, the Indian media’s name for its 
anti-Naxalite paramilitary offensive.  “There is a perception”, said Justice (Retd.) Sawant, 
“within the Government and media that by organising meetings like the IPT, we, 
everyone present in this room are supporting the Maoists and the death of the 76 CRPF 
jawans (officers). Let me clarify this position for once and for all: We are not supporting 
the Maoists. We do not support violence in any form, State or otherwise. We here are 
discussing problems of the tribals and the crisis that is pushing people to a brink of 
desperation and escalating the cycle of violence.”  This position makes it clear that on the 
ground, there is a qualitative difference in the support of Naxalites and the opposition of 
the state-backed development programs that are displacing thousands from their lands.  
Thus, in the discipline of political science there too should be this qualitative difference.  
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Scholars should oppose the situations that lead to widespread Naxalite support in the 
villages, rather than the mob mentality adopted by the Indian state.  Again, Mahapatra’s 
statistics yield direct evidence that “accelerating growth” through SEZ, as suggested by 
the AP government, will not democratically address the root of why the Naxals have been 
able to gain power at lightening speed in AP and elsewhere.  Many citizens would rather 
be ruled by Naxals than be subject to the impoverishing conditions of the SEZ.    
V. BIRTH OF AGRARIAN POPULISM 
Returning to 1947, Nehru’s example has been instructive to Indian politicians of 
all ranks.  Nehru tried desperately to cloak the gravity of the growing civil strife and 
disaccord, with his populist measures.  In reference to his “dazzling address to India” on 
the eve of independence, Chattergee best described this trend when he said that the 
discourse of India’s development became “a single, consistent unambiguous voice” 
(quoted by Sugata Bose in Cooper and Packard 1997:50).  Nehru’s traditional populist 
model of the kind associated with statist politicians and import substitution (ISI) 
economics, was used to manipulate mass opinion.   Part of this encompassing vision, as 
one might have predicted, land reform.  Again, land reform has lost total value as a 
blanket term; rather it must be ranked according to the level of materialist gain it affords 
the peasantry.  Nehru was clearly not advocating the more radical “land-to-tiller” reforms 
of the kind the Telangana activists were fighting for.  He did, however, institute sweeping 
tenancy reforms.  The relevance of these reforms to this study cannot be underestimated; 
it was the intended beneficiaries of Nehruvian populism that have continued to dominate 
AP’s political landscape today.  Needless to say the landless laborers, who were by and 
large Dalit and other backwards castes, were not included in Nehru’s intended to be 
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beneficiaries of Nehru’s program.  Rather, the tenants belonged specifically to the Reddy, 
Kamma and Kappu peasant castes.  In effect, this policy invoked a certain 
“homogenization” of agrarian propertied classes by filling the gaping hole between 
landlords and tenants.  The medium proprietary group was created.  This allowed for the 
Congress to avoid sacrificing power to marginalized folks; instead it built the party 
machine by consolidating its image as “progressive” and “socialistic”.  More incisively, it 
solidified the foundation for a core base of rural elites who would later come to dominate 
the Congress Party’s vote bank.  In summation, it was solely the newly empowered 
peasantry of the Reddy, Kamma and the Kapu castes that benefited from the above 
tenancy reforms (Srinivasulu 2002:6).   
Subsequent to the reforms, all of these dominant castes started vying for power. 
The Reddys found themselves in a fierce competition for leadership positions in the 
Congress Party against the Brahmins, who were in dominant positions both in the party 
as well as government in the early 1950s. But by the mid 1950s the Reddys had 
succeeded in seizing the reigns of the Congress Party from the latter and have continued 
to wield power in the party in AP.  Not surprisingly the Reddy stronghold has led critics 
to caricaturize the Congress as the “Reddy Raj”151.  The below tables are highly 
indicative of this trend.  They classify the power distribution in AP by caste, showing that 
the wide majority of Chief Ministers have been of the Reddy caste since the 1950s.  
S.No. Name Party Tenure Caste 
1 N. Sanjeeva Reddy Congress (I) 01-11-1956 – 10-01-1960 Reddy 
2 D. Sanjeevaiah Congress (I) 11-01-1960 – 11-03-1962 Dalit-Mala
3 N. Sanjeeva Reddy Congress (I) 12-03-1962  – 28-02-1964 Reddy 
4 K. Brahmananda Reddy Congress (I) 29-02-1964 – 29-09-1971 Reddy 
                                                 
151 Gundimeda, Sambaiah. Praja Rajyam Party and Caste Politics in Andhra Pradesh.  May 29th, 2009. 
http://socialjusticeanddemocratization.wordpress.com/ 
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5 P.V. Narasimha Rao Congress (I) 30-09-1971 – 18-01-1973 Brahmin 
 President’s Rule  18-07-1973 – 10-12-1973  
6 J. Vengala Rao Congress (I) 11-12-1973 – 05-03-1978 Velama 
7 M. Chenaa Reddy Congress (I) 06-03-1978 – 10-10-1980 Reddy 
8 T. Anjaiah Congress (I) 11-10-1980 – 24-02-1982 BC 
9 B. Venktram Reddy Congress (I) 24-02-1982 – 20-09-1982 Reddy 
10 K. Vijay Bhaskar Reddy Congress (I) 20-09-1982 – 08-01-1983 Reddy 
11 N. T. Rama Rao TDP 09-01-1983 – 16-08-1984 Kamma 
12 N. Bhaskararao TDP 16-08-1984 – 15-09-1984 Kamma 
13 N. T. Rama Rao TDP 16-09-1984 – 02-12-1989 Kamma 
14 M. Chenna Reddy Congress (I) 03-12-1989 – 17-12-1990 Reddy 
15 N. Janardhan Reddy Congress (I) 17-12-1990 – 08-10-1992 Reddy 
16 K. Vijay Bhaskar Reddy Congress (I) 09-10-1992 – 12-12-1994 Reddy 
17 N. T. Rama Rao TDP 12-12-1994 – 31-08-1995 Kamma 
18 N. Chandra Babu Naidu TDP 01-09-1995 – 11-10-1999 Kamma 
19 N. Chandra Babu Naidu TDP 11-10-1999 – 14-05-2004 Kamma 
20 Y.S. Raja Sekhara Reddy Congress 14-05-2004 —2009 Reddy 
Figure 7: Caste Backgrounds of Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh152  
S.No. Caste 
1 Reddy –     7 
2 Kamma -    3 
3 SC-(Mala) – 1 
4 Brahmin -   1 
5 Velama -    1 
6 BC        -    1 
Total            -    14 
Figure 8: Caste-wise break down of Andhra Pradesh’s Chief Ministers153 
CHAPTER 6: TYING THE LOSE ENDS  
Polepally Village of the Mahbubnagar District occupies an interesting and vibrant 
part of Andhra Pradesh’s history, which might not be guessed from its technologically 
backward and political corrupt climate.  I find it fascinating that this region was, just over 
                                                 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid 
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50 years ago, engaging in a highly energetic revolutionary uprising, and, still today, 
Telangana is fighting for separate statehood. Yet in the face of aggressive development 
plans, the small and marginal peasants of Telangana, along with agrarian communities all 
across India, are paddling hard just to stay afloat.  This is not incomprehensible given the 
austere nature of the neo-liberal regime.   
What I have outlined in the way of economic liberalism’s austerity does not rely 
disproportionately on archaic historical examples.  It is true that in most societies there 
have, since time immemorial, been factions vying for power resulting in an uneven 
distribution of wealth.  I do argue that historical developments, such as the domination of 
the dalams by Reddys during the Telangana armed struggle (1946-1951), have simply 
been capitalized on by modern political strategy.  As such, my more crucial point is that 
modern actors are creating hierarchy in novel ways; whereas before people were bonded 
to more crude and blatant systems of exploitation such as vetti, today economic actors use 
the liberal value of “development” to mask inequality.  In fact, the Special Economic 
Zone Act (2005) encourages the institutionalization of inegalitarian relationships.  To be 
more exact, the mechanism by which the SEZ is passed is highly calculated; it reflects 
what I hypothesize to be a comprehensive state strategy in demobilizing dissent.  As my 
data and interviews showed, the strategy was highly effective in Polepally, as the 
acquisition period brought on atomization in detrimental proportions.  The new 
relationships that emerged from these economic and political ruins are, again, categorized 
by Figures 3 and 4 below.  
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Figure 3: Continuum of those who are most likely to be co-opted by the SEZ actors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Continuum of those who are most likely to be neglected by SEZ actors.  
 
 
Because middle to large pattadors from the Reddy caste became clients in the 
SEZ-driven land acquisition, they were active agents of demobilization of the lower 
castes.  These citizens either were able to preserve the whole of their property or loose 
only part of their lands, leaving their remaining property to escalate in value.  Recall, 
medium to large “landlords” who owned, on average 19.95 acres of land, were able to 
retain 64% of their property, whereas anyone with 10.8 acres or less lost almost all of 
their land to the SEZ.  Given that these are usually contiguous plots of land, it is no 
coincidence that land was acquired mainly from small land holders, STs, SCs, assigned 
land holders and illiterates.  Reddys and landlords ended up profiting through higher 
compensation and being granted employment positions in the SEZs.  They gained the 
recognition and favoritism of local officials.  These measures created an undoubtedly 
populist air in Polepally, consolidating support for the Congress party.  Expectedly, those 
of the poor land-losing sections of Polepally have a grave disdain for the INC.  In a 
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documentary on Polepally by C Vanaja, we see two ladies, Jangamma and Moglimma, 
making a goat offering to the gods, pleading for the “death of YSR”.  When his plane 
crashed in the hills of Andhra Pradesh in July 2009, they celebrated.  The replacement 
Congress Party Chief Minister, K. Rosaiah, continues to express impenetrable support for 
the SEZ today.  In November 2009 he advanced the idea that the “misconception over 
Polepally SEZ” would disappear with the inauguration of pharmaceutical units, citing the 
creation of over 5,000 jobs. “People opposing SEZ should take note of this fact,” he said 
smugly.154   
 
FURTHER RESEARCH REQUIRED AND FINAL REMARKS 
 
The Indian SEZ is not alone in its magnitudinous disregard for farmers’ rights.  
Global land grabbing has become a source of deep concern for peasant scholars all across 
the world, particularly in the Global South.  The recent formation of the Land Deal 
Politics Initiative, a joint effort of five top research institutions in the world, was a 
response to the urgency of the “global land grab”.  According to The Future Agricultures 
Consortium (2009), “The phrase ‘global land grab' has become a catch-all phrase to 
describe the current explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions…”  There 
is a “dramatic re-valuation of land ownership” going on, “as powerful transnational and 
national economic actors tap into lands outside their own borders to provide food and 
energy security at home.”  
This subject matter is gaining more and more importance.  I encourage other 
young scholars who are serious about finding solutions to the agrarian question to invest 
their energy into finding alternatives to land grabbing and debunking populist myths that 
                                                 
154 ‘A.P. Number one in Pharma Exports’ Nov 21, 2009.  The Hindu. 
http://www.hindu.com/2009/11/21/stories/2009112158450100.htm 
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pacify farmers.  As stated a number of times throughout this thesis, neither the Indian 
SEZ Act nor the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, provides a comprehensive rehabilitation 
package to the deprived farmer.  SEZ political actors show no interest in conducting 
impact assessments in regards to different SEZs.  Thus, it is our job as scholars to shift 
the world’s focus to these core issues and ally ourselves with the farmer while producing 
high quality, scientific information on the crisis at hand.   
My research demands that we examine the village with prudence.  The village is a 
microcosm of the larger political trends that are transpiring at the national and even the 
global level.  Aside from my own gain in writing this, I would find my work a 
disappointment unless someone decided to build something atop of it.  In this regards, I 
suggest two key areas in which this research could have further implications.  First, to 
further test the scientific value of my deductions, one could conduct a comparative study 
among Indian or other South Asian states that tests for a correlation between the success 
of neo-liberal policies and the strength of populist politics.  Factors that would signify 
that agrarian populism is ingrained in the political motif of a given place are: the presence 
of personalistic actors, patron-client linkages and bribes (especially during times of 
elections) and the rapid move towards the capitalistic mode in the countryside, either by 
SEZ or other foreign investment-oriented enclaves.  Insofar as crafting a methodology, 
one could design a numerical value system to assign populist characteristics, while 
simultaneously examining the success or failure of marginal farmer resistance.  If there is 
a correlation between the failure of peasant movements and the pervasiveness of agrarian 
populism, there would be further evidence of this strategy for demobilization.  Then 
again, if there was not any degree of neopopulism and the movement still failed, there 
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would be room to reconsider the deductions I have put forth in this thesis.  Of course this 
would require a level of precision in accounting for outside factors that might impact a 
farmer community’s ability to organize, for example the accompaniment of outside 
activists who may have separate agendas.  Secondly, it would be of high value for 
political researchers to embark on a mission in mapping caste relationships in relationship 
to resistance.  Currently, Indian government census, rather unfortunately, does not 
include caste in any of its measures.  This makes it very difficult to notice these 
seemingly glaring cleavages that are created and dissolved to expeditiously pass 
massively unpopular reforms.  Thus, without the work of non-governmental researchers 
making these connections, they are unlikely to be recognized, given weight to and acted 
upon.  Most promising in a caste-based analysis would be the potential to investigate 
whether certain factions of peasantry are capable of waging agrarian revolution in the 
Indian neoliberal context.  The landless peasant and the migratory laborer seemingly have 
nothing to gain from the SEZ and the SEZ actors have no reasons to patronize them.  Are 
landless peasants willing and able to resist global land grabs? This would be an extremely 
interesting subject to delve deeper into.  
Finally, this thesis set sail from a position where conflict, dissent, and rebellion 
are in fact legitimate factors to consider in assessment of development models.  Aspiring 
researchers must come to value political rebellion as an academic subject in itself.  In a 
recent letter to the Planning Commission of India titled Development Challenges in 
Extremist Affected Areas an expert group advises “dissent or expression of dissatisfaction 
is a positive feature of democracy (emphasis added)” and that “unrest is often the only 
thing that actually puts pressure on the government to…live up to its own promises.” The 
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group further expresses concerns about the Indian Government’s egregious violations of 
the right to protest, where even “non-violent agitations are met with severe repression” 
(2008).    
Ultimately, it must be remembered that peoples’ movements, often working to 
give “land to the tiller” (the most crucial form of poverty alleviation) and reclaim control 
of strained resources, are rooted in a local consciousness of deprivation.  At the same 
time, these movements often have impacts far beyond the local scene.  In Telangana, 
revolutionaries have moved thousands of metropolitan activists, intellects, and young 
people to think about their terms of power differently (Balagopal 1997).  They have 
inspired people to take matters into their own hands and have effectively, “turned power 
on its head”, stealing a line from Ranajit Guha (1999).  If we ever wish to truly 
understand the nature of the agrarian question, we must rigorously enforce dialectical 
relationship with those millions upon millions of small farmers who are now coming into 
contact with the austere tentacles of the global neoliberal regime.  
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Appendix: Survey of Polepally People 
 
Survey Administrator: Samantha Agarwal  
 
Village: Polepally          Mendal: Jadcherla       Block: Mahbubnagar  State: AP 
   
 Section: Family Information 
A1. What is your name? _______________________ 
 
A2. What is your date of birth? ____________________ 
 
A3. Gender: 1. Male         2. Female 
 
A4. Marital status? 
1. Married             2. Unmarried          3. Divorced/Separated      4. Widowed 
 
A5. Type of family: Joint______ Nuclear________ 
 
A6. Women headed household? Y_____ N_____ 
 
A7. Relationship to head of the household: 1. Spouse   2. Parent   3.Sibling 4.Grandparent     
5.Cousin   6.Child 7.Self  
 
A8. List each child, their age, gender, literacy and level of education.  
 
Child Age Gender Literate? Education 
Yes No  
   0 1  
   0 1  
   0 1  
   0 1  
   0 1  
   0 1  
   0 1  
 
A9. Till what level have you studied? __________________ (Record exactly)  
 
A9a. (If Married) Till what level has your husband/wife studied? ________(Record 
exactly) 
 
A9b. Till what level have your parents studied? 
Father: __________________________ Mother: ______________________________ 
 
A10. What is your current occupation (circle all that apply)? 1. Working on my own land 
2. Daily wage in agriculture 3. Daily wage in SEZ companies. 4. Full time employed in 
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SEZ companies 5. Business 4. Teacher 6. Government Job 7. Contractor 8.Housework 9. 
Student 10. Retired 11. Other (Specify)_______ 
 
A10a. (If Married) What is your husband/wife’s occupation? 1. Working on my own 
land 2. Daily wage in agriculture 3. Daily wage in SEZ companies 4. Full time employed 
in SEZ companies 5. Business 4. Teacher 6. Government Job 7. Contractor 8.Housework 
9. Student 10. Retired 11. Other (Specify)_______ 
 
A11. Caste/ Jati-biradari/ Tribal name? ______________________________ 
 
A11a. Sub caste: _________________________________ 
 
A12. Religion: 
 1. Hindu   2. Muslim3. Christian  4. Sikh    5. Buddhist   6. Jain  7. Parsi  8. Other 
  
 Section: Living Stability 
B1. Have you been living in this village for past 3 yrs or more? Y_____N_____  
 
B2. Have you stayed away from home in the last 3 years for more than 60 days? 
Y____N____ 
B2a. If yes, what is your usual activity at time of migration? 1. Agricultural Labor 2. 
Non-agricultural labor 3. Searching for fodder 4. Visiting relatives 5. Seeking refuge 6. 
Other_____ 
 
B3. Have you or any of your family members been suffering from any severe or recurring 
illnesses?  List sicknesses of family members.  
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
B3a. What are your annual medical expenses? ______________________ 
 
B3b. Have there been any deaths in your family in the past 10 years? Y___N____  If 
Yes, what was the cause of death? 1. Suicide 2. Heart attack 3. Stroke 4. Accident 
5.Alcoholism 6. Disease 7. Other (explain)________ 
 
B4. House type: 1. Pacca with concrete roof 2.Pacca with terracotta roof 3.Pacca 
with straw roof house 4. Mud hut 5.Homeless  
 
B4a. Indirama Gandhi house?  Y____N_____ 
 
B5. Vehicles: 1. Cycle 2.Motorbike 3.Moped 4.Rickshaw 5.Car/truck 8. None 
 
Section: Agricultural Labor (only for individuals with jobs in agriculture) 
C1. How many hours/day do you labor on a field? ________ 
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C2. How much of the land that you labor on belongs to you? _______acres.  
 
C3. How many months out of the year do you work agriculture labor?  ______ 
 
C4. Have you been jobless at all in the past 5 years? Y___N____ If yes, for how 
long were you jobless? ________ 
 
C5.  Why were you jobless? 1.Work finished and couldn’t find new work 2.Land 
was purchased 3.Was fired 4. Job discrimination 5.Other 
(specify)_____________________________________________  
 
Section: Land Ownership (only for families who own land or have owned land in 
past 15 years)  
D1. How many acres of land does your family own today?__________ 
 
D1a. How many separate plots? _________ 
 
D1b. Average distance from house?_________ km  
 
D2. Ownership: 1.Inherited (pattah) 2.Government assignment 3.Ceiling 4.Sharecrop 
5.Leased Sharecrop 6. Purchased 7.Other (specify)____________ 
 
D2a. How much of the land is pattah ________ How much is assigned __________?  
 
D3. What year did your family acquire the land? ________ 
 
D4. Has your family ever sold any land? Y______ N______ If yes, how much? 
_______acres What year did you sell your land? _________ 
 
D4a. Reason for selling: 1.Government development project (SEZ) 2. Private 
development project (real estate) 3.Distress sale/needed money 4.Other 
(explain)__________________________________ 
 
D4b. How much money was paid for that land? _________rs    
 
D4c. How long after you sold the land did it take for you to receive the money? _______ 
 
D4d. What did you do with the money? ___________________________ 
 
D4e. Were you given the option to sell that land (as opposed to being forced into selling 
it)? Y____N_____ 
 
D4f. After you sold your land, were you or any of your family members employed in the 
companies? Y_____N______  
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D5. Have you purchased any land in the past 15 years? If yes, what year did you buy it? 
______ How much did you buy?___________  
 
D5a. Did someone help you in purchasing the new land? Y_____N______ Who? 
 
 Sub Section: If the person lost his/her land, ask about the last year they farmed. 
If they did not lose their land, ask about 2008.  
 
D6. Utilization of land: 1. Commercial crops 2. Vegetables 3. Herbs 4. Fruits 5.Other 
trees 6. Fallow 7. Non-agricultural use 8.Leased out 9. Land was sold 
 
D7.  Agricultural Items: 1. Disc plates for turning soil 2.Plough 3.Harrow (for inter 
cultivation small/big blade) 4. Gorru (for seeds) 5.Dhindel (weeding) 6.Threshers 
(harvesting machine) 7.Grain processing machine 8. Spraying machine 9.Culavera 10. 
Bullock cart 10. Tractor 11. Cattle (If you check cattle, how many animals do you 
own?_________)  
 
D8. Irrigation (circle all that apply): 1. Bore well 2. Tank 3. Pond canal 4. Drip irrigation 
5. Check dam 6. Have, but not working 7. All crops are rain-fed..  
 
D9. Is any of your land fallow? Y____N____ If yes, why? 1. Poor soil 2. Lack of water 
3. No resources to cultivate 4. Labor shortage 5. Needs leveling 6. Needs de-stoning  
 
D10. How long has it been fallow? ______ 
 
D11. Amount spent annually on growing? ________  
 
D12. Total cost of your living (when you owned land)? _______rs/year  
 
D13. Amount spent annually on growing crops? ________ 
 
D14. Annual profit from farming _________rs? 
 
D15. How do you sell your goods? A. Middle man comes to the land to buy from 
individual.  B. Individually goes to farmers’ market and sells. C. Other 
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The Following Chart applies to the most recent year in which the farmer has grown crops on his/her own land. Provide 
year_______________.  
 
Top 5 
Crops  
Number 
of 
Varieties 
Grown 
of Crop  
Yield 
(Quintals) 
% Sold and 
% 
Consumed  
Pest 
Management? 
How much 
spent on this? 
Fertilizers? 
Organic or 
Chemical?  
Crop 
failure?  
     Yes No 
      0 1 
      0 1 
      0 1 
      0 1 
      0 1 
  
Section: Family Income/Debt. 
E1. What is your annual cost of living today? ________ 
 
E2. Have you taken any loans in the past 15 years?  Y____N______ 
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E3. Amount taken? _______  
 
E4. From whom? A. Private bank B. Government bank C. Friend/family D. NGO 
 
E5. Have you ever been in debt? Y_____N_____For how long?_____________ 
 
E6. Amount paid?______ Amount owed still?___________ Interest?_________  
 
 Section: Participation in Government and Other programs 
F1. How many ration cards does your family get? ________ What kind of card is it?____ 
 
F2. Do you have an NREGS (100 days work) job card? Y____N_____  
 
F3. If YES, how many days did you work under NREGS in 2008? _____ 
 
F4. What was your average daily wage under NREGS?_____ 
 
F5. How many hours have you worked for NREGS in 2009? ______ 
 
F6. What kind of work were you doing under NREGS?  1.Agricultural labor 2. Building 
roads 3. Building bunds 4. Digging holes 5. Chopping trees 6. Collecting wood 
 
F7. Are you a part of any self-help group/ sangham? Y____N_____ 
 
 
 
